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BTATE DEFARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

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FPG/HDR by

Date: 3/17/96

With trawait No.

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By Mara Date VD 105



Department of State TELEGRAM

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DRAFTED BY: NIGERIA TASK FORCE - RPSMITH APPROVED BY: NIGERIA TASK FORCE - RPSMITH AF/CW - MR. SCHAUFELE: (SUBS) AF - MABASSADOR MOORE (SUBS) S/S - MR. BROWN EUR/FBX - MR. MARESCA (SUBS) 66636

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S E C R E T STATE 048938

EXDIS

C B R R E C T E B C O P Y (PORTION OF NUMBERED PARA T GARBLED) SUBJECT: HOUPHOUET BOIGNY VIEWS ON NIGERIA/BIAFRA.

REFERENCE STATE: 47724

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE FROM PARIS MAR. 298

QUOTE

PARIS 4554

EXDIS

STATE RPT AS DESIRED

SUBJ: HOUPHOUET BOIGNY VIEWS ON NIGERIA/BIAFRA

REF STATE 47724

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BV MMARA Date V 5/05



# TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATEL 048938

I. SUMMARY: I MADE POINTS CONTAINED REFTEL, HOUPHOUET SAID HE WANTS ATTEND MONROVIA MEETING IN EFFORT FIND AFRICAN SOLUTION TO NIGERIAN CONFLICT, STARTING WITH TALKS BETWEEN NIGERIA AND BIAFRA WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS.

2. I SAW PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET BOIGNY MORNING MARCH 29: TO DELIVER DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON HIS BROPOSALS. I ALSO STRESSED ONE AGAIN THAT UNITED STATES DOES NOT WISH TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN POLITICAL ASPECTS OF PROBLEM AND BELIEVES INITIATIVE. IN THIS AREA SHOULD COME FROM AFRICANS.

3. HOUPHOUET AGREED THAT AFRICANS SHOULD TAKE INITIATIVE
IN POLITICAL FIELD AND SAID THIS IS REASON HE BADLY WANTS:
ATTEND MONROVIA MEETING. HOWEVER, NO POINT HIS ATTENDING AS
OBSERVER WITHOUT RIGHT TO SPEAK AS TUBMAN ORIGINALLY PROPOSED.
HE SAID TUBMANIHAS REPLIED TO HIS MESSAGE REQUESTING RIGHT TO
SPEAK BY SAYING THAT HE HAS NO OBJECTION BUT MUST CONSULT OTHER!
MEMBERS OF OAU CONCOM. HOUPHOUET SAID HE WILL BE SEEING PRESIDENTS:
MOBUTU AND DIORI HERE IN PARIS DURING NEXT WEEK TO TRY AND GET
THEIR SUPPORT FOR HIS ATTENDANCE OF MONROVIA MEETING. HOUPHOUET
ENVISAGES EITHER HIMSELF ATTENDING, ALONG WITH HONMINS FROM
TANZANIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES RECOGNIZING BY AFRA: OR NYERERE ATTENDANCE ALONG WITH FORMINS FROM
TANZANIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES RECOGNIZING BY AFRA: OR NYERERE ATTENDANCE OF STATE FROM
COUNTRIES RECOGNIZING BY ATTENDANCE ALL CHIEFS: OF STATE FROM
COUNTRIES RECOGNIZING BY AFRA.

4. HOUPHOUET SAID HE HAD ALSO INFORMED TUBMAN OF DUNKWURS AGREEMENT TO ATTEND MEETING AT MONROVIA UNDER CONDITTIONS LAID DOWN BY TUBMAN: THAT IS NO PRECONDITIONS AND NO AGENDA. HOUPHOUET SAID THAT HE BELIEVES MONROVIA MEETING SHOULD TRY AND WORK OUT AGREED POSITION AMONG AFRICAN STATES WHICH WOULD BE PRESENTED TO NIGERIA AND BIAFRA, MUCH AS FOUR POWERS ARE PRESENTING IDEAS TO ARABS AND ISRAEL!

5. HOUPHQUET SAID THAT HE SAW FIRST STEPLAT MONROVIA MEETING.
AS BEGINNING OF TALKS: BETWEEN NIGERIAN AND BIAFRAN DELEGATIONS: WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. HE HAS ASSURANCES FROM QUIKWULTHAT THIS IS AGREED.
ABLE TO HIM. AFTER THAT AFRICAN CHIEFS OF STATE SHOULD ATTEMPT COME!
UP WITH PROPOSALS ON SEVERAL MAJOR POINTS, SUCH AS: TOTAL ARMS:
EMBARGO

WITH EFFECTIVE!:CONTROLS: APPLICABLE: TO NIGERIA AND BIAFRA. (HE: SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED USER UK FRANCE: AND AFRICANI COUNTRIES:

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INVOLVED IN ARMS TRAFFIC AS FALLING UNDER EMBARGO PROPOSALD FUTURE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO PARTIES: UN-CONDITIONAL CEASE FIRE; AND DELIVERY RELIEF SUPPLIES. IMPORTANT
THING IS FOR AFRICAN CHIEFS OF STATE TO AGREE ON PROPOSALS. AND GET TWO SIDES TALKING WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. HOUPHOUET SAID HE FLEXIBLE AS TO PRECISELY WHAT AGREEMENT BETWEEN AFRICAN CHIEFS:
OF STATE SHOULD INCLUDE BUT THOUGHT THERE SHOULD BE "CONCESSIONS ON BOTH SIDES." HE THOUGHT SITAUTION WORSENING IN BOTH NIGERIA AND BIAFRA SO THEY MIGHT BE ANXIOUS TO ACCEPT PROPOSALS PUT TO THEM BY AFRICAN CHIEFS OF STATE.

IF GOWON WOULD MEET OUNKWU WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, THIS

WOOLD BE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION, ACCORDING TO HOUPHOUETS

5. HOUPHQUET SAID HE HAD JUST RECETVED MESSAGE FROM OUUKWU ASKING WHETHER OR NOT HE SHOULD MEET PRIME MINISTER WILSON. THERE HAVE BEEN TWO OR THREE DIFFERENT PROPOSITIONSMADE BY UK OVER RADIO PERTAINING TO OUUKWUWWILSON, MEETING, BUT NOTHING HAS BEEN HEARD "DIRECTLY" FROM UK, ACCORDING TO HOUPHQUET.
THIS WAS UNSATISFACTORY WAY OF DOING BUSINESS. NEVERTHELESS, HE HAD REPLIED TO OJUKWU THAT IF WILDON REALLY WISHED HET HYM, OJUKWU SHOULD AGREE DEALLY, WILSON SHOULD COME TO BIAFRA TO SEE WHAT IT IS REALLY LIKE HOWEVER, IF HE UNWILLING DOUTHIS HOUPHOUET RECOMMENDED THAT OJUKWU AGREE MEET WILSON IN SIERRA LEONE .

6. CONCERNING RELIEF FLIGHTS (PARA 5 REFTEL) HOUPHOUET SAID: HE UNDERSTOOD OUR HUMANITARTANI CONCERN. HOWEVER, HE WAS FIRM IN SAYING THAT QUUKWU WOULD NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT DAYLEGHT FLEGHTS:
ORIGINATING IN NIGERIAN TERRITORY, OR EVEN HAVING FLEGHTS ORIGINATELES WHERE AND TOUCH DOWN SYMBOLICALLY AT NIGERIAN AIRPORT ELSEWHERE AND TOUCH DOWN SYMBOLICALLY AT NIGERIAN AIRPORT CONTROLLED BY ICRC OR OTHER NEUTRAL BODY. I WAS UNABLE TO BUDGE HIM ON THIS. HE SAID THAT OUT WULREADY ACCEPT DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS FROM FERNANDO PO WITH ALL BAFEGUARDS (INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS) LAGOS WISHED PUT ON LOADING OF PLANES THERE FICE HE REPLIED NEGATIVELY TO MY QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THERE WAS ANY OTHER POINT OF DEPARTURE ACCEPTABLE TO OJUKWU'S

7. COMMENT: HOUPHOUST DID: NOT SAY SO DIRECTLY BUT LEFT IMPRESSION HE WILLING TO COMPROMISE ON QUESTION BIAFRAN SOVEREIGNTY PROVIDED FMG WILLING MAKE CONCESSIONS (UNSPECIFIED) ON ITSESTOE. HE WAS VERY CLEAR IN SUPPORTING TALKS BETWEEN NIGERIA AND BIAFRA,

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
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EVEN BETWEEN OJUKWU AND GOWON, WITHOUT PRELIMINARY CEASE FIRE. HE WAS ALSO VERY CLEAR AS TO HIS DESIRE MAKE MAJOR EFFORT ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SOLUTION AT MONROVIA MEETING DAU CONCOM. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT ASK FOR IT, I BELIEVE THERE IS MERIT IN DISCREETLY SUPPORTING HOUPHOUET'S REQUEST THAT HE OR NYERERE ATTEND MONROVIA MEETING AS OBSERVER WITH RIGHT SPEAK. IF NOT GIVEN RIGHT SPEAK. I BOUBT VERY MUCH HE WILL CONSIDER GOING AND IT COULD SPELL END OF HIS EFFORT FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

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SUBJ: HOUPHOUET BOIGNY VIEWS ON NIGERIA/BIAFRA

REF : STATE 47724

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1. SUMMARY: I MADE POINTS CONTAINED REFTEL! HOURHOUET SAÎD HE WANTS ATTEND MONROVIA MEETING ÎN EFFORT FIND AFRICANI SOLUTION TO NIGERIAN CONFLICTA STARTING WITH TALKS BETWEEN NIGERIA AND BIAFRA WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS.

2. I SAW PRESIDENT HOUPHQUET BOTGNA MORNING MARCH 29. TO DELIVER DEPARTMENT S VIEWS ON HIS PROPOSALS. I ALSO STRESSED ONCE AGAIN THAT UNITED STATES DOES NOT WISH TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN POLITICAL ASPECTS OF PROBLEM AND BELIEVES INTILATIVE IN THIS AREA SHOULD COME FROM ARRICANS

P 3. HOUPHQUET AGREED THAT AFRICANS SHOULD TAKE INSTITATIVE IN POLITICAL FIELD AND SAID THIS IS REASON HE BADLY WANTS ATTEND MONROVIA MEETING HOWEVER NO POINT HIS ATTENDING AS OBSERVER WITHOUT RIGHT TO SPEAK AS TUBMAN ORIGINALLY PROPOSED.
HE SAID TUBMAN HAS REPLIED TO HIS MESSAGE REQUESTING RIGHT TO SPEAK BY SAYING THAT HE HAS NO OBJECTION BUT MUST CONSULT OTHER! ı MEMBERS: OF: QAU CONCOME HOUPHQUET, SAID! HE WILL BE SEELING PRESIDENTS: QUENTY AND DIORI HERE IN PARIS: DURING NEXT WEEK TO TRY AND GET THEIR SUPPORT FOR HIS ATTENDANCE OF MONROVIA MEETING HOUPHOUET TO SAID! HERE ATTENDING! ALONG WITH FORMINS FROM TANZANIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES REEDGAIZING BIAFRA: OR: NYERERE ATTENDING! ALONG WITH FORMINS FROM TANZANIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES REEDGAIZING BIAFRA: OR: NYERERE ATTENDING! ACCOMPANIED BY FORMINS' FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. HE DOES NOT SEE!

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PAGE 02 PARIS: 04554 291442Z

NEED OR DESIRABILITY FOR ATTENDANCE ALL CHIEFS OF STATE FROM COUNTRIES RECOGNIZING BIAFRA.

4. HOUPHOUET SAID HE HAD ALSO INFORMED TUBMAN OF QUUKWUMS:
AGREEMENT TO ATTEND MEETING AT MONROVIA UNDER CONDITTIONS L'AID
DOWN BY TUBMAND THAT IS, NO PRECONDITIONS AND NO AGENDA. HOUPHOUET
SAID THAT HE BELIEVES MONROWIA MEETING SHOULD TRY AND WORK OUT
AGREED POSITION AMONG AFRICAN STATES WHICH WOULD BE PRESENTED TO
NIGERIA AND BIAFRA, MUCH AS FOUR POWERS ARE PRESENTING IDEAS TO
ARABS AND ISRAELS.

5. HOUPHOUET SAID THAT HE SAW FIRST STEP AT MONROVIA, MEETING:
AS BEGINNING OF TALKS BETWEEN NIGERIAN AND BLAFRAN DELEGATIONS WITH DUT PRECONDITIONS. HE HAS ASSURANCES FROM OULKWU THAT THIS IS AGREE.
ABLE TO HIM. AFTER THAT AFRICAN CHIEFS OF STATE SHOULD ATTEMPT COME.
UP WITH PROPOSALS ON SEVERAL MAJOR POINTS. SUCH AS: TOTAL ARMS.

WITH EFFEGTIVE CONTROLS: APPLICABLE TO NIGERIA AND BIAFRA (HE SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED USSR, UK) FRANCE AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN ARMS TRAFFIC AS FALLING UNDER EMBARGO PROPOSAL); FUTURE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO PARTIES; UNA CONDITIONAL CEASE FIRE; AND DELIVERY RELATE SUPPLIES. IMPORTANT THING IS FOR AFRICAN CHIEFS OF STATE TO AGREE ON PROPOSALS, AND GET TWO SIDES TALKING WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. HOUPHOUET SAID HE FLEXIBLE AS TO PRECISELY WHAT AGREEMENT BETWEEN AFRICAN CHIEFS: OF STATE SHOULD BE "CONCESSIONS ON BOTH SIDES." HE THOUGHT THERE SHOULD BE "CONCESSIONS ON BOTH SIDES." HE THOUGHT SITAUTION WORSENING IN BOTH NIGERIA AND BIAFRA SO THEY MIGHT BE ANXIOUS TO ACCEPT PROPOSALS PUT TO THEM BY AFRICAN CHIEFS OF STATE.

IF GOWON WOULD MEET OJUKWU WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, THIS WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION, ACCORDING TO HOUPHOUET.

5. HOUPHOUET SAID HE HAD JUST RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM OJUKWUL ASKING WHETHER OR NOT HE SHOULD MEET PRIME MINISTER WILSON.

THERE HAVE BEEN TWO OR THREE DIFFERENT PROPOSITIONSMADE BY UK OVER RADIO PERTAINING TO OUDKWU WILSON MEETING, BUT NOTHING HAS BEEN HEARD! "DIRECTLY" FROM UK, ACCORDING TO HOUPHOUET.

THIS WAS UNSATISFACTORY WAY OF DOING BUSINESS. NEVERTHELESS, HE HAD REBLIED TO OJUKWU THAT IF WILDON REALLY WISHED MEET HIM OJUKWU SHOULD AGREE. IDEALLY, WILSON SHOULD COME TO BIAFRA TO SEE WHAT IT IS REALLY LIKE. HOWEVER, IF HE UNWILLING DOITHIS, HOUPHOUET RECOMMENDED THAT OJUKWU AGREE MEET WILSON IN SIERRA

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6. CONCERNING RELIEF FLIGHTS (PARA 5 REFITEL) HOUPHOUET SAID
HE UNDERSTOOD OUR HUMANITARIAN CONCERN. HOWEVER, HE WAS FIRM IN
SAYING THAT OJUKWU WOULD NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS.
ORIGINATING IN NIGERIAN TERRITORY, OR EVEN HAVING FLIGHTS ORIGINATE
ELSEWHERE AND TOUCH DOWN SYMBOLICALLY AT NIGERIAN AIRPORT
CONTROLLED BY ICRC: OR OTHER NEUTRAL BODY. I WAS UNABLE TO
BUDGE HIM ON THIS. HE SAID THAT OJOKWU READY ACCEPT DAYLIGHT
FLIGHTS FROM FERNANDO PO WITH ALL SAFEGUARDS (INCLUDING
INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS) LAGOS WISHED PUT
ON LOADING OF PLANES THERE, ETC. HE REPLIED NEGATIVELY TO
MY QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THERE WAS ANY OTHER POINT OF
DEPARTURE ACCEPTABLE TO OJUKWU.

7. COMMENT: HOUPHOUET DID NOT SAY SO DIRECTLY BUT LEFT
IMPRESSION HE WILLING TO COMPROMISE ON QUESTION BIAFRAN SOVEREIGNTY
PROVIDED FMG WILLING MAKE CONCESSIONS (UNSPECIFIED) ON ITS SIDE.
HE WAS VERY CLEAR IN SUPPORTING TALKS BETWEEN NIGERIA AND BIAFRA,
EVEN BETWEEN OJUKWU AND GOWON, WITHOUT PRELIMINARY CEASE FIRE. HE
WAS ALSO VERY CLEAR AS TO HIS DESIRE MAKE MAJOR EFFORT ACHIEVE:
PEACEFUL SOLUTION AT MONROVIA MEETING DAU CONCOM. ALTHOUGH HE:
DID NOT ASK FOR IT, I BELIEVE THERE IS MERIT IN DISCRECTLY
SUPPORTING HOUPHOUET'S REQUEST THAT HE: OR NYERERE ATTEND MONBOVIA
MEETING AS OBSERVER WITH RIGHT SPEAK. IF NOT GIVEN RIGHT SPEAK.
I DOUBT VERY MUCH HE WILL CONSIDER GOING AND IT COULD SPELL END
OF HIS EFFORT FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

SHRIVER

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
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USIA 10	NSA 3	CIA	NSC	POLIZ NIGERIA POL NIGERIA
-/-	-	20	6	On March 19, during a class discussion on the subject of "Peace
				Efforts from Kampala to Addis Ababa", Professor E.I. Essien-Udom,
SUGGE	ESTED D	ISTRIB	UTION	Head of the Department of Political Science made a few observations
				on the current Nigerian situation.
				Idea December 11 . D. 12 . D. 1 . The state of the state
				Why Peace Efforts Have Failed: Essien-Udom did not think that the rebels have really negotiated in good faith in an effort to reach
				repers have rearry negotiated in good laith in an ellow to reach
				some sort of settlement with the fodoral managentatives This
				some sort of settlement with the federal representatives. This
				some sort of settlement with the federal representatives. This lack of good faith was due to a number of factors. The most important, and perhaps insuperable, barrier was the so-called siege
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	POST RO		Initials	some sort of settlement with the federal representatives. This lack of good faith was due to a number of factors. The most important, and perhaps insuperable, barrier was the so-called siege mentality which seemed to pervade all aspects of life in rebel held territory. He thought that the rebels were captives of their
				some sort of settlement with the federal representatives. This lack of good faith was due to a number of factors. The most important, and perhaps insuperable, barrier was the so-called siege mentality which seemed to pervade all aspects of life in rebel held territory. He thought that the rebels were captives of their own propaganda efforts and that they believed the stories which
TO:				some sort of settlement with the federal representatives. This lack of good faith was due to a number of factors. The most important, and perhaps insuperable, barrier was the so-called siege mentality which seemed to pervade all aspects of life in rebel held territory. He thought that the rebels were captives of their own propaganda efforts and that they believed the stories which were carried on their radio and which they told visitors. The
TO: AMB/ PO				some sort of settlement with the federal representatives. This lack of good faith was due to a number of factors. The most important, and perhaps insuperable, barrier was the so-called siege mentality which seemed to pervade all aspects of life in rebel held territory. He thought that the rebels were captives of their own propaganda efforts and that they believed the stories which were carried on their radio and which they told visitors. The rebels have such a complete lack of trust in the federal pronounce-
TO: AMB/ PO DCM				some sort of settlement with the federal representatives. This lack of good faith was due to a number of factors. The most important, and perhaps insuperable, barrier was the so-called siege mentality which seemed to pervade all aspects of life in rebel held territory. He thought that the rebels were captives of their own propaganda efforts and that they believed the stories which were carried on their radio and which they told visitors. The
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TO: AMB/PO DCM POL ECON				some sort of settlement with the federal representatives. This lack of good faith was due to a number of factors. The most important, and perhaps insuperable, barrier was the so-called siege mentality which seemed to pervade all aspects of life in rebel held territory. He thought that the rebels were captives of their own propaganda efforts and that they believed the stories which were carried on their radio and which they told visitors. The rebels have such a complete lack of trust in the federal pronouncements that it almost makes no difference what representatives of the FMG say because they will be disbelieved. Essien-Udom also thought that Ojukwu was not completely a free man. He felt that Ojukwu was hemmed in by his own "hawks" in the senior ranks of
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Arms Embargo: Essien-Udom did not think that an arms embargo was either desirable or practical. It would be impossible to "police" such an embargo and there are sufficient international arms dealers that would be willing to profit from breaking an embargo. An embargo would only result in both sides having to pay more for their war material. In addition, both sides had already demonstrated some capacity to manufacture their own supplies.

No Cease Fire: Essien-Udom said that federal Nigeria could not accept a cease fire for the simple reason that it would result in the rebels achieving what they wanted. He reasoned that a cease fire would result in the "de facto" recognition by federal Nigeria that the rebels controlled some sort of territory. International observers would be imposed between the two forces and Ojukwu would then have his frontiers in effect guaranteed by foreign troops. Ojukwu would have no incentive to negotiate in good faith. On the contrary, negotiations could be dragged out as long as desired. Finally, he predicted that Ojukwu would mobilize world opinion to call for the withdrawal of federal troops from the pre-war borders of the East Central State and "Biafra" would then be an internationally guaranteed state.

How to End the War: Essien-Udom was pessimistic about ending the war. The only suggestion he had as to a possible means of reaching a negotiated settlement was in the form of a question: "Is there any country which has sufficient influence with Ojukwu to get him to see where the best interests of the Ibos lie and also can get the FMG to offer the sorts of guarantees which might be acceptable to the Ibos?"

 $\underline{\text{COMMENT:}}$  Essien-Udom is a well-informed South-Eastern minorities man who is a strong supporter of the FMG.

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SUBJ: SOVIET POSITION ON NIGERIA

1. COUNSELOR DANISH EMBASSY (PROTECT) ASKED IF WE HAD ANY INFORMATION ABOUT REPORT HIS MINISTRY RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM FRENCH SOURCES (PRESUMABLY PARIS) THAT SOVIETS HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH BIAFRAN REPRESENTATIVES.

2. AS STATED REFYEL, WE SEE NO SIGNS HERE OF CHANGE IN SOVIET SUPPORT FOR NIGERIAN UNITY. THIS POSITION STRONGLY REAFFIRMED BY IZVESTIYA MARCH 27, WHICH DENOUNCED FINANCIAL TIMES REPORTS: ABOUT SOVIET-BIAFRAN CONTACTS AS LIES AND INVENTIONS SWANK

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON s/s 3432 Attention mis mullett Microfilm. Reep this study together. March 28, 1969 also 620370 (H. Howe) 9/11/75 5-C-121 NISERIA This document released to public per Buship AF public per Dear Wilbur: Thank you for your letter of March 10 forwarding a copy of a letter from James L. Gay about the Nigerian civil war. Mr. Gay's thoughtful letter is obviously written

on the basis of personal knowledge and background gained during his two years in Nigeria. The Department has had access to the facts explained by your constituent and is giving full consideration to the suggestions he made.

That we share Mr. Gay's deep concern for the civilian victims of the war was emphasized by the President in his statement of February 22 expressing the nation's anguish for the terrible human suffering in Nigeria and announcing the appointment of Mr. C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr., as Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War. I have enclosed a copy of the statement which sets forth the Government's position on the war, as well as the mandate given to Mr. Ferguson.

I am also enclosing other information on the Nigerian situation which may be of further assistance in explaining the Government's position regarding this problem.

The Honorable Wilbur D. Mills, House of Representatives.

AF JWIRW FAVILLE: 26-3/18/69

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s/s-RF

BIAFRA- NISERIA

If you would like more information on this matter, please let me know.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

iam P. Rogers

#### Enclosures:

- Disaster Relief Report, 2/15/69 The President's statement,
- 2/22/69
- The Nigerian Relief Problem

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PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE NAMING OF A SPECIAL COORDINATOR ON RELIEF TO THE CIVILIAN VICTIMS OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

I know that I speak for all Americans in expressing this nation's deep anguish for the terrible human suffering in the Nigerian civil war. It is tragic enough to watch a military conflict between peoples who once lived together in peace and developing prosperity. But that tragedy has been compounded, and the conscience of the world engaged by the starvation threatening millions of innocent civilians on both sides of the battle.

Immediately after taking office, I directed an urgent and comprehensive review of the relief situation. The purpose was to examine every possibility to enlarge and expedite the flow of relief. This very complex problem will require continuing study. I am announcing, however, the following initial conclusions of the review:

- 1. The Red Cross and the Voluntary Agencies are now feeding nearly 1 million people in areas of the war zone controlled by the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. They fully expect the numbers will grow in magnitude over the coming months. This, therefore, will require additional support for the international relief effort from donor countries, and of course the continued cooperation of Federal authorities.
- 2. There is widely conflicting information on future food requirements within the Biafran-controlled area, where the relief operation is feeding an estimated two million persons. The United States Government therefore is urgently seeking a comprehensive, internationally conducted survey of food needs in that area.
- 3. Whatever the results of such a survey, it is already clear that the present relief effort is inadequate to the need in the Biafran-controlled area. The major obstacle to expanded relief is

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neither money, food, nor means of transport. The main problem is the absence of relief arrangements acceptable to the two sides which would overcome the limitations posed by the present hazardous and inadequate nighttime airlift.

- 4. The efforts of outside governments to expand relief are greatly complicated by the political and military issues that divide the contestants. Unfortunately, the humanitarian urge to feed the starving has become enmeshed in those issues and stands in danger of interpretation by the parties as a form of intervention. But surely it is within the conscience and ability of man to give effect to his humanitarianism without involving himself in the politics of the dispute.
- 5. It is in this spirit that U.S. policy will draw a sharp distinction between carrying out our moral obligations to respond effectively to humanitarian needs and involving ourselves in the political affairs of others. The U.S. will not shrink from this humanitarian challenge but, in cooperation with those of like mind, will seek to meet it.

With the above conclusions in view, I am pleased to announce that Secretary of State Rogers has today appointed Mr. Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., a distinguished American civic leader and Professor of Law at Rutgers University, as Special Coordinator on relief to civilian victims of the Nigerian civil war. He will be charged with assuring that the U.S. contributions to the international relief effort are responsive to increased needs to the maximum extent possible and that they are effectively utilized. In so doing, he will give particular attention to ways and means by which the flow of relief can be increased to the suffering on both sides of the battle line. He will, of course, work closely with the ICRC and other international relief agencies, the Organization of African Unity, donor governments, and with the parties to the conflict.

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The Special Coordinator will not seek and will not accept a charge to negotiate issues other than those directly relevant to relief.

Nevertheless, the U.S. earnestly hopes for an early negotiated end to the conflict and a settlement that will assure the protection and peaceful development of all the peoples involved.

February 22, 1969

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#### THE NIGERIAN RELIEF PROBLEM

On February 22 President Nixon, reiterating the deep concern of the nation for the terrible human suffering in the Nigerian civil war, announced the appointment by the Secretary of State of Mr. Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr. as Special Coordinator on relief to the civilian victims of the Nigerian civil war. Mr. Ferguson is charged with assuring that the US contributions to the international relief effort are responsive to increased needs to the maximum extent possible and that they are effectively utilized. He will give particular attention to ways and means by which the flow of relief can be increased to the suffering on both sides of the battle lines. He will work closely with the relief agencies engaged in the international relief effort.

Since May 1968 the United States has been providing active assistance to the international relief effort mounted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other organizations. The ICRC derives its role from the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims and has had the support of both the Federal Military Government (FMG) of Nigeria and the Biafran authorities. In addition UNICEF, the World Council of Churches, Caritas International, the Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, and many other organizations are directly concerned with supplying relief to the needy in both the Biafran and the Nigerian controlled areas.

#### Dimensions of the Relief Problem

The civil war in Nigeria has brought about serious food shortages in the former Eastern Region, which proclaimed itself the Republic of Biafra in May 1967, and certain areas in the Mid-West State. The best estimates available indicate that by May of this year as many as 4.5 or 5 million people on both sides of the battle lines may be in need of relief. The situation is worst in the area still under Biafran control, which during the course of the war has been reduced to an enclave about one-sixth of its original size. There are no reliable figures on the death rate in Biafra. Reports from relief experts on the scene vary, but it is clear that large numbers have died, particularly children afflicted by malnutrition. However with the delivery of protein foods through the international relief effort, the death rate is substantially lower than it was in the summer of 1968.

Food and medicines are being distributed to the suffering in the Nigerian Government-controlled areas with its cooperation. Relief supplies can only enter Biafran-held territory through or over Federal territory and most of these supplies have been brought in by the night airlifts of the ICRC and Joint Church Aid from Fernando Po and Sao Tome respectively. Despite the decline in the mortality rate, it is now feared that local carbohydrate foods are being exhausted. This portends

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an intensification of the disaster, unless the parties can reach agreement on badly needed daytime airlifts and surface relief corridors.

#### The Relief Impasse

Because relief entering Biafra is limited at present to supplies airlifted by night, strenuous efforts have been made to open up additional corridors. Despite proposed safeguards, the Biafrans have consistently opposed the overland relief corridors the Federal Military Government (FMG) has offered, while proposing a water route which has been unacceptable to the FMG for military reasons. Most observers believe that surface corridors are the only means of conveying adequate supplies to the needy in Biafra. For its part, the Federal Government was initially opposed to the air corridors preferred by the Biafrans because of concern that they would be used to bring in military supplies as well. It subsequently indicated its acquiescence in the ICRC night airlift from Fernando Po. In September 1968 the FMG made a temporary agreement with the ICRC for daylight relief flights into the main Biafran airstrip at Uli but the Biafran authorities refused their agreement. In early November the FMG again told the ICRC that it would agree to daytime relief flights to Uli, Biafra's major operational airstrip, specifying only that no arms flights occur at the same time. The Biafrans have recently expressed agreement in principle to daytime relief flights, but thus far have not indicated willingness to grant facilities at Uli. Instead they have proposed that a new relief airport should be created. Replacement of night flights by daylight flights would significantly increase the inflow of relief supplies.

#### Allegations of Genocide

The Biafrans have raised charges of genocide against the Nigerians. In response, the Federal Government invited the UK, Canada, Sweden, and Poland as well as the UN and the Organization of African Unity to form international observer groups at the front to satisfy themselves and to help reassure the Biafrans that Federal forces behave with discipline and restraint.

The initial report of the international observer team noted that "there is no evidence of any intent by the Federal troops to destroy the Ibo people and the use of the term genocide is in no way justified" and that "the Federal troops in the area are taking positive action to obtain the confidence of the local population and to assist them in re-establishing a normal life." Subsequent reports of this team and those of the representatives of the OAU and the UN have continued to support these findings.

#### Arms Supplies

The US does not sell or otherwise supply arms to either side. This policy was announced four days after the outbreak of hostilities

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in July 1967. The Soviet Union has not followed our example. In August 1967, it began to sell to the Federal Government military equipment, including modern jet aircraft, an action which the US strongly deplored in a public statement at the time. The Soviets continue to sell to the FMG substantial quantities of arms.

Neither the US nor the USSR has been a traditional arms supplier, but the UK, as the former colonial administrator, has historically trained and equipped Nigerian forces. It has taken the position that to refuse to continue to sell arms to a Commonwealth member facing an armed secession would amount to a pro-rebel action. In the UK view such action would reduce Western and increase Soviet influence in Nigeria.

Since September 1968, there has been an influx of foreign arms on the Biafran side. The provision of arms from abroad is believed to have stiffened Biafran resistance and to have prolonged the war.

#### Negotiations

Unsuccessful discussions in Uganda in May 1968, under the sponsorship of the Commonwealth Secretariat, were followed by negotiations between the parties in the summer under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity, first in Niger and then in Ethiopia, which also became deadlocked.

The negotiations in Addis Ababa adjourned prior to the September 13 meeting in Algiers of the heads of state of the OAU, where all but four member states supported the Nigerian position. The same majority confirmed its earlier position that the problem should be treated in an African context and called on UN member nations to avoid taking action prejudicial to the territorial integrity, unity and peace of Nigeria. The OAU heads of state asked the Consultative Committee on Nigeria to continue efforts to bring about peace. Thus far the Committee has not succeeded in bringing the two sides to the conference table again.

#### US Policy

Our concern for this human tragedy is deep. Humanitarian, political, and military factors are interwoven in this situation, and it has been the policy of the US Government to avoid politico-military involvement by channeling our support for the international relief effort through the non-political International Committee of the Red Cross and through UNICEF and American relief agencies, which have cooperated with it. The Federal Government of Nigeria has taken the position that all international relief efforts should be coordinated through the ICRC.

In consultation with other governments and with the Secretary General of the United Nations, we have explored the possibility of UN consideration of the Nigerian crisis. The great majority of member states, including almost all of the African states as noted above, have

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viewed the crisis as an internal political problem of civil war and secession and have been opposed to formal United Nations consideration. In our search for practical measures to alleviate the suffering and to help bring about a satisfactory resolution of this tragic situation, we are, however, keeping the possibility of United Nations action under continuing review.

This Government has the deepest sympathy for the suffering victims of the war. We believe that the prevention of wholesale famine is of crucial importance. We continue to back efforts by the OAU and the ICRC to bring about agreement on daytime relief flights and on the opening of land corridors to the needy in Biafra. We have appealed to the parties to subordinate the political issues of the war in the interest of reaching agreement on relief. We have fully supported the Commonwealth Secretariat and the OAU efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement and both publicly and privately backed the December 21 appeal to both sides by the Emperor of Ethiopia for a seven-day truce. We are, of course, not able to impose a solution, but we continue to press for an early negotiated settlement to the conflict.

#### The Relief Effort

In the areas under the control of the Federal Government, thousands of tons of food, medicine, and other relief supplies are stockpiled. Supplies are distributed from Lagos, Enugu, Calabar, Agbor and Port Harcourt by trucks and landrovers, cargo aircraft, helicopters, barges, and coastal ships. Most of the relief supplies for Biafra have been stockpiled on the offshore islands of Fernando Po and Sao Tome for delivery by airlift. Here thousands of tons have been accumulated, and large cargo aircraft have been used for transport. The amounts of relief supplies reaching Biafra has recently averaged 3,000-4,000 tons per month. The ICRC estimates that it has been feeding 850,000 in Biafra through its airlift from Fernando Po and 850,000 to 1 million in areas under Federal Government control. Additionally, Joint Church Aid, a group of religious organizations including Caritas and Church World Service, has delivered large quantities of food into Biafra from Sao Tome and estimates that it is distributing food to almost a million persons.

A problem which recently developed for the airlift was the banning on January 6 of ICRC night flights from Fernando Po by the Government of Equatorial Guinea (GEG). We and other governments actively assisted in efforts to iron out this problem. While the matter was under active discussion between the ICRC and the GEG, the Government of Dahomey concluded an agreement with the ICRC initiating relief flights to Biafra from Cotonou. On February 12 the GEG agreed to a renewal of night flights from Fernando Po for 30 days. We hope this agreement may be extended.

The United States has thus far made about 60% of the global contribution for relief in Nigeria/Biafra. The US Government has donated

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a total of \$25 million in cash and surplus food commodities. Of this total \$6.2 million in cash has been provided to the International Red Cross which has used a major part for the chartering of aircraft for the airlift to Biafra. On December 27 the US Government announced that it was making available for the airlift at nominal cost eight C-97G cargo aircraft no longer needed by the US Air Force--four to the ICRC and an additional four to the American voluntary agencies participating in Joint Church Aid. Four aircraft have been delivered to the American agencies. The transfer of the remaining four aircraft to the ICRC is underway. These aircraft are to be used solely for transporting relief

Surplus food commodities (dried milk, bulgur wheat, and high protein blended food products totaling over 23,000 tons), provided to Catholic Relief Services, UNICEF, Church World Service, and the World Food Program are valued at \$17.3 million, including freight costs. The US Government also pays overseas transport costs of the relief supplies donated by accredited American voluntary agencies.

The private voluntary organizations of the US have made substantial donations of food and other supplies totaling more than \$7.3 million on behalf of the relief effort.

#### RELIEF SUMMARY

US Government	\$24,991,700	)
PL 480 food and transport co	osts \$17,291,700	
ICRC	6,200,000	
General Relief Items	285,000	
Voluntary Agency Transport o	costs 1,215,000	
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US Voluntary Agencies
(for which figures are available)

7,268,062

\$32,259,762

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

#3432

TO:

The Secretary

March 21, 1969

THROUGH:

FROM:

AF - Joseph Palmer 2nd Sharks

SUBJECT:

Reply to Congressman Wilbur D. Mills'

Letter about the Nigerian Civil War

ACTION MEMORANDUM

POL 27 BIAFRA-MIGERIA

C C

BIAFRA- NIGERIA

**DISCUSSION:** 

Congressman Mills' letter of March 10 together with an enclosed letter from his constituent, James L. Gay, is attached at Tab B. Mr. Mills requested "your thinking" about his constituent's view of the conflict.

A brief response drawing from the President's statement of February 22 appointing Special Coordinator C. Clyde Ferguson and enclosing information about the Nigerian war and relief activities is attached at Tab A for your signature.

#### RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter to Congressman Mills. (Tab A)

Attachments:

Tab A - Suggested Response.

Tab B - Letter from Congressman Mills.

cc: U, J and C.

3/20/69 AF/W:RWFaville:oh

Clearance: Nigeria Task Force:

RMMelbourne

H - JLeahy

WILBUR D. MILLS 2D DIST., ARKANSAS F789999-1011

CHAIRMAN:
COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS
JOINT COMMITTEE ON
INTERNAL REVENUE
TAXATION

#### Congress of the United States House of Representatives

Washington, D.C.
March 10, 1969

3432

The Honorable William E. Rogers

Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Bill:

I am taking the liberty of forwarding to you the enclosed copy of a letter from an Arkansas Evangelist of the Church of Christ.

As you will note from his letter, he has spent an appreciable amount of time in Nigeria and is personally familiar with many of the problems and leaders there and it may well be the thoughts he expresses on this subject will be helpful to you in formulating future policy.

At your convenience, I would appreciate having the benefit of your thinking on what he has to say.

With kindest personal regards and best wishes,  $\ensuremath{\mathbf{I}}$  am

Sincerely yours,

Wilbur D. Mills

Enclosure WDM/mac

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BALD KNOB, ARKANSAS 72010

March 4, 1969

PHONE PARKVIEW 4-3632

The Honorable Wilbur D. Mills, Congressman The House of Representatives of the United States Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

I want to call your attention to an article in the March 'Co Reader's Digest, page 75, entitled "A Nation Is Dying". I spent two years in Migeria, landing there on July 29, 1966, the day the present military dictator came to power by the assessination of the head of the federal government, General Ironsi, and the Governor of the Western Region, Col. Fajuyi, along with the sleughter of many other leading men and army officers, who were from what later became known as Biafra. I want to say that the article very aptly describes the situation there; though, of course, there is much more, and I am not alone in this feeling. Missionaries, U.S.A.I.D. workers, Europeans there for business, and many educated Nigerians, feel the same way, because I have talked to many in my travels in the Western and Mid-Western regions. I worked and worked with those people from Eastern Nigeria who had migrated from their native villages seeking employment and found that those from that area were the most progressive causing them to be resented bitterly by their Nigerian brothers.

I am quite aware that tribalism has been a fire flaming on both sides, and non-Ibos have suffered in this war in the east, but the Ibos are fighting for survival, the massacres where the federals have been will show that. All the tribes in the east will, and are suffering at the hands of the occupying forces where they have been "liberated", because the other tribesmen didn't know there was any tribal differences, generally speaking, until the present junta started trying to set them all against the Ibos, the majority tribe of the east. I know there will be occurrences of bad treatment by the Ibos on others, but I can't help but wonder what effect continual mistreatment would have on me.

Britian's part in that conflict has been tremendous. Both she and Russia are vying with each other for personal gain. Russia's policies are well known to be lacking in scrupples, but until I saw what a liar and lacking in conscience the British government could be for money and diplomatic advantage, I thought of her much more highly. It seems to me that the price is too high in Nigeria at the present, if one must sell these millions of struggling people down the drain. We are told that 2,000, 000 have already died; it is probably much more than that, since that is such a thickly populated area anyway, even without the refuge problem. I know Britian wants the north in po wer over there, because she can get what she wants through the powerful muslim emirs of the north; this has been her methods of operation in the past, but how are we going to sleep at night knowing the blood-curdling fact that she and Russia are helping the northern tribes murder, by war and famine, millions of people who have as much right to live as we. I feel diplomatic pressure must be applied to

BINTEM- MIGERIA

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By MNARA Date 05 505

cause Britian and Russia, along with the other smaller countries who are supplying arms to those Nigerian criminals to cease. Migeria needs to be made to allow the East to secede. The only reason she has gotten away with wholesale murder thus far is there has been a conspiracy of silence on what was going on over there. She and her buddies have blocked every open discussion they could. It is past time for people to be taking more action on this act of criminality.

Some may wonder West-Eastern Nigeria seceded in the first place. Even after they were slaughtered like animals in the north and west, especially the north, the leaders of the east tried for almost a year of negotiating to settle their differences. Even Yoruba leader Awolowo finally came out publicly to state that the east was being forced out of the federation and if they went the Yorubas would also. The Aburi meetings, which Ojukwu thought settled their differences, accomplished nothing. What Gowon had agreed to was rejected by the northerners immediately after his return from Ghana, one agreement was to take the northern occupation forces out of Yoruba-land. This was not done, along with other things, which showed that what the easterners thought was agreed in good faith was nothing but another, and typical stall. The East then announced their date of succession and were threatened by military attack if they tried it. They stood their ground and the fighting began.

I feel the following is needed to correct the situation there:

1. Diplomatic pressure on arms suppliers and Nigeria.

2. More publicity which will cause people to be more concerned here and abroad.

5. More relief for those victims in Biafra in "liberated areas, where they are starving, like the ones encircled by the federal forces. Churches are helping, and the Red Cross, there is still not nearly enough; one reason is shortage of finances.

4. If the Nigerian army follows it usual procedure when their efforth have been frustrated, they will retaliate against those of the eastern tribes still remaining in the west. Lagos and Ibadan will be especially dangerous for them. The Gowon regime fears publicity, however, so observers should also be in the west and mid-west.

I am sure that you are aware that anything we do over there now cannot do us much harm, as far as Nigeria is concerned. They are angry with us already for helping those poor starving people they want to kill by starvation, and they have been suspicious of Americans anyway for quite sometime since they know many of us sympathize with the easterners. But this is also true of the other expatriates, including the Britons, therefore when our U.S.I.S. was stoned recently, in Ibadan, so was the British consulate building. (Our Consulate offices happens to be about six floors up in an office building.) Some of our preachers have been having difficulty getting a visa to work there and we have been wondering why. I just received a letter from some of my co-workers in Migeria today which states that Migeria has now been officially closed to Americans. We will not be able to replace the man that should come home this summer, and he most likely will not be permitted to stay past the time his visa expires because of impossibility of renewal, with the present regime. We are not the only ones having this trouble. The Sudan Interior Mission has also been notified that visas will not be available for Americans.

I want to apologize for such a lengthy letter. I realize you have much correspondence, but this is of such importance, and the welfare of these poor people weighs so heavily on my mind.

I hope you will use your good offices to help us, If I can be of any assistance, please call.

Sincerely, James L. Gay, evang.

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Authority WN 075 1503

By WN ARA Date 05 105

RS/R

Dear Mr. Mills:

Thank you for your letter of March 10 forwarding a copy of a letter from James L. Gay about the Nigerian civil war.

Mr. Gay's thoughtful letter is obviously written on the basis of personal knowledge and background gained during his two years in Nigeria. The Department has had access to the facts explained by your constituent and is giving full consideration to the suggestions he made.

That we share Mr. Gay's deep concern for the civilian victims of the war was emphasized by the President in his statement of February 22 expressing the nation's anguish for the terrible human suffering in Nigeria and announcing the appointment of Mr. C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr., as Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War. I have enclosed a copy of the statement which sets forth the Government's position on the war, as well as the mandate given to Mr. Ferguson

I am also enclosing other information on the Nigerian situation which may be of further assistance in explaining the Government's position regarding this problem.

If you would like more information on this matter, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

William P. Rogers

Enclosures:

- Disaster Relief Report, 2/15/69
- The President's statement, 2/22/69
- 3. The Nigerian Relief Problem

The Honorable

Wilbur D. Mills,

House of Representatives.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VV) 95 1503

BV MV ARA Date V 5 105

RS/R

TO:

The Secretary

March 21, 1969

THROUGH: s/s

FROM:

AF - Joseph Palmer 2nd

SUBJECT:

Reply to Congressman Wilbur D. Mills' Letter about the Nigerian Civil War ACTION MEMORANDUM

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#### RECOMMENDATION!

That you sign the letter to Congressman Mills.

#### Attachments:

Tab A - Suggested Response.

Tab B - Letter from Congressman Mills.

3/20/69 AF/W:RWFaville:oh

Clearance: Nigeria Task Force:

RMMelbourne

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RS/R

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Sincerely yours,

William P. Rogers

Enclosures:

1. Disaster Relief Report, 2/15/69

2. The President's statement, 2/22/69

3. The Nigerian Relief Problem

Honorable Wilbur D. Mills, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. 20515

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAN	CONTROL NO. AFW
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AF - Mr. Alexander	DATE 3/13/69
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By Whara Date 0 5 65

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MARCH 28, 1969

Honorable Donald E. Lukens House of Representatives Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Lukens:

POL 27 BIAFRA-

The Secretary of State has asked me to thank you for your letter of January 28, 1969, setting out your thoughts concerning the Nigerian civil war.

I understand that you have subsequently discussed with officials of the Department of State most of the matters raised in your letter. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs is temporarily absent from Washington and I believe you intend to leave the country later this week. If, after your return from the Far East, you wish to discuss the Nigerian or other African problems in greater depth, Mr. Palmer or other members of the African Bureau will be happy to meet with you. By that time Dean Clyde Ferguson will have returned from his trip and will, I am sure, be happy to review his observations with you.

Sincerely yours,

William B. Macomber, Jr. Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations

Clearances:
Nigeria Task Force Mr. Melbourne
AF - Ambassador Moore (draft)

H - Mr. Leaky

AF/W:RWFaville:ba:las 3-26-69 S/S #763 RS 33747

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BIATRA- NIGERIA

FORM.DS-1563 46	DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ACTION SLIP	)	S/S 763	Ī
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SUBJECT Ltr to S	fm LUKENS dtd 1/28 re on in Nigeria.			ıt
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For your informa	tion.			
REMARKS		SECRETARY AF	DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1969 JAN 31 AM 10 23 0FFICE OF THE ASST.	
S - Mr. U - Mr. H - Mr. IO - Mr.				
	V		George Kelly SECRETARIAT STAFF EXT. 4735	

Authority WND 959593

By Whara Date U 5100

DONALD E. "BUZ" LI 24TH DISTRICT, OHIO "BUZ" LUKENS

ONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING AREA CODE 202: 225-6205

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT: JOHN E. SCHROTE

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

January 28, 1969

COUNTIES:

DISTRICT OFFICES: 311 RENTSCHLER BUILDING HAMILTON, OHID 45011 AREA COOE 513: 893-9369

202 Pickwick Building Middletown, Ohid 45042

AREA CODE 513: 423-4641

RREN, BUTLER, CLINTON,
HAMILTON (PART),
MONTGOMERY (PART)

ACTION is assigned to

The Honorable William Rogers Secretary of State Washington, D. C.

Dear Secretary Rogers:

First of all, let me thank you for your courtesy in taking the time out from your busy schedule to talk to me on January twenty-seventh. Secondly, may I say in advance that I offer my suggestions with deep humility and real sincerity. Certainly not in the yein of an and real sincerity, certainly not in the vein of an amateur advising a professional how to proceed in a very delicate situation.

I wish to serve the cause of world peace without harm to my country and without unduly affecting productive activities on the part of this Administration or the State Department. It is only out of a real concern for these countries that I find the courage to forward the following observations.

- (1) An immediate cease fire Whatever we are doing, it seems to have produced no results at the time of this writing. I sincerely urge that we employ every measure short of armed intervention to persuade the Federal government to come to a cease fire. Since they are in a superior military position, it is obvious that a cease fire initiative must come from the side with the capability militarily to support daily bombing (unopposed) and with the capacity to initiate major ground offensives.
- (2) One area I feel we can do more is in the area of massive relief. I feel that our country can offer more aircraft, more medical and food supplies, and offer to fly them over any and all routes. I do not think this posi-tion of our Government which I support has been clearly explained or adequately promoted to the American public.

WIGHTHIME IN INCH 1-29-69

/s/ Buz Donald E. Lukens

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- (3) Only after one of the two previous steps, hopefully both, has been achieved can the two belligerents ever sit down to a table to discuss a permanent peace settlement. It is unfortunate, but the continued fighting only intensifies the distrust and suspicion in the minds of both the Nigerians and Biafrans. I think that time alone is the only thing which will allow these factors to dissipate to the point where intelligent and sensible consideration of a permanent settlement can occur.
- (4) It seems to me that our country should consider immediately the very real possibility of establishing in cooperation with the Gabonese government a children's hospital, along the lines of the proposal of the Schweitzer Foundation. In endorsing this humanitarian effort, I think the United States can only gain in (a) increasing favorable relations with the government of Gabon, (b) increasing favorable world opinion as to America's genuine humanitarian posture, (c) underlining the emphasis which the Nixon Administration and the people of this country place on peace in the world generally, and (d) promoting the cause of peace in Paris by showing that we are sincere in our efforts around the world to affect honorable peace for all people.
- (5) I make the additional point that I believe African nationa especially—and nations in the world generally—are more willing now to accept black Americans as Ambassadors to their country. The last few years has seen a rise in civil rights activities and a terrific increase in the participation and demands for participation by black Americans, and I think these activities have generated a new healty respect for black Americans everywhere. Several Africans mentioned to me on their own initiative that black Americans were certainly making their pressure felt and increasing their influence on the American scene, domestically and internationally.
- (6) I further suggest that a change of faces in the Nigerian Embassy without harming the careers of the personnel involved would be a good move. If we are locked into our present policy, with in all candor, sir, I feel has been unproductive in producing peace, then I feel we must create some political maneuverability which a physical change in personnel would allow.

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I think it important also from the standpoint of reexamination and re-evaluation that we search most thoroughly for any new idea or suggestion which could possibly increase the hopes for a peaceful settlement in Nigeria.

Thank you for your courtesy in considering the foregoing.

Sincerely,

Donald E. Lukens

DEL:jks

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Authority VV) 95 1503

BV/WMARA Date 0 5 05





MARICAN COUNCIL OF YOUNG POLITICAL LEADERS





The American Council of Young Political Leaders is to be commended for its efforts in seeking international understanding. The Council strives to bring together young political leaders of all nations to examine the problems and opportunities of the world now and in the future.

— Senator Mike Mansfield Majority Leader, United States Senate The American Council of Young Political Leaders deserves high praise for its activities. Programs such as those conducted by the ACYPL bring us ever closer to the universal goal of international cooperation.

— Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen Minority Leader, United States Senate

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BV MMARA Date (U5 05)


THE YOUNG DEMOCRATIC CLUBS OF AMERICA AND THE YOUNG REPUBLICAN NATIONAL FEDERATION . . .

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. . . are united in the belief that the politically active youth of today will in large part shape the political structure of the future. Even today young politicians are increasingly assuming positions of responsibility in their respective countries. In the developing nations, this phenomenon is an important fact of political life, as the young tend to be the most highly educated and motivated segment of the population. In the United States, the increasing youthfulness of elected office holders is caused not only by a rapidly declining average age but by an upsurge of political activism on the part of young people.





In 1961, 32 Members of the 87th Congress were under the age of 40. The 90th Congress contains over 55 Members under 40. Of some 7,000 state legislators, over 1,100 are active Young Democrats or Young Republicans. In addition, thousands of other elected state and local officials are active in the youth arms of their parties.

Most of these persons will be moving on to higher elective office, and will ultimately form the core of the elected leadership of this country. In today's world, preparation for service in public office increasingly requires a broad awareness of world problems and international issues.

With this in mind, the Young Democratic Clubs of America and the Young Republican National Federation have joined together to open and maintain lines of communication between young political leaders of the United States and those of other nations. In this way, aspiring young politicians of this country can equip themselves with an understanding of those problems of interdepend-



ence among nations which will confront them in the course of their political careers. Conversely, young political leaders from abroad will, through their association with Young Democrats and Young Republicans, come to a fuller understanding of the workings of the American political system.


The leadership of the Young Democratic Clubs of America and the leadership of the Young Republican National Federation have formed the American Council of Young Political Leaders in order that they might jointly originate, finance, and implement programs leading to increased cooperation and understanding among young political leaders of the world. In this effort, the American Council of Young Political Leaders is undertaking the following projects:

— A comprehensive program of young political leader exchanges, beginning with the nations of Europe and extending to other countries when possible.

— Visits to this country by young political leaders from abroad. Conferences with high officials and prominent academicians in this country, arranged by the










American Council of Young Political Leaders, have provided visiting young political leaders with both a practical and an academic understanding of American politics.

— An annual Foreign Policy Conference in Washington, D. C., for Young Democratic and Young Republican leaders from all over the country. The aim of this Conference is both to explain the process by which American foreign policy is made and to illuminate the policies that result from this process.

— Preparation of young American political leaders invited to participate in young








political leader activities in foreign countries so that they may more effectively explain American foreign policy and also understand the political framework of the country they are visiting. This preparation takes the form of briefings, seminars, and working papers.

— A number of six month internships in the United States Congress for qualified young political leaders from abroad. It is hoped that this program will be enlarged to provide political internships for young American political leaders in foreign countries.

— An essay contest in the College Young Democrats and College Young Republicans, the winners to participate in an international meeting of young political leaders.

— Correspondence and an exchange of materials relating to United States domestic and foreign policy with foreign young political leaders and their national organizations.


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— An international newsletter for distribution in this country among Young Democrats, Young Republicans, and other interested persons. This newsletter will report on the activities and programs of the American Council of Young Political Leaders.

— Planning for and implementing such other programs as will lead to understanding and cooperation among young political leaders of the world.



Photos: 1. Visiting young political leaders in front of the U. S. Capitol.
2. Senator George McGovern greets young politicians from abroad.

3. Informal meeting with Senator Charles Percy.

4. At the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

5. Representative Donald Lukens addresses a luncheon.

6. Visiting young politicians participate in a local panel of poverty workers.


The American Council of Young Political Leaders is a bi-partisan, non-profit educational corporation jointly directed by the Young Democratic Clubs of America and the Young Republican National Federation.

The American Council of Young Political Leaders receives no support from the United States Government. It relies for support solely on individuals, corporations, and foundations that believe international understanding and cooperation among young political leaders to be a worthy goal.

Contributions, bequests, legacies, devises, transfers, and gifts to the American Council of Young Political Leaders are tax deductible under sections 170, 2055, 2106, and 2522 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

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By MMARA Date 0 5 05

1616 H STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 202 347-9353



This document released to public per the AF 9/11/15 this study together A n, D.C. 20520 3969 March 19, 1969 Letter sent direct from White House. RMoose to RLBrown 5/21/69. Bah Johnson ENR enfor COPIES TO: MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: Letter to the President from the Student Council of the Vatican's North American College Enclosed is a letter to the President from the Student Council of the North American College at the . Vatican. The letter was presented to our Embassy in Rome with the request that it be eonveyed to the President; the Embassy subsequently pouched the letter to the Department for transmittal to the White House. The letter expresses the Student Council's eoneern about the eivil war in Nigeria and urges the President to use his influence to bring the contending sides to the negotiation table. In view of the fact that the President addressed the seminarians at the North American College during his visit to the Vatican on March 2, the Department believes that a response signed by a member of the White House staff on behalf of the President would be appropriate and well received. A suggested reply is enclosed for your signature; if you concur, the letter eould be delivered to the Student Council by the Embassy's liaison officer to the Vatiean. Walsh John P. Acting Executive Secretary Enclosures: 1. Letter from the Student Council of the North American College at the Vatican.

Suggested Reply.

EUR - Mr. Ruhan Springsteen

3/18/69

- Mr. Waeh

Clearanee:

EUR/AIS: CKJohnson/ld

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S/S:RF

EUR/AIS

AF/W

#### Suggested Reply

Dear Members of the Student Council:

The President recalls with pleasure his meeting with you at the Vatican on March 2. Upon his return to Washington, your letter concerning the tragic Nigerian war was brought to his attention, and he has asked me to reply on his behalf.

The President shares the concern for human suffering which you have so eloquently described in your letter. He has recently appointed Mr. Clarence C. Ferguson, Jr., as Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian War. It will be Mr. Ferguson's task to assure that U.S. contributions, which to date have accounted for 60% of international assistance to war victims, are responsive to increased needs to the maximum extent possible.

On the diplomatic side, our efforts to promote negotiations between the two contending parties have been earnest and urgent. Through quiet diplomacy, we have supported the efforts

The Student Council,

North American Council,

Via del Gianicolo 14,

Rome, Italy.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority WN 95 1503

By Mr. Ara Date 0 5 65

efforts of organizations in a position to help promote negotiations. We regret that these endeavors have yet to be successful, but will continue to offer our support and encouragement in the hope that an early settlement in Nigeria can be achieved.

Sincerely yours,

Henry A. Kissinger

Clearance:

EUR - Mr. Puhan

AF/W:RJWach/EUR/AIS:CKJohnson/ld

3/18/69

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Authority VND 95 1503

By MARA Date 0 5 65



#### NORTH AMERICAN COLLEGE

VIA DEL GIANICOLO 14

ROME

POSTAL ADDRESS: VATICAN CITY STATE

Dear Mr. President,

On January twentieth in your Inaugural Address, you assured the entire world that the most important goal of your administration was that of promoting peace throughout the world. A world plagued by wars and the threat of war received from you a promise of respite. It is in the spirit of sharing your goal of peace that we bring this petition concerning the Nigeria-Biafra war to your attention.

Our concern about this problem recently was given a stimulus by the eyewitness testimony of both Nigerian and Biafran dignitaries visiting here in Rome. Their description of the grimness of a situation of appalling hunger and suffering, and their impassioned pleas for help are partly responsible for bringing our concern to conscious awareness.

As a result, we have come to see that this is not just a Nigerian problem, nor is it only an African problem. Historically it is in large part the fruit of Western colonialism. Currently the situation is complicated by the dependence of these peoples of a developing area upon various rich nations to sustain themselves in conflict.

We are not diplomats proposing specific solutions, Mr. President. Instead our request for action flows from the moral issue, the supreme value of human life, which far transcends the issues of boundaries, alliances, and economics. Our concern is that expressed by the February eighth statement of Pope Paul VI to the convened Catholic religious leaders of the areas in conflict: "It is not for us... to suggest a concrete political plan, but it is our duty... to declare solemnly that it is not by war, but by sincere negotiations, not in an atmosphere of opposition, but in one of cooperation, that the wished-for solution of the controversy will be found."

What is particularly tragic in this Nigerian-Biafran matter is that negotiations to cease hostilities have not come to issue; and measures to end the displacement of people and the disruption of human life still seem remote and wanting in support.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority WN 0 95 9503

By Mara Date 0 5 05



#### NORTH AMERICAN COLLEGE

VIA DEL GIANICOLO 14

ROME

POSTAL ADDRESS: VATICAN CITY STATE

We ask therefore, Mr. President, that you would employ the full influence of your office to bring the two parties to the conference table as soon as possible. Your impartial encouragement in the direction of peace talks can only hurry the day of peace.

Respectfully,

The Student Council in behalf of the Students of the North American College

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VN ) 95/15/03

By MN: ARA Date 0/5/05

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By MMARA Date 0 5 05

#### CONFIDENTIAL

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that this is going to be a long war, we must reconcile ourselves to that fact and re-arrange our national affairs accordingly." Paper suggested four-point economic and political program: 1) elect or appoint constituent assembly to prepare new constitution; 2) begin probe of assets of the federal officers; 3) appoint fiscal commission for allocation of revenue and 4) prepare new development plan.

The March 19, 1969, edition of the Tribune pointed out "The Way Forward" (see enclosure number 2). The paper said "... In our view the time has come for a civilian government ... we are convinced that if we are to steer ourselves out of the present morass, a civilian government is not only desirable but imperative." In explanation, the paper claimed that "... at present the Nigerian Army is saddled with the onerous task of administering the country in addition to fighting a civil war." To hand over to a civilian regime would be, in the eyes of the Tribune, only following the declared aim of the FMG: "The method of appointing or (preferably) electing such a civilian government ... can be settled by the Supreme Military Council."

The third editorial on March 20, 1969 (see enclosure number 3), came out even more strongly for a civilian government. It claimed that "whether a government is military or civilian is irrelevant to the fighting of a war." The army should not be "distracted by having to administer the country." The example of the American Civil War is cited. The editorial ended with a call for the army "... to put into the civil war all the concentration of which it is capable and all the resources and skill at its disposal. But it cannot effectively do so while it is saddled with the full-time occupation of governing the country. That is why a return to civilian rule is now urgent and imperative."

The final (so far) editorial in the series appeared in the March 21, 1969, edition of the <u>Tribune</u> (see enclosure number 4). The editorial merely reinforced the <u>suggestion</u> that "it is in the interest of the country... and of the Nigerian Army that we return to civilian rule." The paper concluded: "Some critics have accused some of the military leaders of behaving as if they did not want the war to end. Others have said that the corrective regime has in fact corrected nothing. The most effective answer to these critics is an immediate return to civilian government."

The only other newspaper comment to date appeared in the Lagos-based Sunday Times of March 23, 1969. In a full front page editorial the Times rejected the call of the Nigerian Tribune for a return to civilian rule as an "Invitation to Chaos" which was "irresponsible and ... unpatriotic." The paper said "The armed forces took over a united country. They have an obligation to hand over a united country back to the elected representatives of the people." The paper called for "over-ambitious civilian leaders" to have patience and concluded that "at the proper time, the right people can take over the country."

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By MNARA Date 05505



## Department of State

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SUBU: NIGERIA: SOVIET VIEWS:

Por 1 22 of the an interpretary TOOAY TO 1. SOV FIRST SECTY MAKARON CAME, BY EMB. TODAY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON NIGERIA. IN ADDITION TO AFFIRMING STRONG SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ONE NIGERIA, HE MADE FOLLOWING POINTS!

2. BRITISH WERE! MAKING SERIOUS: MISTAKE IN: PUTTING SO MUCH. PRESSURE: ON FMG. TO MODIFY ITS: NEGOTIATING POSITION AND RESTRAIN ITS: MILITARY FORCES. FMG. HAD: STATEO THAT EVERYTHING WAS NEGOTIABLE EXCEPT ISSUE: OF SOVEREIGNTY. THIS: WAS REASONABLE: POSITION: AND: FMG. COULD! NOT CONCEDE MORE WITHOUT SURRENDERING: PRINCIPLE: OVER: WHICH: CONFLICT WAS BEING: FOUGHT. PRESSURE: SHOULD! BE: BROUGHT TO BEAR! ON BIAFRANS TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY. SETTLEMENT WAS IMPOSSIBLE UNTIL! THEY ACCEPTED CONCEPT OF ONE! NUGERIA.

3. BRITISH: HAVELNOT SOUNDED! OUT SOWIETS: ON QUESTION! OF ARMS: EMBARGO. WHEN FORSEC STERART RAS: QUESTIONED!

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## Department of State TELEGRAM

Pal 27 Biafra - Nigeria

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UNCLAS LONDON 2469

SUBJECT: NIGERIA: STEWART ON ARMS: EMBARGO:
REF: LONDON'S: 2120 - Por 27 Brafra - rigeria

de Por 17 USSR-UK

1. FOLLOWING EXCHANGE OCCURRED IN HOUSE MARCH 27 BETWEEN FONSEC STEWART AND LABOR BACKBENCHER MICHAEL BARNES.

2. QUOTE • MR. BARNES: IS: MY RIGHT HON • FRIEND: AWARE
THAT THE RUSSIAN: EMBASSY INL LONDON: DOES: NOT APPEAR:
TO BE AWARE OF ANY PROPOSITION ABOUT ANI ARMS: BAN HAVING
BEEN PUT TO IT BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT? IN VIEW OF THAT,
WILL MY RIGHT HON FRIEND SAY WHY HE IS SO DEFINITE:
ABOUT THE REFUSAL OF THE RUSSIANS: TO COOPERATE IN THIS

(2)

MR'S STEWART: WE! HAVE MADE! ENQUIRIES: ABOUT THIS AND THE POSITION IS AS I STATED IT DURING! THE DEBATE THAT SUCH AN EMBARGO. TO BE! EFFECTIVE, WOULD HAVE TO BE! POLICED INSIDE: NIGERIA ITSELF UNQUOTE KAISER

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Authority VND 95 1503
By Mr. ARA Date 0 5 65



One 27 Biafra Pigeria

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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DRAFTED BY AF / W & RMMELBOURNE APPROVED BY FROY M MELBOURNE, NIGERÍA TASK FORCE S/S:MR BROWN 66631

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R 272309Z MAR 69: FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY LAGOS

SECRET STATE 047697

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE FROM PARIS MAR 24. QTE:

PARIS 4213

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED

SUBJ: HOUPHOUET -BOIGNY VIEWS ON NIGERIA / BIAFRA

REF & STATE 44656

1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET BOIGNY AND I MET FOR HOUR AND 1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET BOIGNY AND I ME! FOR HOUR AND A HALF MARCH 24 WITH FSO ROBERT OAKLEY ONLY OTHER PERSON PRESENT: HOUPHOUET FIRST WENT THROUGH LONG HISTORICAL EXPOSE: OF HIS VIEWS ABOUT SOVIET UNION; COMMUNIST CHINA, ARAB STATES AND AFRICAN SOCIO-POLITICAL REALITIES: (E.G. NEED FOR SINGLE PARTY; UNWORKABILITY OF LARGE FEDERATIONS, AND DANGER OF TRIBALISM). THIS OF COURSE LED INTO THE NIGERIA/BAFRA SITUATION AND WHAT COULD BE DONE ABOUT IT. HOUPHOUET PROPOSED AFRICAN GALL, BACKED BY UNITED STATES AND OTHER MAJOR POWERS! FOR COMPLETE ARMS. EMBARGO ON BOTH SIDES. HE SEES THIS AND NIGERIA/BIAFRA TALKS POSSIBLY EMERGING FROM MONROVIA MEETING.

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WM HOUPHET SAID HE FAVORED TALKS BETWEEN NIGERIANS AND BIAFRANS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS AND THAT OUUKWU HAD LET HAM KNOW AFTER OCAM MEETING AT KINSHASA HE IS READY TO TALK. HE WOULD HAVE GONE TO KINSHASA TO MEET GOWON HAD OCAM INTIIATIVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL. HOOPHOUET SAID OUUKWU WANTED CEASEFIRE BEFORE TALKING BUT INTIMATED THERE MIGHT POSSIBLY BE SOME GIVE IN THIS POSITION. HE STATED THAT OUUKWU IS NOT REPEAT NOT DEMANDING RECOGNITION OF BIAFRAN SOVERBIGNTY PRIOR TO ANY TALKS. HOUPHOUET ADDED HIS OWN OPINION THAT NEITHER SIDE COULD REASONABLY EXPECT OTHER TO AGREE IN ADMANCE TO ITS POSITION ON SOVERBIGNTY/UNITY ISSUE. IF PEACE TALKS ARE TO AWAIT CONCESSION ON THIS KEY POINT THERE WILL NEVER BE ANY PEACE TALKS.

3. HOUPHOUET THEN TURNED TO RESPONSIBILITY OF MAJOR POWERS: TO TRY AND BRING END TO FIGHTING IN NIGERIA. I TOLD HIM THAT USS. REGARDED THIS AS MATTER FOR AFRICANS: TO RESOLVE, AND THAT WE DID NOT WISH BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN POLITICAL ASPECT OF NIGERIA. CONFLICT. HOUPHET REPLIED THAT SINCE GREAT POWERS ALREADY VERY MUCH INVOLVED IN NIGERIAN CONFLICT, THEY HAD CLEAR RESPONSIBILITY HELD STOP IT. HE SAW NO DIFFERENCE IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN THIS AND MIDDLE EAST WHERE GREAT POWERS HAVE OBLIGATION TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHEREBY PARTIES TO CONFLICT CAN REACH SETTLEMENT AMONG THEMSELVES.

4. I ASKED HOUPHOUET WHAT ROLE HE ENVISAGED FOR US AND OTHER GREAT POWERS. HE REPLIED THAT HE WANTED TO SEE US USE OUR EFFORTS TO HELP ARTIGAN STATES BRING ABOUT TOTAL EMBARGO ON DELIVERY OF ARMS TO NIGERIA AND BEARRA. THIS WOULD HOPEFULLY BE FOLLOWED BY CEASE. FIRE AND TALKS BETWEEN OJUKWU AND GOWON. BUT ARMS EMBARGO. IS ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP I REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT MY GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE SYMPATHETIC TO TRYING TO HELP AFRICANS BRING ABOUT TOTAL ARMS EMBARGO. AND ASKED HOW HE THOUGHT AFRICANS MIGHT INT.

5. HOURHOUET THEN SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY PRESIDENT TUBMAN TO COME TO OAUCOMCON MEETING IN MONROVIA AS AN OBSERVER AND ALSO TO ENSURE PRESENCE OF BIAFRANDELEGATION WHICH MIGHT MEET WITH DELEGATION FROM NIGERIA. HOURHOUET SAID HE HAD SENT MES TO TUBMAN SAYING HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO GET BIAFRAND DELEGATI THERE BUT THAT HE HIMSELF WOULD NOT COME AS MERE OBSERVER. HE COULD NOT BE EXPECTED ATTEND MEETING AND REMAIN SILENT.

ALSO, BIAFRANS WILL NOT AGREE TO DEAL PRIMARILY WITH

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OAU COMMITTEE ASKED IF BIAFRANS WOULD MEET NIGERIANS SINCE
THEY HAD NOT REPEAT NOT DONE SO AT LONDON, HOUPHOUET SAID
HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD ALTHOUGH MEETING IN LONDON DURING
COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE WAS DISADVANTAGEOUS TO BIAFRANS. THEY
HAD GONE THERE PREPARED TO MEET. REASON THEY HAD NOT GONE
THROUGH WITH MEETING. ACCORDING TO HOUPHOUET, WAS BECAUSE
AWOLOWO AND SAMUEL WERE FMG REPS AND BIAFRANS HAVE NO CONFIDENCE.
IN THEM. HOUPHOUET ADDED HE SHARED THIS VIEW.

6. HOUPHQUET THEN INDICATED HIS: WILLINGNESS ATTEND MONROVIA
MEETING IF TUBMAN COULD TAKE INITIATIVE TO ARRANGE THINGS SO
THAT HE COULD ATTEND MEETING AS PARTICIPANT RATHER THAN OBSERVER.
APPARENTLY THINKING ALOUDS HE ADDED THAT IF HE AND PRESIDENT
BONGO AND PERHAPS PRESIDENT NYDERERE COULD ATTENDS IT MIGHT BE
POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN CALL FOR IMMEDIATE END TO ALL OUTSIDE
INTERFERENCE IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS AND FOR IMPOSITION OF TOTAL
EMBARGO ON ARMS DELIVERIES FROM ANY SOURCE TO NIGERIA AND BIAFRA.
HE WOULD HOPE THAT IF WE AND UK AND FRANCE WENT ALDNG WITH AFRICAN
APPEAL FOR EMBARGO, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE FORCED TO ACCEPT ITS FOLLOWING THIS APPEAL AND TALKS BETWEEN NIGERIA AND BIAFRAN DELEGATIONS,

IT MIGHT THEN BELPOSSIBLE FOR AFRICAN STATES AT MONROVIA MEETING TO ARE RANGE FOR SUBSECUENT CEASEFTRE. AND MEETING WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS

BETWEEN OJUKWU: AND GOWON, AND EVENTUALLY SOME SORT OF INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE TO PROTECT BIAFRANS. (COMMENT: HOURHOUET SEEMED TO BE THINKING OF UN ROLE HERE SINCE HE CONSIDERS OAULAS BIASED BUT HE WAS: NOT DEFINITED. I ASKED WHETHER GEN DE GAULLE WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A PLAN AND HOUPHOUET INDICATED HE THOUGHT SO BUT THAT HE HAS NOT ACTUALLY DISCUSSED IT WITH DEGAULLE.

7. CONCLUDING HIS PRESENTATION, HOUPHOUET SAID HE WOULD SEND ANOTHER MESSAGE TO TUBMAN WITH HIS IDEAS FOR MEETING MONROVIA. HOW PEVER, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE OUR OFFICIAL REACTION TO, AND IF POSSIBLE OUR DISCREET SUPPORT FOR HIS IDEAS I SAID I WOULD COMMUNICATE HIS IDEAS TO WASHINGTON AND WOULD TRY TO HAVE REPLY FOR HIM WHEN HE RETURNS TO PARIS FROM LYON FAIR ON MARCH 28, HOUPHOUET SAID HE WOULD GO TO GENEVA FROM PARIS ON MARCH 29, AFTER RETURNING FROM LYON. HE WILL BE AVAILABLE TO RETURN TO PARIS TO DISCUSS NIGERIA/ BIAFRA ISSUE DURING THIS TWO WEEK PERIOD!

8. IN BRIEF CONVERSATION LATER IN DAY, MARCH 24 (PIERRET OF

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Authority WN 05959

By Weara Date 0595



### Department of State

## **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 04 STATE: 047697

QUAL NIGERIAN DESKA TOLD EMBOFF THAT TUBMAN HAD INVITED ALL FOUR AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHICH RECOGNIZE BLAFRA TO ATTEND MONROVIA

OAO' CONCOM MEETING. PIERRET SATO QUAI CONSIDERS THIS! VERY HOPEFUL SIGN AND IS IN FAVOR OF SUCH A MEETING. SINGE QUUKWU WILL NEVER ACCEPT DAUL ACCORDING TO PIERRET ONLY ENLARGED MEETING OF THIS SORT COULD ARRIVE AT PEACE PROPOSALS WITH HOPE OF ACCEPTANCE.

9. COMMENT: HOUPHOUETTOLD ME THAT THIS WAS HIS FIRST EFFORT ESTABLISH SERIOUS CONTACT WITH NEXON ADMINISTRATION ON NIGERIA/
BIAFRA QUESTION WHICH HE CONSIDERS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE.

HE PLANS SEND FONMIN USHER TO WASHINGTON LATER BUT WANTS TO TRY AND DO SOMETHING RIGHT AWAY. SINCE HOUPHOUET SAW DEGAULLE LATE LAST WEEK, WE ASSUME THAT THEIR THINKING IS NOT IN CONFLICT ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT KNOW THAT HE DISCUSSED HIS IDEAS WITH THE GENERAL. IF DEPT HAS ANY SUGGESTIONS WHICH THEY THINK MIGHT IMPROVE HOOPHOUET'S PROPOSAL. I BELTEVE THEY WOULD BE SYMPATHETICALLY RECEIVED. IN MY OPINION, WE SHOULD TRY AND MOVE AHEAD WITH WHAT SOUNDS LIKE A REASONABLE APPROACH FOR SOMEONE AS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO BIAFRAN COUSE AS HOUPHOUET. GP-2 SHRIVER UNGTE ROGERS.

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Authority VND 959503

By MARA Date VD 509

Lol 27 Brafra Nigeria

Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET 245

PAGE Ø1 STATEL Ø47696

ORIGIN SS: 10

INFO /ØIØ R

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EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE FROM PARES MAR 27 OTE

PARIS: 4369:

EXDIS

STATE RPT AS DESERED

SUBU . HOUPHOUET BOTGNY VIEWS ON NIGERTAY BIAFRA

REF & ABIDUAN 826

T. WITH RESPECT RARA 2 REFIEL WE WISH REITERATE THAT AS REPORTED IN PARAS 4 AND 600F PARIS 4213 HOURHOUST STATED HE WANTED TOTAL EMBARGO ON DELIVERTES ARMS TO NIGERIA AND BUAFRA.

AS NOTED PARA 6 00 R 4213 HE DOUBTFUL THAT SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT BY US FRANCE AND DIVIN WOULD FRANCE TO NOTED BY US FRANCE AND DIVIN WOULD FOR ELTHEM TO DOUGH AFRICANS BACKED BY US FRANCE AND DIVIN WOULD FOR ELTHEM TO DOUGH AFRICANS BACKED BY US FRANCE AND DIVING ABOUT UK (OR FRANCE ZIVORY COAST KGABON) STOPPING ARMS DELIVERIES UNLESS THERE WAS ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT INCLUDING USSR.

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Authority WND9 By MNARA Date 0



### Department of State

### **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 047696

2. WHILE FMG MAGHT BELLUPSET BY AFRICANLAPPEAL FOR ARMS EMBARGOD BACKED BY WESTERN POWERS THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE SOME CONSOLATION FOR FMG IN FACTOR HAT PROPOSED EMBARGO WOULD APPLY TO BE AFRA AS WELL AS FMG.

ASCINCTED INCPARA 9:00F PARIS 4213) HOUPHOUET SAW DE GAULLE MARCH 21 FRENCH PARIS 124157) THAT KEY TO ANY SETTLEMENT OR CHANGE INCPAST (E GA PARIS 24157) THAT INCPARIS HOUPHOUET.

IN THIS WAY BETTLEMENT OR CHANGE INCPOLICY ON BIAFRA WAS HOUPHOUET.

NOT REPEAT NOT KNOW THAT FRENCH POLICY IS CHANGENG. HOWEVER,

IF US AND DUKLARE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN TRYING TOLFIND NON.

MILITARY SOLUTION TO NIGERIA/BIAFRA CONFLICT; I BELIEVE IT.

WOULD BE MIST KL NOT TOORLSPOND TO HOUPHOUET, S BROPOS L. IF!

WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN TOTAL ARMS EMBARGO (WHE PROPOSALS COULD)

WE ARE NOT INTERESTED WITH REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF COURSE.

HAS APPLIED SINCE BEGINNING. WHAT CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS COULD!

THEIR BEING ACCEPTED SENCE HOUPHOUET WILL EXPECT SOME WORD

FROM ME TOMORROW WHEN HE RETURNS FROM LYON; I WOULD APPRECIATE

INSTRUCTIONS FROM DEPARTMENT EVEN IFFITHEY ARE ONLY TO TELL HIM

GP42. SHRIVERHUNGTE ROGERS:

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Authority VV) 959503

By MV ARA Date V 5105

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

27 Mar 69 23

### OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT

SECRET/EXDIS Classification

ACTION: Amembassy

PARTS PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy

ABIDJAN LAGOS

STATE

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Houphouet-Boigny Views on Nigeria/Biafra

REFS: a) Paris 4213, b) Paris 4369, c) State 44656, d) Abidjan 826

1. In examining extent to which Houphouet-Boigny ideas can be equated with US policy on Nigeria/Biafra, there might be area of agreement if he subscribes to our view that there should be peace talks without precondition of a preconditions, including/cease fire. On every appropriate occasion USG has urged this step and would welcome initiatives in this direction, including Houphouet's. It is here that he could be encouraged to act (ref b).

2. On Houphouet proposal for arms embargo, we could not take initiative, but would support such action if all of those involved in arms traffic, suppliers and recipients, were to agree to stop and to zenantakokadakazakaldariatanakarbakarokaarbakarbaadoekadakendakarokadakaria darakarbakarbak adequate inspection. Realistically, if Houphouet expects OAU to issue call for arms embargo, Department doubts that organization would want to antagonize FMG, which it generally supports, by calling for such embargo.

3. Department concurs with Abidjan estimate (ref d) that Houphouet unlikely to be able to evolve a satisfactory mediation formula

AF/W: RMMelbourne: emb

AF - C

AF/CW - Mr. Schaufel

S/S Mr. Brown EUR/FBX - Mr. Tanguy

U - Mr. Ruser

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

B-65 DS-322

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT

SECRET/EXDIS
Classification

Origin

XXXXXX Page 2 - Amembassy PARIS

Info:

which would not have strong pro-Biafra overtones. While aware that we do not wish to get directly involved in the political aspects of the conflict (ref c), Houphouet apparently seeking US commitment to his arms embargo proposal prior to Concom meeting in Monrovia, which we cannot give.

- 4. However, we do think that if Concom, in view its membership which pro-FMG, is to have constructive role, representation from among those African countries recognizing Biafra would make its discussions and possible initiatives more palatable to both Ojukwu and FMG.
- 5. In view our deep humanitarian concern, Houphouet should be informed our our profound regret that Biafra has rejected Ferguson's proposal for 60-day temporary arrangement for daylight flights to Uli and Obilagu airfields while overland transport route was to be negotiated. He should be urged to inform Biafrans of unfortunate impression this refusal to accept daylight relief flights under adequate safeguards has made overseas. He could perform signal relief service by pressing Biafrans to be more flexible and forthcoming so that those wanting to help suffering civilians can do so.

  GP-3

  END

Draftad by:

Tal. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Claarancas

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FORM DS-322

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
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#### **DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 70150-8

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### POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

### Department of State

**TELEGRAM** 

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PAGE 01 PARIS 04369 271041Z

ACTION SS 30

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2307

SE CER ELT PARIS 4369

EXDIS:

STATE RPT AS DESIRED

SUBJ: HOUPHOUET BOIGNY VIEWS ON NIGERIA/BIAFRA

REF: ABIDUAN 826 POL 37-14 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

1. WITH RESPECT PARA 2: REFITEL, WE: WISH RELITERATE THAT AS REPORTED IN PARAS 4 AND 6 OF PARIS: 4213, HOUPHOUET STATED HE WANTED TOTAL EMBARGO ON DELIVERIES ARMS TO NIGERIA AND BIAFRA. AS NOTED PARA 6 OUR 4213. HE DOUBTFUL THAT SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT BUT HOPED THAT APPEAL FROM AFRICANS BACKED BY US, FRANCE AND UK WOULD FORCE THEM TO DO SO! AT NO TIME DID HE INDICATE HE WAS THINKING ABOUT UK (OR FRANCE/IVORY COAST/GABON) STOPPING ARMS DELIVERIES UNLESS THERE WAS ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT INCLUDING USSR.

2. WHILE FMG MIGHT BE UPSET BY AFRICAN APPEAL FOR ARMS EMBARGO. BACKED BY WESTERN POWERS. THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE SOME CONSOLATION FOR FMG IN FACT THAT PROPOSED EMBARGO WOULD APPLY TO BIAFRA AS WELLI AS FMG.

3. AS NOTED IN PARA 9 OF PARIS 4213 HOUPHOUET SAW DE GAULLE MARCH 21. FRENCH HAVE TOLD US IN PAST (E.G. PARIS 24157) THAT KEY TO ANY SETTLEMENT OR CHANGE IN POLICY ON BIAFRA WAS HOUPHOUET. IN THIS WAY DE GAULLE (AND FOCCART) CAN SAVE FACE . WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT KNOW THAT FRENCH POLICY IS CHANGING. HOWEVER, IF US AND UK ARE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN TRYING TO FIND NON-MILITARY SOLUTION TO NIGERIA/BIAFRA CONFLICT, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MISTAKE NOT TO RESPOND TO HOUPHOUET'S PROPOSAL. IF

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Authority <u>WW</u>) By MNARA Date



# Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 PARIS 04369 271041Z

WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN TOTAL ARMS EMBARGO (WHICH US) OF COURSE, HAS APPLIED SINCE BEGINNING), WHAT CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS COULD WE PUT TO HOUPHOUET WITH REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF THEIR BEING ACCEPTED? SINCE HOUPHOUET WILL EXPECT SOME WORD FROM ME TOMORROW WHEN HE RETURNS FROM LYON, I WOULD APPRECIATE INSTRUCTIONS FROM DEPARTMENT EVEN IF THEY ARE ONLY TO TELL HIM WE ARE STILL STUDYING MATTER.

GP-2. SHRIVER

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United States Benate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
THE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS CONN
REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 27, 1969

**ACTION** is assigned to

The Honorable William P. Rogers Secretary of State Department of State Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you know, deep congressional and public concern continues in the humanitarian problems of the Nigerian civil war, which I know you personally share, as well as the Administration generally. The current mission of Dr. C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr. to Lagos and Umuahia has, therefore, generated considerable interest, and a hope in many quarters that progress can be made in meeting the extraordinary human needs on both sides of the battle line.

I believe it would be extremely helpful to members of Congress and the private sector, if Dr. Ferguson were available, following the congressional spring recess, to report his findings and recommendations in a public hearing before the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees. It would be helpful as well, I feel, if you or someone you designate would accompany Dr. Ferguson to the hearing.

If it is convenient, I would like to schedule the hearing for Monday morning, April 14. Please be assured of the Subcommittee's cooperation in helping to find an appropriate American response to the continuing human tragedy in West Africa.

Many thanks for your consideration. I hope to hear from you soon.

9846

Edward M. Kennedy, Chai



31

## Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 LONDON 02372 271448Z

ACTION SS 70

INFO: CIAE: 00./070 W

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LIMDIS

CORRERECT ELD COPLY

SUBJECT: NIGERIA: FOAU REPRESENTATIVE

REF: USUN 900: LONDON 2241 Pol 27 Biolina - Migeria 1. FONOFF'S MOBERLY (WEST AFRICANI DEPT) TELLS US THAT THERE HAS BEEN SLIGHT CHANGE IN WAY BRITISH WANT TO HANDLE U THANT'S IDEA FOR SPECIAL OAU REP. FONOFF BELIEVES SYG HIMSELF IS IN BETTER POSITION THAN PRIMIN WILSON TO SELL SUGGESTION TO HAILE SELASSIE. UKUN HAS THEREFORE BEEN ASKED TO TELL SYG THAT BRITISH THINK
HIS IDEA IS EXCELLENT AND TO URGE HIM TO PUT IT TO EMPEROR AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE IF THIS CAN BE DONE BEFORE WILSON LEAVES
LAGOS AND EMPEROR'S REACTION IS FAVORABLE PM WILL SUPPORT PROPOSALI WITH GOWON AND URGE FMG TO COOPERATE

2. ALTERNATIVELY, IF U THANT THINKS IT DESIRABLE AND NECESSARY, WILSON WOULD BE WILLING TO FOLLOW-UP SYG'S LEAD WITH EMPEROR DURING VISIT TO ADDIS.

KAISER

NOTE: LAST WORD OF TEXT CORRECTED TO READ ADDIS VICE LAGOS PER ORIGINATOR .

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Ship loading dates: Halifax, February 7-12 (Fish - Hospital Supplies, etc.) St. John, N.B., February 14-19 (Potato Flakes)

NOTE: (1) If Santa Isabel not operational allocated tonnage will be landed at Cotonou I.C.R.C. "off-loading" port.

(2) Only 326 matresses supplied

Prepared by S.C. GOODYFR Jan. 23, 1969 Revised Feb 4/69 Revised Mar 17/69

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Authority VV) 95 95 95

By WMARA Date 0 5 05

Enclosure 2 1 of OTTAWA A-251 2

The Nigeria/Biafra Relief Fund of Canada

Fonds de Secours canadien pour le Nigeria et le Biafra Toronto 5. Ontario

RS/R

We can't let it happen./Resterez-vous insensible?

FOR RELEASE

MONDAY, MARCH 24, 1969

Canadians have given almost one million dollars to the Nigeria/Biafra Relief Fund of Canada.

The executive committee at its weekend meeting in Toronto announced donations now amount to \$994,605.

The Nigeria/Biafra Relief Fund has received \$223,014 directly into its central fund while the balance has been given through the churches of Canada and the participating voluntary agencies, the Canadian Red Cross Society, the Canadian Save the Children Fund, the Canadian UNICEF Committee and OXFAM of Canada.

Receipts from the central fund of \$223,014 have been allocated to the church groups and the participating voluntary agencies. As a result, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace and the Canadian Council of Churches each received \$41,760 to assist the work of Caritas Internationalis and the World Council of Churches respectively. The allocation to the Canadian Red Cross Society was \$93,960 for the International Committee of the Red Cross. Other allocations of \$10,400 each were for the Canadian Save the Children Fund, the Canadian UNICEF Committee and OXFAM of Canada to assist the relief activities of their international affiliates in Nigeria and Biafra.

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By Meara Date 10

The committee was informed that the cost of printed 2 of material, stationery, receipts, postage and promotion was only 1.4 per cent of the money raised. It was explained that the very low figure was realized because of the voluntary services provided by Vickers and Benson Limited, print, film and sound production firms, the loan of staff from participating churches and agencies and interested volunteers who worked in many capacities.

The Canadian Council of Churches reported to the meeting that relief planes sponsored by Joint Church Aid had flown 1,784 flights and delivered 16,474 tons of relief supplies from Sao: Tome to Biafra. The Canadian Red Cross said the planes of the International Committee of the Red Cross had completed 1,047 flights and transported 10,020 tons of relief supplies from Santa Isabel and Cotonou.

A total of more than 58-million pounds of relief supplies, primarily concentrated food has been flown into Biafra since last April.

Reporting on the situation in areas under the control of the Nigerian Federal Military Government, it was stated that the International Committee of the Red Cross is feeding more than one million people. This involves the transportation of 5,000 tons of relief supplies every month from Lagos to forward areas in Nigeria and their distribution to those in need. While distribution is running at some 5,000 tons per month, strong efforts are being made by the Red Cross to raise this to 10,000 tons per month in the near future.

From July 3 to March 5 the Red Cross has distributed almost 80-million pounds of relief supplies to victims of the war in the area.

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R 251235Z MAR 69 FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5673 INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON AMCONSUL IBADAN AMCONSUL KADUNA

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 2678

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN TRIBUNE EDITORIALS DEMANDING CIVILIAN RULE

CIVILIAN RULE
REF: LAGUS 2520: 2490: 2438: IBADAN A-39

I. REFTELS REPORTED THAT FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE DAYS
LAST WEEK NIGERIAN TRIBUNE RAN EDITORIALS CALLING FOR
RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE. REFAIRGRAM GIVES DETAILED
ANALYSIS OF MOTIVATION BEHIND CAMPAIGN AND REACTION TO IT.

2. AMCONSUL IBADAN BELIEVES THERE LITTLE DOUBT THAT AWOLOWO BEHIND EDITORIALSIPAPER IS CLOSELY IDENTIFIED. WITH AWOLOWO AND ACTION GROUP) AND SEES THEM AS AG / WARNING TO FMG THAT YOUUBALAND DISAATISFIED WITH MILITAPY RULE AND FAILURE TO END WAR ALSO COULD BE HINTING THAT AG CAPABLE OF MOBILIZING DISCONTENTED ELEMENTS IF YOURUBA LEADERS PARTICULARLY AWOLOWO NOT GIVEN MORE PROMINENT ROLE. CONSULATE REPORTS LOCAL REACTION TO EDITORIALS DEPENDENT ON PARTY ORIENTATION OF PERSON SPEAKING WITH NNOP SUPPORTERS DENYING EDITORIALS REPRESENT POPULAR OPINION.

3. INTERNAL YOUBA POLITICS COULD ALSO BE INVOLVED.
AG FEARS FMG WILL SPLIT WESTERN STATE IF IT STAYS IN

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PER-25 2002 MARI 69 FMI AMEMBASSY LAGOS: TO: SECSTATE: WASHDC: PRIORITY 5646/ INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS: ABABA AMEMBASSY LOME: AMEMBASSY LOME: AMEMBASSY LONDON: AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE! USMISSION: GENEVA

CLOLNI EL I DE EL NI TELA LI L'AGOS: 2623:

REFIE STATE: 045029 fol 21 Magra Migun

1. ACCORDING SEMERALI REPORTS NAFFILE 28 ONI MARCHI 20 WITH ADEKUNLET ABOARDI WAS: EITHER HITT BY BIAFRAN APA. OR INLOW PASS AT UGA. AIRSTRIP ONELENGINE HIT A. TREE REPORTS STATE: PLANELLIMPED BACKI TOUPORT HARCOURT WHERE IT CRASH LADED. AS NEARLY AS CAN BE DETERMINED ADEKUNLE UNDURT. WAS SEEN YESTERDAY 24TH BY VISITOR IN APPARENT GOOD HEALTH.

20 THERE IS: NO! VERTETCATION! OF NAFE REPORT OF DESTRUCTION:
OF SIX: A IRCRAFT AT ULT: ONLY A IRCRAFT KNOWN DESTROYED.
RECENTLY AT ULT: ÎS: BIAFRANI DC 93: WHITCHLAS: PREVIOUSLY
REPORTED PROBABLY CRASHED ON TAKELOFF RATHEN THÂN SHOT
DOWN DAMSON AND FLAHERTY WHO CAMELOUT OF ULT LAST NIGHT
AND FERGUSON WHO CAMELOUT PREVIOUS: NIGHT QUITE: CERTAIN
NO OTHER PLANES: DESTROYED FLAHERTY SAYS: JCA-DC-7 RAN
OFFI RUNWAY NIGHT OF 23RD WITH DAMAGE TO ONE ENGINE BUT
MANAGED TO RETURN SAO! TOME ON THREE ENGINES.

3. DATT PREPARING ROUNDI UPLOFI RECENT NAFLACTIVITIES: WHICH WILL FOLLOW INESEPTEL. GP83. MATHEWS:

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EXDIS THE HOLD OF THE BOOK OF THE HOLD OF

DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED

SUBJ: HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY VIEWS ON NIGERIA / BIAFRA

REF: STATE 44656

1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY AND I MET FOR HOUR AND A HALF MARCH 24 WITH FSO ROBERT OAKLEY ONLY OTHER PERSON PRESENT. HOUPHOUET FIRST WENT THROUGH LONG HISTORICAL EXPOSE OF HIS VIEWS ABOUT SOVIET UNION, COMMUNIST CHINA, ARAB STATES AND AFRICAN SOCIO-POLITICAL REALITIES (E.G. NEED FOR SINGLE PARTY, UNWORKABILITY OF LARGE FEDERATIONS, AND DANGER OF TRIBALISM). THIS OF COURSE LED INTO THE NIGERIA/BIAFRA SITUATION AND WHAT COULD BE DONE ABOUT IT. HOUPHOUET PROPOSED AFRICAN CALL, BACKED BY UNITED STATES AND OTHER MAJOR POWERS, FOR COMPLETE ARMS EMBARGO ON BOTH SIDES. HE SEES THIS AND NIGERIA/BIAFRA TALKS POSSIBLY EMERGING FROM MONROVIA MEETING.

2. HOUPHET SAID HE FAVORED TALKS BETWEEN NIGERIANS AND BIAFRANS

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WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS AND THAT OJUKWU HAD LET HIM KNOW AFTER
OCAM MEETING AT KINSHASA HE IS READY TO TALK. HE WOULD HAVE
GONE TO KINSHASA TO MEET GOWON HAD OCAM INITIATIVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL.
HOUPHOUET SAID: OJUKWU WANTED CEASEFIRE BEFORE TALKING BUT
INTIMATED THERE MIGHT POSSIBLY BE SOME GIVE IN THIS POSITION.
HE STATED THAT OJUKWU IS NOT REPEAT NOT DEMANDING RECOGNITION
OF BIAFRAN SOVEREIGNTY PRIOR TO ANY TALKS. HOUPHOUET ADDED
HIS OWN OPINION THAT NEITHER SIDE COULD REASONABLY EXPECT OTHER
TO AGREE IN ADVANCE TO ITS POSITION ON SOVEREIGNTY/UNITY ISSUE.
IF PEACE TALKS ARE TO AWAIT CONCESSION ON THIS KEY POINT THERE
WILL NEVER BE ANY PEACE TALKS.

3. HOUPHOUET THEN TURNED TO RESPONSIBILITY OF MAJOR POWERS TO TRY AND BRING END TO FIGHTING IN NIGERIA. I TOLD HIM THAT U.S. REGARDED THIS AS MATTER FOR AFRICANS TO RESOLVE, AND THAT WE DID NOT WISH BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN POLITICAL ASPECT OF NIGERIA CONFLICT, HOUPHET REPLIED THAT SINCE GREAT POWERS ALREADY VERY MUCH INVOLVED IN NIGERIAN CONFLICT, THEY HAD CLEAR RESPONSIBILITY HELP STOP IT. HE SAW NO DIFFERENCE IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN THIS AND MIDDLE EAST WHERE GREAT POWERS HAVE OBLIGATION TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHEREBY PARTIES TO CONFLICT CAN REACH SETTLEMENT AMONG THEMSELVES.

4. I ASKED HOUPHOUET WHAT ROLE HE ENVISAGED FOR US AND OTHER GREAT POWERS. HE REPLIED THAT HE WANTED TO SEE US USE OUR EFFORTS TO HELP AFRICAN STATES BRING ABOUT TOTAL EMBARGO ON DELIVERY OF ARMS TO NIGERIA AND BIAFRA. THIS WOULD HOPEFULLY BE FOLLOWED BY CEASE. FIRE AND TALKS BETWEEN OJUKWU AND GOWON. BUT ARMS EMBARGO IS ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP. I REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT MY GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE SYMPATHETIC TO TRYING TO HELP AFRICANS BRING ABOUT TOTAL ARMS EMBARGO AND ASKED HOW HE THOUGHT AFRICANS MIGHT INITIATE SUCH CALL.

5. HOUPHOUET THEN SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY PRESIDENT TUBMAN TO COME TO DAY COMEON MEETING IN MONROVIA AS AN OBSERVER AND ALSO TO ENSURE PRESENCE OF BIAFRAN DELEGATION WHICH MIGHT MEET WITH DELEGATION FROM NIGERIA. HOUPHOUET SAID HE HAD SENT MESSAGE TO TUBMAN SAYING HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO GET BIAFRAN DELEGATION THERE BUT THAT HE HIMSELF WOULD NOT COME AS MERE OBSERVER. HE COULD NOT BE EXPECTED ATTEND MEETING AND REMAIN SILENT. ALSO, BIAFRANS WILL NOT AGREE TO DEAL PRIMARILY WITH DAY COMMITTEE. ASKED IF BIAFRANS WOULD MEET NIGERIANS SINCE

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THEY HAD NOT REPEAT NOT DONE SO AT LONDON, HOUPHOUET SAID HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD. ALTHOUGH MEETING IN LONDON DURING COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE WAS DISADVANTAGEOUS TO BIAFRANS. THEY HAD GONE THERE PREPARED TO MEET. REASON THEY HAD NOT GONE THROUGH WITH MEETING. ACCORDING TO HOUPHOUET, WAS BECAUSE AWOLOWO AND SAMUEL WERE FMG REPS AND BIAFRANS HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN THEM. HOUPHOUET ADDED HE SHARED THIS VIEW.

6. HOUPHOUET THEN INDICATED HIS WILLINGNESS ATTEND MONROVIA
MEETING IE TUBMAN COULD TAKE INITIATIVE TO ARRANGE THINGS SO
THAT HE COULD ATTEND MEETING AS PARTICIPANT RATHER THAN OBSERVER.
APPARENTLY THINKING ALOUD, HE ADDED THAT IF HE AND PRESIDENT
BONGO AND PERHAPS PRESIDENT NYDERERE COULD ATTEND, IT MIGHT BE
POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN CALL FOR IMMEDIATE END TO ALL OUTSIDE
INTERFERENCE IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS AND FOR IMPOSITION OF TOTAL
EMBARGO ON ARMS DELIVERIES FROM ANY SOURCE TO NIGERIA AND BIAFRA.
HE WOULD HOPE THAT IF WE AND UK AND FRANCE WENT ALONG WITH AFRICAN
APPEAL FOR EMBARGO, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE FORCED TO ACCEPT IT FOLIA.
LOWING THIS APPEAL AND TALKS BETWEEN NIGERIA AND BIAFRAN DELEGATIONS,

IT MIGHT THEN BE POSSIBLE FOR AFRICAN STATES AT MONROVIA MEETING TO ARRANGE FOR SUBSEQUENT CEASEFIRE, AND MEETING WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS BETWEEN OJUKWU AND GOWON, AND EVENTUALLY SOME SORT OF INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE TO PROTECT BIAFRANS. (COMMENT: HOUPHOUET SEEMED TO BE THINKING OF UN ROLE HERE SINCE HE CONSIDERS DAUL AS BIASED BUT HE WAS NOT DEFINITE). I ASKED WHETHER GEN DE GAULLE WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A PLAN AND HOUPHOUET INDICATED HE THOUGHT SO BUT THAT HE HAS NOT ACTUALLY DISCUSSED IT WITH DEGAULLE.

7. CONCLUDING HIS PRESENTATION, HOOPHOUET SAID HE WOULD SEND ANOTHER MESSAGE TO TUBMAN WITH HIS IDEAS FOR MEETING MONROVIA. HOW-EVER, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE OUR OFFICIAL REACTION TO, AND IF POSSIBLE OUR DISCREET SUPPORT FOR HIS IDEAS. I SAID I WOULD COMMUNICATE HIS IDEAS TO WASHINGTON AND WOULD TRY TO HAVE REPLY FOR HIM WHEN HE RETURNS TO PARIS FROM LYON FAIR ON MARCH 28. HOUPHOUET SAID HE WOULD GO TO GENEVA FROM PARIS ON MARCH 29. AFTER RETURNING FROM LYON. HE WILL BE AVAILABLE TO RETURN TO PARIS TO DISCUSS NIGERIA/BIFFRA ISSUE DURING THIS TWO WEEK PERIOD.

8. IN BRIEF CONVERSATION LATER IN DAY, MARCH 24 (PIERRET OF QUAI NIGERIAN DESK) TOLD EMBOFF THAT TUBMAN HAD INVITED ALL

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FOUR AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHICH RECOGNIZE BIAFRA TO ATTEND MONROVIA OAU CONCOM MEETING. PIERRET SAID QUAI CONSIDERS THIS: VERY HOPEFUL SIGN AND IS IN FAVOR OF SUCH A MEETING. SINCE QUUKWU WILL NEVER ACCEPT DAU. ACCORDING TO PIERRET, ONLY ENLARGED MEETING OF THIS SORT COULD ARRIVE AT PEACE PROPOSALS WITH HOPE OF ACCEPTANCE .

9. COMMENT: HOUPHOUET TOLD ME THAT THIS WAS HIS FIRST EFFORT ESTABLISH SERIOUS CONTACT WITH NIXON ADMINISTRATION ON NIGERIA/ BLAFRA QUESTION WHICH HE CONSIDERES OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. HE PLANS SEND FORMEN USHER TO WASHINGTON LATER BUT WANTS TO TRY AND DO SOMETHING RIGHT AWAY. SINCE HOUPHOUET SAW DEGAULLE LATE LAST WEEK, WE ASSUME THAT THEIR THINKING IS NOT IN CONFLICT ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT KNOW THAT HE DISCUSSED HIS IDEAS WITH THE GENERAL. IF DEPT HAS ANY SUGGESTIONS WHICH THEY THINK MIGHT IMPROVE HOUPHOUET'S PROPOSAL. I BELIEVE THEY WOULD BE SYMPATHETICALLY RECEIVED. IN MY OPINION, WE SHOULD TRY AND MOVE AHEAD WITH WHAT SOUNDS LIKE A REASONABLE APPROACH FOR SOMEONE AS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO BIAFRAN COUSE AS HOUPHOUET. GP-2 SHRIVER UNDTE ROGERS

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UNCLAS LONDON 2328

SUBJECT: FORETGN AFFAIRS DEBATE: NIGERIA

1. DURING COURSE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE MARCH 24 IN HOUSE OF COMMONS. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION WHETHER PRIMIN WOULD ATTEMPT MEET COL. OUUKWU WHEN HE VISITS NIGERIA. FONSEC STEWART SAID: "TO VISIT TERRITORY OF SOMEONE WHO IN LAW IS REBELL IS UNUSUALL STEP . HOWEVER PRIMIN WOULD NOT BELADVERSE TO THIS AND IT WOULDI DEPENDI ONI WHETHERI COLLO COUKWUL WERE PREADY TO RECEIVE HIMMONI MANY ASPECTS OF THIS SUBJECTS IT HAS BEEN UNWILLINGNESS OF COLO COUKWUL WHICH HAS OBSTRUCTED ATTEMPTS AT PRACE.

2. ASKED: BY SIR! ALECODOUGLASTHOME: WHETHER! WILSON: INTENDED: RAISE! WITH GEN. GOWON POSSIBILITY OF SUPERVISED! CEASEFIRE! ANDILIMITATION OF ARMS BY MAIN SUPPLIERS, FONSEC REPLIEDS "I CANNOT PREDICT EXACTLY COURSE OF TALKS, I BELIEVE THAT IF WE COULD GET THIS DONE THROUGH ORGANIZATION OF AFRICANTUNITY THERES WOULD BE MORE HOPE OF GETTING ACTION THAN THROUGH UN WHICH FOR NUMBER OF REASONS IS AVERSEL TO HANDLING THIS MATTERIA

THERE IS CONSIDERABLE VIEW IN UNITHAT THIS IS INTERNAL MATTER AND OUTSIDE THEIR COMPETENCE I DON'T RULE THIS OUT BUT I BELIEVE THAT OAU IS BODY WITH WHOM WE OUGHT KEEP CHIEFLY IN

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## Department of State TELEGRAM

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Touch:•

"TRIBAL! SECESSION: WOULD, BELGREWT DANGER: BOTHETO: NIGERIA AND TOO AFRICA AS WHOLE: WELHOPE! THAT IBO PEOPLE! WILL! REALIZE THAT, OTHER! THAN DISMEMBERMENT OF NIGERIA, SETTLEMENT IS POSSIBLE THAT GIVES THEM THEIR! PROPER! PLACE: "KAISER!

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
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Department of State 1 SECRET PAGE 01 PARIS: 04213: 242010Z. ACTION SS: 30 INFO: CCO: 00, SSO: 00, NSCE! 00, /030 W Ø95483 G: 241830Z MAR: 69 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS (N TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 2242 SEELCERENT PARIS 4213: EXDIS: DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESTRED! SUBUS HOUPHOUET BOTGNY VIEWSLON NIGERIA / BIAFRA REFR STATE 44656 1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT HOUPHOUEF-BOLGNY AND I MET FOR HOUR AND A HALF MARCH 24 WITH FSO ROBERT OAKLEY ONLY OTHER PERSON PRESENT. HOUPHOUET FIRST WENT THROUGH LONG HISTORICAL EXPOSE N OF HIS VIEWS ABOUT SOMET UNION, COMMUNIST CHINA, ARAB STATES AND AFRICAN SOCIO-POLITICALI REALITIES (E.G. NEED FOR SINGLE PARTY, UNWORKABILITY OF LARGE FEDERATIONS AND DANGER OF TRIBALISM ENTER OF COURSE LED INTO THE NIGERIA/BIAFRA SITUATION AND WHAT COULD BE DONE ABOUT IT HOUPHOUSE PROPOSED AFRICAN CALL BACKED BY UNITED STATES AND OTHER MAJOR POWERS, FOR COMPLETE ARMS MBARGO ON BOTH SIDES HE SEES THIS AND NIGERIA/BIAFRA TALKS 77 POSSIBLY EMERGING FROM MONROVIA MEETING. >  $\frac{1}{Z}$ 

2. HOUPHET GAJOHE FAWORED TALKS BETWEEN NIGERIANS AND BIAFRANS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS AND THAT QUUKWU HAD LET HIM KNOW AFTER QCAM MEETING AT KINSHASA HELIS READY TO TALK HELWOULD HAVE GONE: TO KINSHASA. TO MEET GOWON: HADI OCAM INITIATIVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL HOUPHOUET SAID OUUKWU WANTED! CEASEFIRE! BEFORE! TALKING BUT INTIMATED THERE MIGHT POSSIBLY BE SOME GIVE IN THIS POSITION.
HE STATED THAT OUR WOLLS NOT REPEAT NOT DEMANDING RECOGNITION OF BLAFRAN SOVERELGNNTY PRIORI TO ANY TALKS. HOUPHOUET ADDED HIS OWN OPINTON THAT NEITHER SIDE COULD REASONABLY EXPECT OTHER TO AGREE IN ADVANCE TO ITS POSITION ON SOVEREIGNTY VUNITY ISSUE IF PEAGE TALKS ARE TO AWAIT CONCESSION ON THIS KEY POINT THERE

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WILL NEVER BELANY PEACE TALKS

3. HOUPHOUET THEN TURNED TO RESPONSIBILITY OF MAJOR POWERS TO TRY AND BRING END TO FIGHTING IN NIGERIA. I TOLD HIM THAT U.S. REGARDED THIS AS MATTER FOR AFRICANS TO RESOLVE. AND THAT WE DID NOT WISH BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN POLITICAL ASPECT OF NIGERIA. CONFLICT. HOUPHET REPLIED THAT SINCE GREAT POWERS ALREADY VERY MUCH INVOLVED IN NIGERIAN CONFLICT. THEY HAD CLEAR RESPONSIBILITY HELP STOP IT. HE SAW NO DIFFERENCE IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN THIS AND MIDDLE EAST WHERE GREAT POWERS HAVE OBLIGATION TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHEREBY PARTIES TO CONFLICT.

40 I ASKED HOUPHOUET WHAT ROLEPHE ENVISAGED FOR US AND OTHER GREAT POWERS. HE REPLIED THAT HE WANTED TO SEE US USE OUR EFFORTS.

TO HELP AFRICAN STATES BRUNG ABOUT TOTAL EMBARGO ON DELIVERY OF ARMS TO NIGERIA AND BIAFRA. THIS WOULD HOPEFULLY BE FOLLOWED BY CEASE.

FIRE AND TALKS BETWEEN OUUKWU AND BUT ARMS EMBARGO IS ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP. I REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT MY GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE SYMPATHETIC TO TRYING TO HELP AFRICANS BRING ABOUT TOTAL ARMS. EMBARGO AND ASKED HOW HE! THOUGHT AFRICANS MIGHT INI.

5. HOUPHOUET THEN: SAID: HEI HAD: BEEN! ASKED BY PRESIDENT TUBMAN TO COME TO DAU COMCON MEETING. IN! MONROVIA AS AN OBSERVER AND ALSO TO ENSURE! PRESENCE! OF BIAFRAN! DELEGATION: WHICH MIGHT MEET WITH DELEGATION! FROM NIGERIA. HOUPHOUET SAID HE: HAD SENT MESSAGE TO TUBMAN SAYING HE: WOULD! DO: HIS: BEST TO: GET BIAFRAN DELEGATION THERE BUT THAT HE! HIMSELF! WOULD NOT COME AS MERE! OBSERVER. HE COULD NOT BE! EXPECTED! ATTEND, MEETING AND REMAIN! SILENT. ALSO, BIAFRANS WILL NOT AGREE! TO! DEAL! PRIMARILY WITH!

OAU COMMITTEE. ASKED! IF! BIAFRANS: WOULD MEET NIGERIANS: SINCE!

THEY HAD NOT REPEAT NOT DONE! SO! AT LONDON, HOUPHOUET SAID HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD. ALTHOUGH MEETING, IN: LONDON DURING!

COMMONWEALTH! CONFERENCE! WAS: DISADVANTAGEOUS: TO! BIAFRANS, THEY HAD GONE THERE! PREPARED! TO! MEET. REASON! THEY HAD NOT GONE

THROUGH! WITH! MEETING, ACCORDING! TO! HOUPHOUET; WAS BECAUSE:
ANOLOWO: AND SAMUEL! WERE! FMG! REPS! AND! BIAFRANS HAVE! NO! CONFIDE!

IN. THEM. HOUPHOUET ADDED! HE! SHARED! THIS: VIEW.

6. HOUPHOUET THEN INDICATED HIS WILLINGNESS ATTEND MONROVIA MEETING IF TUBMAN COULD TAKE INTITIATIVE TO ARRANGE THINGS SO

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THAT HE COULD ATTEND MEETING AS: PARTICIPANT RATHER: THAN OBSERVER APPARENTLY THINKING ALDUD HE ADDED THAT IF HE AND PRESIDENT BONGO AND PERHAPS PRESIDENT NYDERERE COULD ATTEND, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN CALL FOR IMMEDIATE END TO ALL OUTSIDE:
INTERFERENCE IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS: AND FOR IMPOSITION OF TOTAL
EMBARGO ON ARMS: DELIVERIES: FROM ANY SOURCE TO NIGERIA AND BIAFRA HE WOULD HOPE THAT IF WE AND UK AND FRANCE WENT ALONG WITH AFRICAN APPEAL FOR EMBARGO, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE FORCED TO ACCEPT IT FOLIA

IT MIGHT THEN BELPOSSIBLE FOR AFRICAN STATES: AT MONROVIA MEETING TO ARRANGE!
FOR SUBSEQUENT CEASEFIRE, AND MEETING WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS.
BETWEEN OUUKWU AND GOWON, AND EVENTUALLY SOME SORT OF INTERNATIONAL.
POLICE FORCE: TO PROTECT BITAFRANS. (COMMENT: HOUPHOUET SEEMED TO BE THINKING OF UN ROLE HERE SINCE HE CONSIDERS OAU AS BIASED.
BUT HE WAS NOT DEFINITED I ASKED WHETHER GEN DE GAULLE WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A PLAN AND HOUPHOUET INDICATED HE THOUGHT SO BUT THAT HE HAS NOT ACTUALLY DISCUSSED IT WITH DEGAULLE.

70 CONCLUDING HTS: PRESENTATION, HOUPHOUET SAID HE WOULD SEND ANOTHER MESSAGE, TO TUBMAN WITH HIS IDEAS FOR MEETING MONROVIA. HOW EVER, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE OUR OFFICIAL REACTION TO, AND IF POSSIBLE OUR DISCREST SUPPORT FOR HIS IDEAS. I SAID I WOULD COMMUNICATE HIS IDEAS: TO WASHINGTON AND WOULD TRY TO HAVE REPLY FOR HIM WHEN HE RETURNS TO PARIS FROM LYON FAIR ON MARCH 28. HOUPHOUST SAID HE WOULD GO TO GENEVA FROM PARIS ON MARCH 29, AFTER RETURNING FROM LYON. HE WILL BE AVAILABLE TO RETURN TO PARIS TO DISCUSS NIGERIA/ BIAFRA ISSUE DURING THIS TWO WEEK PERIOD.

8. IN BRIEF: CONVERSATION: LATER: IN DAY. MARCH: 24 (PIERRET OF GUAI NIGERIAN DESK) TOLD: EMBOFF: THAT TUBMAN: HAD: INVITED ALL. FOUR: AFRICAN: COUNTRIES: WHICH: RECOGNIZE: BIAFRA. TO: ATTEND: MONROVIA

OAU CONCOM MEETING PIERRET SAID QUAI CONSIDERS THIS VERY HOPEFUL SIGN AND IS IN FAVOR OF SUCH A MEETING SINCE QUUKWU WILL NEVER ACCEPT OAU ACCORDING TO PIERRET ONLY ENLARGED MEETING OF THIS SORT COULD ARRIVE AT PEACE PROPOSALS WITH HOPE OF ACCEPTANCE

S. COMMENT: HOUPHOUET TOLD ME THAT THIS: WAS: HIS FIRST EFFORT ESTABLISH SERIOUS CONTACT WITH NIXON ADMINISTRATION ON NIGERIA/

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## TEECRAN

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BTAFRA QUESTION: WHICH: HE CONSIDERES: OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE.

HE PLANS SEND FONMIN: USHER! TO: WASHINGTON LATER BUT WANTS TO TRY

AND DO SOMETHING RIGHT AWAY. SINCE! HOUPHOUST SAW DEGAULLE LATE.

LAST WEEK, WE ASSUME! THAT, THEIR! THINKING: ID. NOT IN! CONFLICT

ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT KNOW THAT HE DISCUSSED! HIS: IDEAS: WITH THE

GENERAL. IF DEPT HAS: ANY SUGGESTIONS WHICH! THEY THINK MIGHT IMPROVE

HOUPHOUST'S PROPOSAL I BELIEVE! THEY WOULD, BE: SYMPATHETICALLY

RECEIVED. IN: MY OPINIONS WE! SHOULD! TRY AND MOVE! AHEAD WITH WHAT

SOUNDS: LIKE A REASONABLE! APPROACH! FOR SOMEONE: AS DEEPLY COMMITTED

TO BIAFRAN COUSE: AS: HOUPHOUST. GP-2: SHRIVER:

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POL 27 BIAFRA- MIGERIA 0 4 5 0 2 9 outgoing telegram Department of State INDICATE: COLLECT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Classification Origin 4 Mar 69 21 402 ACTION: Amembassy PRIORITY TAGOS Info ADDIS ABABA INFO: Amembassy COTONOU LOME LONDON YAOUNDE · USMission GENEVA STATE 1. Washington Post March 24 reports radio Biafra broadcast that Biafran anti-aircraft crew brought down a Nigerian bomber which injuring crashed at Calabar critically knjuring 3rd Division Commander Adekunle. AP ticker item March 24 reports Federal Air Force officiers' statement that Adekunle was in a jet bomber which crashlanded at Port Harcourt after a flight over Biafran airstrip during which wing damaged while flying at tree top level. Witnesses reported as saying that plane returned with one engine hanging "as if it had been shot up." No mention of injuries. 2. According to Reuters March 24 Nigerian Air Force reported destruction of 6 aircraft using Uli airstrip in raids during weekend and on Monday. 3. Request any info Embassy may have. ROGERS END Melbourne AF/W:DFSmith 7705 classification approved by: Roy M. Nigeria Task For AF/P - Mr. Perk (substance) LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Classification FORM DS-322



## POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA XR DEF 12-5 BIAFRA

#### Department of State **TELEGRAM**

XC POL 29 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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CONFIDENTIAL COTONOU 318

SUBJECT: DC-3 CRASH UL1 MARCH 17 REF: STATE 43880  $\sim l^{\rm color} e^{-l/2} = l^{\rm color} e^{-l/2} = l^{\rm color} =$ 

1. ACCORDING BIAFRAN EYEWITNESS ULI DC-3 HAD UNLOADED ARMS
AND BEER AND TAKEN ON "BIAFRAN" PASSENGER. EYEWITNESS SAID
PASSENGER WAS BIAFRAN GOV OFFICIAL. SAID DID NOT KNOW IDENTITY.
DC-3 MADE TAKE OFF RUN WITH LANDING LIGHTS ONLY. STRIP
LIGHTS OUT. PLANE REACHED! ALTITUDE OF 100-150 FEET OVER END OF
RUNWAY WHEN LOST RIGHT ENGINE WITH SOUND LIKE BACKFIRE. NOSE
OF PLANE WENT UP STEEPER ANGLE TURNED RIGHT ON DOWN GLIDE HIT
TREES AND EXPLODED.

2. ICRC AND WCC PILOTS ON STRIP EXPRESS OPINION PILOT PANICKED.

Authority VND By MNARA Date



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## Department of State TELECRAM

Pol 27 Biogra - Nigeria

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PAGE: 01 LONDON: 02260 242036Z

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P: 241641Z MAR: 69 EM: AMEMBASSY LONDON: TO: USUN. NY PRIORITY 1644 INFO: SECSTATE: WASHDC: 9492;

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UNCLAS LONDON 2260 SECTION 1 OF 2

SUBJECT MARCH 12 TIMES ARTICLE BY SIR BERNARD FERGUSSON.

REF® LONDON: 1932: AND: YOUR SVC. OF: MARCH: 23.
QUOTE: I HAVE: JUST FINISHED STINT OF: 17 WKS: AS SENIOR BRITISH
OBSERVER ON: INT®L: OBSERVER: TEAM IN: NIGERIA. IT WAS: SAD AND
UNHAPPY JOB WITH MANY FRUSTRATIONS. WE: WERE. BASED ON LAGOS, BUT
SPENT MOST OF: TIME VISITING: AND. REVISITING: BATTLEFRONTS,
INSPECTING REFUGEE AND: PRISON OF WAR CAMPS, LOOKING AT MASSIVE
RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES, AND: STUDYING SITUATION OF: IBOS- BOTH
THOSE IN "LIBERATED" AREAS AND THOSE WHO: HAD REMAINED IN THEIR

I NOTICE THAT IN MANY LETTERS TO PRESS WE HAVE BEEN CRITICIZED FOR NOT GOING INTO BIAFRA. ÉVIDENTLY ÎN SOME QUARTERS THERE IS MISUNDERSTANDINS ABOUT OUR ROLE. WE WERE IN NIGERIA AT DIRECT INVITATION OF FEDERAL MILLITARY GOVOT TO INVESTIGATE CHARGES:
BEING BROUGHT AGAINST THEM OF GENOCIDE. ETC. GENOCIDE. BY UN DEFINITION. IS: THE COMMITTING OF CERTAIN ACTS WITH INTENT TO DESTROY—WHOLLY OR IN PART—NATIONAL ETHNIC. RACIAL OR RELIGIOUS. GROUP AS SUCH."

WE: WERE: ABLE: TO: STRETCH: OUT PART OF OUR: TERMS OF: REFERENCE: AS: FAR: AS: WE: LIKED. WE! FOUND: NO: EVIDENCE WHATEVER OF: GENOCIDE. AND: CONSIDERING: ALL! THUNGS: THE: BEHAVIOUR AND: CONTROL: OF: THE:

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## TELEGRAM

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PAGE: 02 LONDON: 02260 2420362

TROOPS WERE GOOD: "ALL! THINGS! INCLUDES: THE:
FACTS: THAT THE: FEDERAL! ARMY HAS INCREASED: ITS: STRENGTH: TENFOLD.
IN: THE: PAST YEAR! THAT THE: VENEER OF: CIVIL! ZATION: AMONG: SOM: OF
TROOPS: IS: STILL! THIN: THAT CIVIL! WARS ARE: ALMAYS MORE: BITTER
THAN ORDINARY WARS, AND: IN: THIS CASE: INTER-TRIBAL: RIVALRIES
ARE: ALSO INVOLVED: THAT LITTLE: GUARTER-IS: GIVEN: BY EITHER-SIDE:
AND: THAT PRESENT WAR: WAS: TRIGGERED: OFF: BY: ASSASSINATION: BY IBOS
OF: SOME OF MOST REVERED: AND: RESPECTED NON-IBOS IN: COUNTRY.

FACT THAT WE WERE INVITED BY FEDERAL GOVOT DEMONSTRATES AS NOTHING ELSE COULD, THEIR OWN FEELING THAT THEY HAD NOTHING TO HIDE. SO FAR AS I KNOW, SUCH AN INVITATION IS WITHOUT PRE CEDENT. WE EXAMINED HUNDREDS OF SOLDIERS ON THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF CODE OF CONDUCT ISSUED BY GOVT. MOST OF THEM HAD COPIES ON THEIR PERSONS, AND EVEN ILLITERATE HAD BEEN SCHOOLED IN ITS CONTENTS, AND REPLIED TO OUR SATISFACTION. AS FOR BOMEINGS, HERE ARE EXTRACTS FROM STANDING ORDERS, OF WHICH I

ALL: EFFORTS MUST BE MADE TO ADHERE STRICTLY TO THIS CODE OF: CONDUCT. SINCERE EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO PRESERVE AS: MANY LIVES AS POSSIBLE. YOU WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BOMB ANY NON-MILITARY TARGET. ANY GATHERING OF ANY CIVILLAN POPULATION WILL BE AVOIDED. MILITARY TARGETS IN MOST CASES WILL NOT NORMALLY BE IN TOWNS. YOU WILL ENDEAVOR TO MAINTAIN A MAXIMUM RESTRAINT ON YOUR ACTIVITIES OVER REBEL AREA.

ONE OF OUR RULES WAS NOT BE GULLIBLE, AND TO ACCEPT AS EMIDENCE NOTHING THAT WE HAD NOT SEEN WITH OUR OWN EYES OR HEARD WITH OUR OWN EARS OCCASSIONALLY, OF COURSE, ONE GOT BUILD UP OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE FROM SEVERAL DIRECTIONS SO IMPRESSIVE THAT WE WERE TEMPTED TO BREAK THIS RULE; AND REPORTS OF HEAVY CIVILIAN CASUALTIES FROM AIR ATTACK IN BIAFRA ARE NOW SO NUMEROUS FROM WITNESSES MANY OF WHOM ARE REPUTABLE, THAT I PERSONALLY FEEL DRIVEN TO ACCEPT THEM. BUT I AM NOT YET CON-

SOME: PEOPLE WOULD: APPARENTLY HAVE US THINK: PREGNANT WOMEN ARE CAREFULLY CHOSEN: AS TARGETS. THE COUNTRY IS THICKLY POPULATED, WITH: A VILLAGE OF ALMOST EVERY MILE, AND TARGET ERROR OF SECONDS IN AIR CAN MEAN MILES ON GROUND: FROM FAST-FLYING AIRCRAFT WITH INEXPERIENCED: PILOT. FEDERAL GOVIT IS FULLY AWARE

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## Department of State TEIGRAM

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OF: MOUNTING CHORUS: OF CRITICISM AND PROPAGANDA, AND ITS LEADERS ARE NOT SUCH: FOOLS: AS: TO: COURT IT BY DELIBERATELY ATTACKING PURELY CIVILIAN OBJECTIVES.

BUT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO INVESTIGATE THESE ALLEGATIONS.
WE COULD AND DID CALL FOR PILOTS REPORTS ON THEIR SORTIES. BUT
IN DETERMINATION NOT TO BE GULLIBLE WE HAD TO REALIZE THAT
THESE COULD HAVE BEEN FUDGED. NOR WERE WE NUMEROUS ENOUGH
TO DETACH OBSERVERS TO EVERY OPERATIONAL AIRSTELD. FACT THAT
IN MY OPINION SUCH ATROCITIES WOULD BE OUT OF CHARACTER WITH THE
CONDUCT OF WAR AS I SAW IT IS NOT EVIDENCE EITHER.

I UNDERSTAND THAT BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION IN LAGOS HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF DISMISSING ALL THESE REPORTS AS: "BIAFRANI PROPAGANDA". THAT IS JUST PLAINLY UNTRUE: ONE SUCH REPORT EMANATED FROM CORRESDONDENT WHO IN FACT LEFT LAGOS THE DAY BEFORE RAID HE MENTIONED TOOK PLACE. IN MY VIEW BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONERS DOING MAGNIFICENT JOBS FROM SIR DAVID HUNT DOWNWARDS AND THEY HAVE LOT TO PUT UP WITHS NOT LIST FROM PERIPATETIC BUSYBODIES, WHO ARE PARTISPRIS FOR ONE SIDE OR OTHER BEFORE THEY EVER ARRIVE.

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UNCLAS LONDON 2260 SECTION 2 OF 2:

AS: FOR BIAFRAN REPORTS: WHICH ARELOFTEN: ACCEPTED AS GOSPEL
BY THEIR WELL-WISHERS: I CAN ONLY TESTIFY FROM FIRSTHAND:
EXPERIENCE THAT WE HAVE AT TIMES BEEN STANDING ON TERRITORY
WHICH BIAFRAN RADIO WAS CLAIMING TO HAVE WON AND TO HOLD. HERE ARE TWO EXAMPLES FROM PAST FEW NEEKS. BIAFRA RADIO CLAIMED THERE WAS REVOLT IN IBADAN. AND THAT FEDERALIAIR FORCE HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO BOMB CITY, CAUSING 300 CASUALTIES. LATER THEY SAID THAT 120 HOSTAGES HAD BEEN SHOT IN PORT HARCOURT PRISON. IT SO HAPPENS THAT I WAS IN IBADAN ON FIRST DAY, AND IN PORT HARCOURT PRISON. ON SECOND, BOTH: IN MORNING AND AFTERNOON, NEITHER: REPORT HAD: ANY FOUNDATION, LET NOBODY TELL: ME: THAT PRISONERS: MIGHT HAVE BEEN SHOT AFTER I LEFT'S I WAS IN PORT HARCOURT FOR 24 HOURS THEREAFTER DURING WHICH TIME I WAS VISITED BY RED CROSS WORKERS FROM PRISON. WHICH IS NOT REFUGEE CAMP.

I HAVE BEEN DISTRESSED BY NUMEROUS LETTERS FROM WELL MEANING PEOPLE TELLING ME THINGS WHICH I KNOW TO BELFALSE THAT FEDERALS SHOT EVERY IBO MAN, WHOMAN AND CHILD BETWEEN AGBOR AND ASABAS THAT MINORITY PEOPLES IN ORIGINAL BREAKAWAY STATE OF BLAFRA WERE HEART AND SOUL BEHIND THE SECESSIONSISTS & ALL EXCESSES IN WAR HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BY FEDERALS, AND NONE BY IBOS. I AM SURE THAT THERE HAVE BEEN EXCESSES ON BOTH SIDES. I ALSO BELIEVED HUMBLY, THAT KNOWLEDGE OF OUR PRESENCE, AND FACT THAT WE MIGHT SUDDENLY TURNI UP MAY HAVE REDUCED THEM - AND I REPEAT THAT WE WERE

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### Department of State

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THERE BY FEDERAL INVITATION.

LASTITWO: MONTHS: OF: MY TIME: IN: NIGERIA WERE: INFINITELY LESS
HARROWING: THAN FIRST TWO: IN: THAT SPECTRE: OF: FAMINE HAS:
RECEDED: TRAGEDY OF: NIGERIA IS THAT; GENERALLY SPEAKING; THERE
IS NORMALLY ENOUGH FOOD: FOR: EVERYBODY GIVEN: THAT THEY STAY AND
GROW CROPS IN THEIR: OWN: DISTRICT AND ARE: FREE: TO DRAW ON: THOSE
OF: OTHERS IN: NORMAL WAY OF: TRADE: BUT UPHEAVAL: OF: LAST EIGHTEEN
MONTHS: HAS: DISPLACED THOUSANDS OF: PEOPLE: AND: MOST OF THEM: HAVE
BEEN: UNABLE: TO RETURN TO: THEIR OWN: HOMES IN: TIME: TO SOW: FOR:
NEXT: HARVEST === WHICH: SHOULD: HAVE: BEEN: DONE: BY END: OF: JAN:

IN NOV., RED, CROSS: AND! KINDRED: ORGANIZATIONS: WERE FEEDING:
350,000 PEOPLE: IN AND: ROUND GYO AND ITU AND: AT ONE MOMENT
THEY HAD ONLY FEW DAYS: SUPPLY LEFT, FORTUNATELY GAP WAS: BRIDGED
IN TIME TO AVOID COMPLETE! CALAMITY, BUT VERY MANY HAD DIED IN: MONTHS
BEFORE, EITHER FROM SHEER STARVATION OR FROM SUCH DEFICIENCY
DISEASES: AS. KWASHIKOR. I AM TOLD BY RED CROSS OFFICIALS -- BUT
ACCORDING TO OUR RULES THIS IS HEAR-SAY. -- THAT SITUATION:
IN: BIAFRA IS: ALSO: MUCH! BETTER; HOWEVER, "THE NEED TO FEED! WILL
CONTINUE FOR: LONG: TIME! TO: COME, AND: WHOLE: PROCESS OF REHABILITATION.
WILL! TAKE: A LONG: TIME:

THE EFFORTS OF THE FEDERAL GOVOT IN THIS DIRECTION HAVE BEEN PRAISEWORTHY. TWO TOWNS WHICH HAVE SUFFERED MOST DAMAGE.
ONITSHA AND ABA, ARE STILL TOO CLOSE TO FRONT FOR THEIR INHABITANTS TO RETURN, OR FOR REBUILDING TO BEGIN. BUT ENUGU, FOR INSTANCE, FORMER CAPITAL OF EASTERN REGION AND SUBSEQUENTLY OF SECESSIONIST REGIME, IS STARTING UPLAGAIN UNDER ABLE ADMINISTRATOR AND STAFF, ALLOF THEM IBO. WHEREAS GREAT MAJORITY OF IBOS IN OTHER PARTS OF NIGERIA, RESPONDED TO COLIOUKWUS SUMMONS TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND SHORTLY BEFORE WAR BEGAN, MANY OTHERS REMAINED, AND WE OBSERVERS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO VISIT MANY OF THESE ALLOVER THE COUNTRY AND ASSURE OURSELVES THEY HAVE NO FEAR FOR THEIR SAFETY.

ONE: OF: OUR MANY FRUSTRATIONS: WAS TO: READ IN BRITISH NEWSPAPERS OF: MANY MISCONCEPTIONS: {AS: IT SEEMED: TO ME; AT ANY RATE;}
PREMALENT IN COUNTRY. I LOOKED ON: MY JOB AS: BEING THREEFOLD:
IN: FIRST PLACE; I WAS MEMBER: OF: THE: TEAM & IN: SECOND I WAS:
EYES: AND EARS: OF: BRITISH PUBLIC; WHO WERE, FOR: MOST PART
AS: ILL=INFORMED: AS: I WAS WHEN I FIRST WENT OUT: AND THIRDLY;

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By MNARA Date V 5 05



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WHILE STRIVING TO REMAIN IMPARTIAL AND REMINDING MYSELF THAT I WAS SEEING ONLY FEDERAL SIDE, I COULD NOT HELP FORMING INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS.

SOME OF: WHAT SEEMED: TO MEI TO BE MISCONCEPTIONS WERE:
HAWKED: AROUND LAGOS BY BRITISH AND OTHER: FOREIGN VISITORS,
MANY OF: WHOM = AND THIS: IS. PERHAPS: ANOTHER: FEATHER: IN CAP
OF FEDERAL GOVOT, WHO WELCOMED ALLI AND SUNDRY = HAD ALREADY
MADE CLEAR THEIR SYMPATHY FOR SECESSIONIST SIDE I WAS
BRAINWASHED FOR HOUR IN: MY HOTEL! ROOM IN: LAGOS BY TWO BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARIANS WHOSE CONSTANT THEAM WAS: AN IMMEDIATE
CEASEFIRE, FOLLOWED BY COOLING OFFIOMY REACTIONS TO THIS:
WAS, AND REMAINS, THAT THIS WOULD SETTLE: NOTHING AND THAT
COOLING OFFI PERIOD WOULD INEVITABLY BECOME! HOTTING -UP:
ONE; WITH BOTHS SIDES: FLEXING THEIR: MUSCLES: AND RESTOCKING
THEIR ARMOURIES.

PROBABLY NO ISSUE HAS DIVIDED BRITTISH PUBLIC OPINION SO MUCH SINCE THE SUEZ AFFAIR ÎN 1956 WINSTON CHURCHILL HAD TWO PRIVILEGES WHICH WEREINOT MINER HE WAS ABLE TO VISIT BUAFRA, AND HE WAS FREE TO TAKE SIDES I HAVE FELT BOUND THROUGHOUT TO REMAIN IMPARTIAL IN PUTTING FORWARD IN THIS ARTICLE CERTAIN MATTERS FAVOURING FEDERAL SIDE! I HAVE SOUGHT TO CAST LIGHT ON ASPECTS OF THEIR CASE WHICH SEEMED TO ME TO BE GOING BY DEFAULT, AND WHICH OUGHT TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY HONEST APPRAISAL. I WOULD ADD THAT PAST FOUR MONTHS HAVE BEEN JUST ABOUT SADDEST OF MY LIFE. UNQUOTE. KAISER

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## Department of State TELEGRAM

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AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMCONSUL OOUALA

C O N F I O E'N T I A L YAOUNOE 511

SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH PRES AHIOJO

- I. PRES AHIOJO AND I HAD WIDE RANGING CONVERSATION AT HIS HOME IN GAROUA MAR 19 FOLLOWING CONCLUSION UNC PARTY CONGRESS. FOLLOWING WERE MAIN POINTS DISCUSSED.
- 2. PRES EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION AT OUTCOME PARTY CONGRESS. HE APPEARED MOST PLEASED BY OPPORTUNITY CONGRESS AFFORDED DELEGATES FROM SOUTH AND WEST TO SEE THAT NORTHERNERS NOT POOR RELATIONS BUT CULTURED AND REASONABLY PROSPEROUS PARTNERS MAKING DEMONSTRABLE CONTRIBUTION TO FEDERAL STATE. PRES.S FEELING MOTIVATED BY HIS GENUINE CONCERN THAT ALL SECTIONS COUNTRY COOPERATE. NOT BY REGIONAL PRIDE ALONE (ALTHOUGH THAT ALSO EVICENT).
- 3. AHIDJO SAID HE WILL ATTEND OAU MEETING MONROVIA APR 17, ALTHOUGH HE SEES LITTLE CHANGE IN BASIC POSITIONS FMG OR BIAFRANS. HE EXPRESSED FEA THAT WITH CONTINUING INTERNATIONALIZATION OF NIGERIAN CONFLIT, STRUGGLE COULD TAKE ON DIMESIONS MIDDLE EAST OR VIETNAMESE PROBLEMS.

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# POL 15-1 ZAMBIA XL POL 19 SW AFR/UN TELEGRAM

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CHO. RER EL CHT ELD CHO PLY (ENTIRE) TEXT)

SUBJ: ZAMBIAN FONMIN APPRECIATES US COOPERATION ON

1. SUMMARY. ZAMBIAN FOREIGN MIMISTER ELIJAH MUDENDA CALLED ME IN MARCH 24 TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR US COOPERATION WITH ZAMBIA IN PASSING UNSC RESOLUTION ON NAMIBIA (SWA). WE DISCUSSED SEVERAL OTHER MATTERS INCLUDING HIS RECENT BITTER CONDEMNATION OF NATO "SUPPORT FOR PORTUGAL". END SUMMARY.

2. MUDENDA BEGAN BY SAYING HE: PLEASED THAT US-ZAMBIAN RELATIONS CONTINUE TO BE GOOD DESPITE FACT THERE WERE AREAS WHERE TWO: COUNTRIES: WERE: NOT ALWAYS: AGREED. EXPRESSED: SATISFACTION: THAT AMERICANS HAVE! BEEN: INVOLVED! IN ZAMBIA'S: ECONOMIC: DEVELOPMENT AND, NOTING THAT THERE IS: GREATER AMERICAN PARTICIPATION: IN DEVELOPMENT OF: OTHER; COUNTRIES; HE: HOPED! AMERICANS WOULD: INCREASE: THEIR PARTICIPATION: IN: DEVELOPMENT OF: ZAMBIA. HE: WELCOMED! AMERICAN: PARTICIPATION: IN: COPPER! INDUSTRY (RST) BUT SAID!

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Cleared by Roger Morris per . Alice Caubet to AGrier 4/1/69 COPIES TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE RFWashington, D.C. 20520 AR/W 3394 NIGERIAN T LIMITED OFFICIAL USE EUR/BMI March 24, 1969

> MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from Mr. M.B. Ekpang, President of the Nigeria Union of Ireland

Mr. Ekpang has written to the President about the Nigerian civil war. His letter, dated February 28, was received under cover of an airgram from Embassy Dublin.

We recommend that the Embassy be instructed to reply to Mr. Ekpang in behalf of the President, utilizing the enclosed suggested reply.

Acting Executive Secretary 5/S cwm =

A True Copy

Enclosures:

- Airgram A-351, March 4, 1969
- Suggested Reply

Redrafted and retyped in S/S-S:CLKelly

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## NIGERIA UNION OF IRELAND Encl

(DUBLIN BRANCH)

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3394

YOUR REF.

OUR REF.

c/o 18, Windsor Road

Rathmines, Dublin, 6.

28th February, 1969

The President of the United States of America White House, Washington D. C.

Mr. President,

I am directed by the Nigeria Union of Ireland to write you on a matter of grave concern to our country - viz - the rebellion organised and executed by a power hungry clique with the active support of certain European Churches which has brought death and agony to our peoples. Perhaps before I go any further it might be well to recall that Nigeria and the United States have been traditional friends long before we became am Independent Nation in 1960. If we display a special interest in the attitude of the United States it is not because America is a super-power, but because of several factors. America which has gone through a civil war of unification, share co-mon history and experience with Nigeria. Even more so now with a Republican President in office whose predecessor, Abraham Lincoln, extolled the virtues of the Union. It is significant that Major General Valubu Gowon is to us what Abraham Lincoln is to Americans. Besides, American citizens and capital ham played a considerate part in the development of Nigeria and American Institutions have trained many Nigerians including some of the country's leading citizens. Moreover, many parts of Africa depend directly or indirectly on American financial aid, which tend to adversely affect America's balance of payments. But in Nigeria, we have the opportunity, the resources, and the will to create a United and viable entity capable of ultimately relieving the United States of some of this burden. Is this not an enterprise which the United States should actively support?

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By MMARA Date 0 5/05

For these reasons we believe we are entitled to expect positive commitment by the United States in our efforts to keep Nigeria united. We are disappointed that a country whose declared policy is peace and stability in the world should not rally to our help when clearly the stability of West Africa and indeed of the Whole continent is threatened. There is no question nor any doubt whatever that a United Nigeria is vital to the stability of Africa.

Mr. President, you may recall that in May 1967 a clique which had inspired the coup of January 1966 which overthrew our Second Republic rebelled against the Federal Government and declared that if called "Republic of Biafra". This "republic" included 5 million Efiks, Ibibios, Ikois, Ijaws, who had a distinctive culture from the Ibos and emphatically rejected the idea of secession which was the brain child of the Ibo leadership. These non-Ibos in the former Eastern Nigeria (which the rebels called "biafra") appealed to the Federal Government to come to their rescue. Before the Federal Government answered their call the rebels bombed parts of the country with American made bombs and planes which had been acquired secretly. The Federal Government was caught unawares and badly shaken. However, it soon made a remarkable recovery. Both the United States and Great Britain refused to supply arms to us when approached much to our disappointment and dismay. It will be well to add that so far Great Britain has since reconsidered her decision and is one of our greatest friends.today. However, our Government succeeded in obtaining arms elsewhere with which it halted the initial advance and reversed the march of the rebels.

Meanwhile, the rebels, is equal partnership with so called clerics of European origins, had mounted a massive compaign of lies and villification designed to discredit the Federal Government and whip up sympathy and support for the rebels. These propagandists assiduously adhered to the canon of propaganda laid down by Goebbels to his staff of the Nazi Ministry.for Propaganda - viz - the bigger the lie the easier it is to swallow. It has since become manifestly clear that even those who parade themselves as the Custodians of public morality are patently dishonest and incorrigible liers. The ease with which they exploit the sufferings of black people in the name of humanity and the Almighty would bring confert to Lucifer and his fallen Angels. This propaganda failed dismally in Africa. But its effect in Europe and the United States is somewhat nebulous. However, one suspects that many decent and honest men and women in the United States have been propelled by sheer force of propaganda rather then by reason to say and do

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things they would otherwise never dream of doing particularly if they were fully aware of the facts.

Certain European religious Institutions which are part and marcel of this gigantic propaganda machinery, persuaded their more obedient followers, some of them in high places in Europe and the United States, that the rebels were fighting a religious war against the Muslims. When it became clear that there were more Christeins in other parts of the country than in Ibo-land, the directors of propaganda shifted amphasis from a religious war to a claim that "Biafra" was fighting what they described as a "war of survival". This lie was dropped when they were unable to explain to a bemused public why the rebels over-ran the Mid-West and were poised for an attack on Lagos in the early days of the rebellion.

Then the "genocide" theme was resorted to ... that most emotive theme! The force of support they evoked under this new tag compelled the Federal Government to invite a team of International observers into the country to see things themselves. Members of the team in their report said there was no evidence of genocide and indeed added that they had observed Federal forces attempting to help with the feeding and resettlement of Ibos and other civilians displaced by the war. It is also a fact that there are many Ibos living and working freely in the areas under the control of the Federal Government and the Ibos found in villages re-taken from robel forces stand as evidence and proof that the genocide story is a blattant lie. Only last week the Administrator for the East Central State (Ibo State), Mr. Ukpabi Asika, himself an Ibo was reported to have said that four million Ibos now had returned to Federal Held territory.

Presently, the propagandists - who have by now become inextricably interwoven with certain European Churches - are exploiting the hunger for political ends. They are using huamn suffering as a bargaining counter. This would surely be a most engaging study for students of Politics. The Propagandists effectively turned international concern to concentrate on an airlift as the only way to bring relief to the suffering in rebel held areas. It is will to remember that it is not the only means possible and indeed it is the most expensive and least appropriate means. Since February 1968, the Federal Government has repeatedly offered to co-operate in the delivery of food and relief supplies first by sea and then by road. The Red Cross has given its opinion that only by the opening of land routes could supplies be sent in the quantities required. These offers have been rejected by the rebels.

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Lest week the Federal Government offered to place Obelagwn Airstrip at the disposal of Relief Organisations. The rebels of course derided the idea of transporting relief supplies through an airstrip under Federal Government control whether by night or by day. It has become visibly plain that the Federal Government has done everything humanle possible to facilitate relief supplies to reb&6 area and everybody knows it but nebody seems to appreciate it. Sometimes one wonders if people have not lost their reason under the constant rain of propaganda tailored to exploit human suffering for political end.

Now the atmosphere is charged with rumours (however, yet unconfirmed) that the United States is going to plump for the rebels and stand behind the colours of De Gaulle, Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia - a clique held together by the common desire to see a fragmented Africa fighting against itself. It will be a pity and indeed a misfortune if the present United States Administration does anything which could be construed by the rebels as encouragement to continue futile rebellion andso prolong the suffering of our people. Surely those who have encouraged the rebels a and thus ensured the continued death of our people have much to account for before God. History willnot forgive those who in our hour of distress joined with the destructive forces which sought to decommate us. As for our friends who stood byus, they have erected a memorial to an everlasting friendship - a friendship which we will treasure dearly and will hand down from one generation of Nigerians to another.

Finally, we appeal to the United States to call on the rebels and their collaborators to give up their futile rebellion and thus facilitate the alleviation of the agony and suffering of our people. We call on the United States to come out and positively demonstrate their support for a United Nigeria.

Yours sincerely,

M. B. Ekpang President

Nigeria Union of Ireland

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Authority VN ) 95 9503

By MNARA Date 0 5 105

### DEPARTMENT OF STATE

#### Suggested Reply

Dear Mr. Ekpang:

The Department of State has asked me to reply to your letter of February 28 to the President about the Nigerian civil war, which has been given careful consideration in Washington. The position of the United States Government regarding the Nigerian civil war was most recently enunciated by the President on February 22, when he expressed the nation's deep concern for the terrible human suffering caused by the war on both sides. He made clear, however, that U.S. policy draws a sharp distinction between carrying out our moral obligations to respond effectively to humanitarian needs and involving ourselves in the political affairs of others.

He appointed Mr. C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr., as

Special Coordinator on relief to civilian victims of
the war on both sides of the battle lines. Mr. Ferguson
was charged with assuring that the U.S. contributions
to the international relief effort are responsive to

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the increased needs to the maximum extent possible and that they are effectively utilized. He will give particular attention to ways and means by which the flow of relief can be increased to all afflicted areas. Mr. Ferguson will not seek and will not accept a charge to negotiate issues other than those directly relevant to relief.

The United States recognizes the Federal Military

Government as the government of Nigeria. We do not recognize Biafra. We have steadfastly adhered to the position that the Nigerian civil war is first, a Nigerian problem and, secondly, an African problem. We believe that a solution must be found within this context. We continue to urge both sides to reach a negotiated settlement of their differences.

I have enclosed information of the Nigerian relief problem which may be of interest to you.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONTROL NO. EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ACTION SLIP WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL AF -Mr. Alexander TO 3/12/69 DATE SUBJECT Ltr to the Pres fm M.B. Ekpang, President of the Nigerian Union of Ireland dtd 2/28 re a positive commitment by the US to keep Nigeria united. XXXPrepare a/Read to <u>Kissinger</u> memo enclosing or containing: letter and NOTES Draft reply for President's White House referrals must be answered within 48 hours unless otherwise noted. If deadline signature. Draft reply for signature by cannot be met, inform S/S immediately at extension given Memo for use as enclosure to reply by White House. below. XXX Comment or recommendation. re reply. Direct replies to White House mail Direct-reply:-must be signed at the Assistant or Acting Assistant Secretary level. Furnish information copy under cover of a Read to 3. Unless otherwise noted, direct replies, depending upon the addresse memo. Comeback copy required for S/S. of the incoming letter, must begin; "The President has asked me to reply" or "Mr. has asked Suitable acknowledgment or other has asked appropriate handling: me to reply" Furnish information copy of reply, if any, under cover of a Read to memo 4. Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum or comment or comeback Refer to White House request of copy for the White House is requested. XXXDue in S/S by REMARKS 3 YAAT 3ÄSSS W COPIES TO: EUR - Mr. DuBose (W/att) ZI WWW 696 DEPARTMENT OF STATE AParker 4735

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
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TO: AMB/PO DCM POL ECON CONS	POST R Action	OUTING Infa.	Initials	scale suffering caused by Nigeria's civil war, the main elements underlying Houphouet's recommendated Houphouet's primary objective is to bring the but while he has been of considerable help to it is doubtful that he has had great influence of His strong penchant for discussion and comprahim to work toward a negotiated solution to the clear losers or winners.  * * * * * * *  It is almost a year now since President Houph showed his sympathy for the Biafran side in the war and to this day we cannot say we know jus	rognition of Biafra. fighting to an end Biafra thus far, In Biafran policy. In Biafran po
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Like some other decisions he made in the past (e.g. on Tshombe), this one was a highly personal act. Whatever the degree of Houphouet's emotional involvement with Biafra as he was building up to his decision in Paris last spring, it is pretty certain he knew it was unlikely to generate enthusiasm in Africa or for that matter even Ivory Coast. The care with which he prepared the ground here points to that. He was of course overoptimistic in thinking, as he apparently did, that his and President Nyerere of Tanzania's earlier recognition would bring other African leaders to reexamine their views and that a fair number would sooner or later come around to the Ivorian and Tanzanian positions.

To get the full perspective on Houphouet's actions on Biafra during the past year it is useful to remember that from 1960 through 1965, Houphouet remained a firm friend of the Nigerian federal government (though he has since said he never believed in the federation). After all, Nigeria pursued moderate, pragmatic policies abroad and had chosen the liberal economic path in building up a modern econ omy. All of this was highly congenial to Houphouet who, furthermore, held Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa in high personal esteem. At a time when Houphouet and other African leaders felt increasingly threatened by Nkrumah's ambitions and were trying to oppose his policies in Africa, the imposing bulk of the Nigerian federation seemed to them to stand as a bulwark of stability and a source of moral and political support.

Nkrumah's overthrow and the establishment of military regimes in Nigeria and Ghana in 1966 changed matters considerably. Relieved of the threat of Nkrumah, Houphouet moved to establish good relations with Ghana's military rulers. With them he shared a powerful interest in ensuring Nkrumah's permanent removal from the scene and this sufficed to override his ingrained dislike of military takeovers. In the case of Nigeria, correct relations were established with the new rulers but the coup had no redeeming feature as in Ghana. Balewa's assassination made the military regime even harder to take. Matters were not improved by the second military coup and by the apparent inability of the Nigerian military to restore political balance to the country and prevent serious tribal difficulties.

Against this background and from things he has said and what we know of his general views, the following seems a reasonable outline of the process by which Houphouet came to recognize Biafra. The basic premise results from a complete reevaluation by Houphouet of Nigeria's role in West Africa after the 1966 coups. Viewed from Abidjan the once stable, progressive and moderate big power of the

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area had been alarmingly transformed into a scene of strife and instability, its leadership/inexperienced hands of a military regime whose membership was moreover subject to sudden and violent changes. Under the stresses of internal dissension Nigeria might well move in unforeseen and possibly highly dangerous directions as far as its neighbors are concerned; it might furthermore become subject to outside influences\* hostile to the fundamental aims of the smaller moderate countries in the area.

The new situation in Nigeria reawakened Houphouet's long held objections to federal systems that are imposed from above without an organic basis, regardless of important local objections, and which he suspects as devices for perpetuating special political and economic interests against the will of large segments of the population. The Ibo resistance to federal control and indications of hauling and pulling by other ethnic groups no doubt made him feel that the federal structure could from now on survive only through the use of force. Consequently, he could not be a supporter of the federation any longer. Yet Houphouet's attitude toward the FMG, as its struggle with the Ibos continued through 1967, was not antagonistic though in November of that year he said that, even if Gowon was claiming it was only a police action, the conflict had now clearly a real civil war of a tribal character involving slaughter on a large scale. As late as January 1968, he believed the FMG would win, though he felt this would bring no lasting peace because as always in Africa the defeated tribe would inevitably rise up again.

Certain French elements for reasons of their own may well have pressed upon Houphouet the view that the Nigerian federation represented a potential threat to every smaller state in this region and that any development which weakened the federation helped exorcize the danger, but we doubt that this would have carried weight with Houphouet, if only because he was now convinced the federation was utterly unviable anyway. What tipped the scales most probably was, first the strength of popular Biafran separatist sentiment and resistance which seemed to harden as the Biafrans were being pushed back into their redoubt. What this apparently did was to help change the image of Ojukwu's leadership for Houphouet who was probably prone to regard him at first as something of a military adventurer in the same way as he looked upon other Nigerian military figures. Ojukwu (helped by astute propaganda) now emerged as the embodiment of the Ibo claim to self-determination.

\*Houphouet has made much of the alleged danger presented by the influence of Soviet-backed "radical" Arabs inNigeria. He sees them exploiting Northern Moslem religious feelings against the Christian coastal peoples of the South, notably the Ibos.

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The second and perhaps equally potent element, was the impact made by his talks with Azikiwe and Dike. Houphouet, by then, was increasingly moved by accounts of large scale killing in Nigeria, including a French TV documentary on the horrors of war in Biafra, and was increasingly determined to do all he could to bring the fighting to a stop. As late as April 1968, he had unsuccesfully urged the FMG to offer a compromise. We do not know details of Azikiwe and Dike's meetings with Houphouet but we understand they were effective in their accounts of the "genocide" allegedly being perpetrated against the Ibos, their pleas for recognition of the Ibo's claim to self determination and their criticism of the federation as an instrument of non-African interests. All of this evidently made a very strong impression coming as it did from sources with Zik and Dike's credentials as African nationalists and men of experience and responsibility.

One of the puzzling aspects of the course adopted by Houphouet is the long delay before he announced his decision to back Biafra. Looking back, one can speculate there may have been some discussion and meeting of the minds between himself and Nyerere about Biafra when the latter visited here in February of last year. Yet it took Houphouet until the end of April to announce his position officially; Nyerere had taken the same step two weeks before. An explanation which we believe deserves consideration is that Houphouet was waiting to get de Gaulle's assurance of tangible support for Biafra. Without such support it is difficult to see how Ivory Coast's or Gabon's recognition, however useful politically and psychologically, would bring about a rapid material improvement in Biafra's prospects. We can only surmise about how Houphouet and de Gaulle dealt with one another on this matter.

From what we know of Houphouet's independence of French views on certain matters and reports that de Gaulle considers him hard-headed and hard to handle, the picture seems a good deal more complex than is sometimes assumed. On the one hand you would have Houphouet by now worked up about Biafra telling de Gaulle he sees no course to adopt other than side with Biafra and pressing the General to take his word on the rightness of this course and help out in whatever way seems best. On the other hand, there is de Gaulle unwilling to turn down Houphouet, who after all is one of France's best and most influential friends in Africa, and leader of a country in which France has an enormous stake. De Gaulle also sees potential advantages for France in supporting Biafra, especially if Houphouet is prepared to step out in front, but is unwilling to give Ojukwu a clear cut commitment including formal recognition of Biafra. The outcome is what we know.

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Thus far any adverse effects Houphouet's policy might have had on his position at home and abroad seem to have been limited. Within Ivory Coast there is no doubt muted criticism by members of the elite who don't like to be out of step with most of the rest of Africa and who furthermore do not see what Ivory Coast stands to gain from embroiling itself in Nigeria's internal problems. There has been some grumbling at the notion that money is being spent on Biafran children brought here for medical treatment. Government news output never touches upon Ivory Coast's contributions to Biafra, if any, but lets it be generally assumed that money needed to run the arms airlift and the weapons themselves is provided by non-Ivorian sources. As for relief supplies and associated logistical operations, their/sources of funding are usually properly identified. There would almost certainly be strong criticism among the public at large if it were learned that Ivorian resources were being diverted to Biafra and this is no doubt the reason why, up to now, there have been no "Biafra days" or other wide scale fund raising efforts here and why Houphouet is apparently avoiding a debate on Biafra within the PDCI.

Outside Ivory Coast, Houphouet's position does not seem to have suffered much either. In part this stems from the fact that Nyerere and Kaunda, whose African nationalism is unquestioned, have adopted positions parallel to his on Biafra. Whatever their differences on Biafra, Houphouet and the other Entente and OCAM chiefs are not letting these stand in the way of cooperation in other areas. The same situation appears to obtain as regards Tubman and Ankrah both of whom made successful visits to Ivory Coast last September and entertain continuing cordial relations with Houphouet.

To the extent that Biafra's military collapse has been avoided and a military stalemate has destroyed FMG hopes of a quick crushing victory, Houphouet probably considers his policy successful. There is another sense in which he can feel he has made headway, and that is inhelping to focus intense humanitarian concern on the civil war. For, quite apart from his feelings about the human suffering resulting directly from the war, he is also plainly preoccupied by the brutalizing psychological impact that would be made upon this region of Africa if human suffering on the large scale now prevailing in Nigeria had not given rise to strong and active disapproval by world opinion.

What seems less clear is where Houphouet sees himself going from now on. His abiding inclination to resolve problems through discussion and compromise would lead him to favor some confederal formula but he would be highly unlikely

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to advance anything of the sort unless the Biafrans agreed. In any event his influence with Ojukwu appears to be decidely limited on issues of key importance to the conduct of the war and the starting of peace talks. For instance, we know he tried and failed to budge the Biafrans on the establishment of relief corridors.

Even though Houphouet may disagree with positions taken by Ojukwu or with his tactics (we have had some small intimations of this) he has gone too far to be openly critical, without losing face. We believe he is sincere when he says he wants to see peace restored and is looking for ways to bring the struggle to an end; viz his statements to the OCAM chiefs at Kinshasa. But it is difficult to see what he can do as long as positions on both sides remain frozen. From here, it looks as though, at the moment, neither the Biafrans nor the FMG are amenable to outside advice which seems unpalatable. Yet we believe Houphouet is looking for some break in the situation which would make it possible to work towards a negotiated solution with no clear winners or losers.

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"I believe that, if the existence of those States is threatened by tribal secessions, we shall find ourselves living in a world in which Africa is for ever dragging behind other continents. This, I believe, would be profoundly wrong. This surely is one of the essentials of the problem. I know that not all hon. Members accept it, but they must accept that many of us do believe this sincerely and deeply. They must also be prepared to realise that this is very much the African view of the problem."

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

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1. PRIMIN WILSON WAS QUESTIONED! IN HOUSE OF COMMONS YESTERDAY

(MARCH 11) ABOUT BRITISH ARMS SUPPLY POLICY AND POSSIBILITY OF

BRINGING ABOUT EMBARGO ON ARMS DELIVERIES TO BOTH SIDES IN

NIGERIAN CONFLICT. HE REPLIED THAT GOV'T WOULD BE WILLING TO

CHANGE ITS ARMS POLICY "IF WE THOUGHT WE COULD HELP TO END THIS

WAR OR TO SHORTEN IT BY ONE DAY." RECALLING THAT COMMONWEALTH

PRIME MINISTERS CONFERENCE HAD NOT CALLED ON BRITISH TO TAKE

SUCH ACTION WILSON MADE CLEAR HIS INTENTION TO CONTINUE PRESENT

POLICY, ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED ARMS QUESTION WAS "INFERNALLY

DIFFICULT PROBLEM WHICH HAUNTS EVERYONE IN THE HOUSE". QUESTIONED

ABOUT ARMS EMBARGO, PRIMIN STATED HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC. "IF

THERE WERE TO BE AN EMBARGO IT WOULD HAVE TO APPLY TO PRIVATE

AND BLACK MARKET SALES AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT SALES." OTHER

QUESTIONS HE TURNED AS DE WITH STATEMENT THERE WOULD BE AMPLE TIME

TO EXPLORE ALL ASPECTS OF NIGERIAN PROBLEM IN DEBATE MARCH 13.

2. NIGERIA ALSO FIGURED IN EXCHANGES IN HOUSE OF LORDS YESTERDAY WITH LORD SHEPHERD ON BEHALF OF GIVERNMENT PARRYING QUESTIONS ON BOMBING AND ARMS POLICY FROM VARIOUS GOV\*T AND

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority VN ) 95 95 9

By MMARA Date 0 5 05



# Department of State TELEGRAM

#### CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LONDON 01932 121839Z

OPPOSITION PEERS RE BOMBING SHEPHERD SAID WE ARE SATISIFIED INSTRUCTIONS TO NIGERIAN AIR FORCE PILOTS ARE CLEAR AND PRECISE INSTRUCTIONS TO NIGERIAN AIR FORCE PILOTS ARE CLEAR AND PRECISE OF EFFECT THEY MUST NOT BOMB ANY NON-MILITARY TARGETS AND ANY GATHERING OF CIVILIAN POPULATION MUST BE AVOIDED. WE HAVE ACCEPTED ASSURANCES THAT REPORTS OF ALLEGED INFRINGEMENTS WILL BE INVESTIGATED AS MATTER OF URGENCY. WHEN QUERIED ABOUT WINSTON CHURCHILL S REPORTS IN TIMES OF CIVILIAN BOMB DAMAGE AND WHETHER GOV'T WAS BEING ADEQUATELY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS BY BRITISH HICOMER'S SHEPHERD PRAISED WORK OF SIR DAVID HUNT AND HIS STAFF "DORING THESE! LONG AND DIFFICULT MONTHS" AND EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT ACCURACY OF CHURCHILL'S REPORTING. SHEPHERD RECALLED THAT CHURCHILL CLAIMED HICOM HAD DISMISSED BIAFRAN REPORTS OF BOMBING ATROCITY FEB 6 AS "PROPAGANDA". HE WONDERED HOW CHURCHILL COULD HAVE DISCUSSED THIS EPISODE WITH HICOMER WHEN HE LEFT LAGOS MRNING OF FEB 6 BEFORE REPORTS OF BOMBING HAD BEEN CARRIED ON RADIO BIAFRA.

- 3. TIMES THIS: MORNING DEFENDS CHURCHILL IN SHORT EDITORIAL
  DEPLORING "OFFICIALLY INSPIRED" ATTEMPT TO DISCREDIT HIM. PAPER
  ALSO CARRIES THREE COLUMN ARTICLE BY FORMER BRITISH OBSERVER
  SIR BERNARD FERGUSON DEFENDING CONDUCT OF WAR BY NIGERIAN FORCES
  AND DENYING CHARGES OF GENOCIDE. (TEXT BY POUCH)
- 4. COMENT: FONOFF'S: WILSON (HEAD) WEST AFRICAN DEPT) EXPECTS:
  NO! CHANGE IN BRITISH: POLICY AS: RESULT OF DEBATE! TOMORROW. HE
  SAID SIR DENIS GREENHILL! HAD SEEN GOWON TWICE; HAD URGED HIM TO
  HELP BRITISH BY SHOWING MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY; BUT HAD FAILED
  OBTAIN GOWON'S ACQUIESCENCE! IN EFFORT GET OBSERVER! TEAM INTO
  BIAFRA TO INSPECT BOMB! DAMAGE! AT FIRST HAND. WILSON ALSO SAID!
  THAT DURING DEBATE GOV'T EXPECTED! TO ANNOUNCE! "SUBSTANTIAL!"
  CONTRIBUTION TO! ICRC. FONSEC STEWART WAS: STILL SCHEDULED TO SUM
  UP! GOV'T'S CASE! AT END! OF! DEBATE! ALTHOUGH: THERE WAS: SLIGHT CHANCE!
  PRIMIN WOULD TAKE ON THIS: JOB, HIMSELF: BRUCE!

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By WNARA Date 0 5 05

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

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LIMDIS/NOFORN

SUBU 8 U: THANT'S: MEETING WITH FOLEY AND TEBBIT

1. FONOFF#S: TEBBIT: (ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY) . WHO RETURNED LAST NIGHT FROM NEW YORK TOLD US: THIS AFTERNOON (MARCH 21) THAT DURING METING WITH MAURICE FOLEY MARCH 19: UNITHANT HAD REAFFIRMED HIS OPPOSITION TO GREATER UNITARY NOOL REAFFIRMED AND CONSTRUCT OF THE SECRETARY O IN SPEAKING OF OAU EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT SETTLEMENT & SYGOBSERVED THAT CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE HAD PROVED UNWIELDY INSTRUMENT . IFI PROGRESS: WAS TO BEL MADE HE THOUGHT COMMITTEE SHOULD APPOINT REPRESENTATIVE (PREFERABLY ENGLISH - SPEAKING WEST AFRICANI) TO ACT ON ITS BEHALF . HELHOPED PRIMIN WILSON WOULD URGE THIS IDEA ON HAILE SELASSIE WHEN HE SAW EMPEROR IN ADDIS

2. TEBBIT SAID FOLEY AND HE WOULD RECOMMEND WILSON DO THIS AND TEBBIT WAS PERSONALLY CONFIDENT PRIMIN WOULD AGREE. HE SAID BRITS WOULD KEEP US INFORMED. MEANWHILE HE ASKED FOR INFOCTO: BECHANDLED ON NOFORN BASIS: SINCE BRITS: WOULD WANT TO PASS WORD TO UT THANK IN DUEL COURSEL THROUGH THEIR OWN CHANNELS.

EMI . ACCORDING TEBBIT, ULTHANT SINGLED OUT SIR BERNARD FERGUSON'S RECENT ARTICLE SUPPORTING FEDERAL CASE IN TIMES (LONDON'S 1932) AND SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS ONE OF BEST ASSESSMENTS HE! HAD! SEEN! KAISER

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By MNARA Date

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CONFIDENTIAL MONROVIA 1372

CORRECTED COPY

SUBJ: PRIME MINISTER WILSON'S VISIT NIGERIA

1. BRITISH AMBASSADOR (PROTECT SOURCE) ADVISED EMBOFF MARCH 21 THAT HE PRESENTING LETTER TO PRESIDENT TUBMAN FROM PRIME MINISTER HAROND WILSON RE LATTER'S VISIT TO NIGERIA.

2. POINT OF LETTER IS APPARENTLY TO REASSURE PRESIDENT TUBMAN THAT PM NOT RPT NOT ATTEMPTING TO MEDILE IN NIGERIAN SETTLEMENT AND THAT HE REGARDS NIGERIAN PROBLEM AS AFRICAN AFFAIR WHICH DAU HOPEFULLY CAN SETTLE.

3. LETTER EXPLAINS THAT SINCE GOWON UNABLE TO ATTEND LAST COMMON-WEALTH CONFERENCE PM THOUGHT IT USEFUL VISIT LAGOS TO SEE AT FIRST HAND WHAT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SITUATION IS AND MEET GOWON. IN ADDITION HE WISHES LOOK INTO RELIEF ASSISTANCE SITUATION.

4. BRITISH AMBASSADOR WILL ALSO ADVISE PRESIDENT THAT PM PLANS

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By MMARA Date 0 5 05

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10	_3	20	6	The Zambia News of March 16, 19	60 nononted th	est the Correspond
				of Zambia had sent a goodwill of	delegation, con	sisting of leaders
SUGGE	STED	ISTRIB	UTION	of church and other organization	ons to Biafra "	to gain first-hand
				experience of the suffering of war."	the Biafrans t	hrough the civil
TO: AMB/PO DCM POL ECON CONS ADM AID USIS	POST R Action Token:	OUTING Info.	Initials	Articles in the Times of Zambia reported the arrival of the ter Biafra for a period of one week support and thanks were made by gation, Zambia's Ambassador to by Biafra's Information Commiss Simbule and Lusaka City Council members of the delegation whose Copies of the three articles are Enclosure:	-man team which so the leader of the Ivory Coastioner, Dr. Ifellor Fleetford e names have be re enclosed.	h was to stay in of friendship, the Zambian dele- t, Ali Simbule, and gwu Eke. Ambassador Chirwa are the only
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By Mara Date 0 5 05

# **BIAFRANS** WILL NOT **FORGET**

Zambia Mail March 21, 1969

[]MUAHIA, Biafra. -UMUAHIA, Biafra. — The war between Biafra and Federal Nigeria is only part of the larger war for true African independence, said a welcoming message to Zambia's goodwill mission here from the Biafra/Zambia Friendship Association and the Biafra International

Friendship Association and the Biafra International Friendship Committee.

Primarily a war for Biafran survival as a people and as individuals, it was also for Biafrans a war for the survival of the African as a man of honour and dignity, the message said.

Biafrans would never forget that in their time of need, it was the people of Zambia, among others, who stretched forth to them the hand of fellowship.

### Dancing

More than 10,000 cheering crowds attended a civic reception given to the tenman Zambian goodwill mission now on a week's visit to Biafra.

For the first time since the war, traditional dancing groups from Biafra's Ibo, Efik and Rivers tribes performed during the open air reception — on Tuesday night — in which crowds carrying pro-Zambia posters chanted "Hail Biafra", "Hail Zambia", "Ojukwu power", and "Kaunda power".

Speaking at the reception, Biafra's Information Commissioner, Dr Hegwu Eke, said Biafrans regarded members of the delegation as "Biafrans".

Enclosure to Lusaka A-103

### **Biafra mission**

The Government has sent a The Government has sent a small goodwill mission to Biafra, consisting of church leaders and leaders of other social organizations, to gain first-hand experience of the suffering of the Biafrans through the civil war.—Zana.

Zambia News March 16, 1969

Times of Zambia, March 21,1969

## AMBASSADOR ALI BOOSTS BIAFRAN MORALE

# Victory is yours–Simbule

UMUAHIA (Biafra), Thursday.

THE war between Biafra and

THE war between Biafra and Federal Nigeria is only part of the big war for true African independence.

That was the message to Zambia's goodwill mission here: from the Biafra-Zambia Friendship Association and the Biafra International Friendship Conunittee.

The war, they said, was also for Biafrans a war for the survival of the African as a man of honour and dignity.

The welcome message add-

ed: "For two years the Nigerians have-been the willing instruments for Blafran extermination by the niew imperialism of Britain and Russia." This has created for Biafra a refugee problem of unprecedented dimensions in African history and that of the world."

Fellowship

Blafrans would never for get that in their time of need, it was the people of Zambia, among others, who offered them the hand of fellowship.

The Zambia delegation was asked to tell the world that the right for which Biafrans fight was also that which was guaranteed by both the charter of the OAU and of the conventions of the United Nations:

"Tell Zambians we look to them for relief, for succour, but only in the truly African spirit of brotherhood and fellowship," the message added.

Zambian Ambassador to Ivory Coast, Mr Ali Simbule, said on behalf of the mission and the Zambian Government


that Zambia was deeply touched by what was happen-ing in Biafra.

### Freedom

Zambia had followed the course of the war and was not sitting idle, because she knew Zambia, it was also sweet for Biafra.

Said Mr Simbule: "We'want to show the world we are determined in our struggle and that we' are one people."

He urged the Biafrain to tighten their belts because victory was theirs and it was not far away. — Zana.



27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

MARCH 21, 1969

Honorable Florence P. Dwyer House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mrs. Dwyer: POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
The Secretary of State has asked me to reply to your letter of

March 7 about the Nigerian civil war.

We share your deep concern for the civilian victims of the war. This concern was reflected in the President's statement of February 22 when he expressed the nation's deep concern for the terrible human suffering in the war and announced the appointment of Mr. C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr., as Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War. Mr. Ferguson was charged with assuring that the United States contributions to the international relief effort are responsive to increased needs to the maximum extent possible and that they are effectively utilized. He will give particular attention to ways and means by which the flow of relief can be increased to the afflicted areas on both sides of the battle lines. Mr. Ferguson has assumed his duties and is now abroad conferring with relief organizations and the parties to the conflict.

When he announced Mr. Ferguson's appointment, the President made clear that the United States policy will draw a sharp distinction between carrying out our moral obligations to respond effectively to humanitarian needs and involving ourselves in the political affairs of others. Mr. Ferguson will not seek and will not accept a charge to negotiate issues other than those directly relevant to relief. However, we have fully supported the efforts of the Organization of African Unity and others to bring about negotiations between the adversaries. We are, of course, not able to impose a solution, but we continue to press for an early negotiated settlement to the conflict.

I have enclosed several documents explaining the Nigerian situation and the Government's position. As you will note, approximately 60% of the global contribution to the Nigerian relief has come from American sources, including about \$31.5 million from the U.S. Government.

AF/W: R.W. Faville

If you would like any additional information on this matter, please let me  ${\rm know}_{\,\bullet}$ 

Sincerely yours,

William B. Macomber, Jr. Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations

Enclosures:

As stated

AF/W:RWFaville:oh 3/17/69

Clearances:
AF-Amb. Moore
H-Mr. Leahy

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By MMARA Date 10 5 105

FLORENCE P. DWYER 12TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT UNION ESSEX SUBURBS, NEW JERSEY

WASHINGTON OFFICE: RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUII TELEPHONE: (202) 225-5361

DISTRICT OFFICE: ROOM 202, 40 SOMERSET STREET PLAINFIELD, NEW JERSEY 07060 TELEPHONE: (201) 754-6686



## Congress of the United States House of Representatives

Mashington, D.C. 20515

ACTION is assigned to



March 7, 1969

13193

The Honorable William Rogers Secretary Department of State Washington, D. C.

Dear Secretary Rogers:

On several occasions last year I wrote to the Secretary of State with regard to the urgent necessity of relieving starvation among the people of Biafra, the helpless victims of the civil war between Nigeria and Biafra. My appeals were made exclusively from the humanitarian point of trying to relieve human suffering and were made with full awareness of the political complications involved, including the very debatable question of the justifyability of the war itself.

At this time I would very much appreciate being advised of the position being followed by the new Administration under your leadership in the Department of State and I would greatly welcome any information you could furnish me both with regard to the basis of our policy and the results to date of attempts to relieve suffering and starvation in Biafra. I should emphasize I have not intention of taking sides with regard to the relative position of Nigeria and Biafra, but I would welcome any information and judgements you could offer in this regard. My sole concern is that the United States do everything possible to prevent suffering by innocent victims without taking sides in the dispute.

Very sincerely,

FLORENCE P. DWYER Member of Congress

7322

Authority VV By MNARA Date

POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT ☐ CHARGE TO UNCLASSIFIED Classification 20 May 69 432<sup>8</sup> Origin ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS INFO: Amembassy COTONOU LONDON PARIS US MISSION GENEVA USUN CINCSTRIKE Amconsul IBADAN KADUNA SUBJECT: Nigeria Press Summary - March 20 1. Wash Post carries unattributed item Lagos headed chilly reception. President Nixon's special relief coordinator for Nigeria, Clarence C. Ferguson, Jr., got a cool reception from the head of Nigeria's federal military government. MajGen Yakubu Gowon, the Nigerian chief of state, told Ferguson Nigeria condemned "external interference in the guise of humanitarianism," a federal spokesman reported. 2. Post carries article by John De St. Jorre of London Observer from London headed two nationalisms breed war - Nigerian conflict waged with savagery, idealism. Nigerian civil war being fought with mixture crazy heorism, brutal savagery, burning idealism and mindless ineptitude. Has already joined Vietnam and Middle East as world problem of dangerous importance. An "outside" solution seems be only way stopping it. Of eastern region 12 million people at start war, only about 7 million were Ibos. But war was not primarily tribal struggle between Ibos, Hausa, Yorubas. It was AF/P:RLPerkins:mb 3/20/69

UNCLASSIFIED Classification

FORM DS-322

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

or soon became revolution of minority tribes against all dominators. For

FMG war is struggle maintain unity four regions. For minorities it is

struggle prevent Ibos carrying unconsenting minorities in Biafra into separate

state for sake rich oilfields and major ports. What has happened both sides

during war, and it largely explains why war no longer backwater affair, is

rise two diametrically opposed nationalisms. They still in embryonic stage

but forged in furnace war grow stronger and less reconcilable daily.

Tragically neither side seems appreciate that same process affecting both and

as result they continuously and seriously underestimate each other's capability

sustain the war. Biafran nationalism more articulate and passionate because

everyone in Biafra directly affected by war. But in Nigeria too through radio,

TV, press and massive turnover men from all regions in armed forces concept of

national identity established firm hold.

3. Significant men who have developed and nurtured two nationalisms are young men, most in early 30's like Gowon and Ojukwu. They were technocrats of ancien regime. In Lagos they calling themselves "new Nigerians;" in Biafra "Biafrans" is enough. They scorn old politicians who wrecked old Nigeria, who now playing backseat role in conflict. They dynamic, hardworking, talented, completely new generation of Africans. These men real activists and leaders

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Authority VN) 95 9503

By MMARA Date V 5 05

## outgoing telegram Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT

UNCLASSIFIED Classification

ACTION: Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

in war. Present in key jobs, grew up together, went to same schools, universities, served in administration and army, developed comradeship and national identity through serving abroad together, married across tribal barriers. If you have visited both sides of war they constantly ask you how relatives and friends getting along. Pride molded and tempered by war experience another factor prolonging conflict. Soldiers on both sides have spoken glowingly to me of ideals for which they risking lives.

4. Propaganda has played significant part, much more so internally than abroad. In Biafra there relentless constant revival horrors of past, headless corpses on postage stamps, designed frighten people what will happen if Biafra surrenders or overrun. During time I spent each side I have failed uncover evidence that proves genocide. But it is a dirty war; war in which human life worth less than bottle of beer, pack of cigarettes; war in which both sides terrified of other, often fire and kill as much from nervousness as premeditation; war in which most fighting troops, officers and noncoms included, have virtually no military training worth name; war in which uneducated and semieducated easily go on rampage when no one is firing.

5. St. Jorre concludes: after 20 months disillusionment, suffering, terrible

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ACTION: Page 4 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

momentum has gripped war. Nigeria's implacable insistence on political unity and Biafra's equally uncompromising stand on political sovereignty leaves no room for maneuver. Neither side has lost belief it can eventually win.

END

ROGERS

Draftad by:

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1164
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS:
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS:
USMISSION USUN

C O N: F I O E N T I A L: MOSCOW 1184

REF: LONDON 2063, 2120

SUBJ: SOVIET POLICY TOWARD NIGERIA

and the state of the present of the state of

I. WE HAVE NOT SEEN ANY PUBLIC: INDICATION OF CHANGE IN MOSCOW'S NIGERIA POLICY AWAY FROM FULL SUPPORT FOR UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF COUNTRY. NOTABLY, SOVIET-ALGERIAN COMMUNIQUE SIGNED MOSCOW MARCH: II
REAFFIRMS SUPPORT BOTHI COUNTRIES: FOR NIGERIAN: UNITY. IZVESTIYA MARCH. IS. IN MOST RECENT EDITORIAL COMMENT ON PROBLEM, REITERATED STANDARD SOVIET LINE.

2. NIGERIAN EMBASSY PRESSS ATTACHE HERE, IN TALK WITH EMBOFF, DISMISSED BOTH MARCH 16 SUNDAY TELEGRAPH AND MARCH 17 FINANCIAL TIMES: ARTICLES. WHILE ONE COULD NOT COMPLETELY RULE DUT POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET UNDERHANDEONESS IN NIGERI N. CRISIS, THERE

O REASON BELIEVE MOSCOW ABOUT CHANGE ITS POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR FMG. ATTACHE VOLUNTEERED THAT "A STORY" ABOUT SOVIET BIAFRAN CONTACTS SURFACED LAST DECEMBER, BUT PROVED TO BE ERRONEOUS. BRITISH EMBASSY MOSCOW ALSO TENOS DISMISS POSSIBILITY THAT SOVIET BACKING DEFIFROM FULL SUPPORT LAGOS.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority WN ) 95 9503

By MMARA Date 0 5 05



# Department of State TELEGRAM

Pol 27 Biafra - Ligeria

SECRET 208

PAGE: 01 LONDON: 02170 201808Z fr Pol 7 Biafra

ACTION AF 18

INFO: ARA 08, EUR! 15, 10-13, CIAE: 00, DODE: 00, JPM: 04, H: 02, INR 07, L: 03

NSAE: 00, NSC: 10, P. 04, RSC: 01, SP! 02, SS: 20, USIA: 12, AID: 28, RSR: 01,

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PI R: 201709Z: MARI 69 FMEAMEMBASSY LONDON TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9437 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA AMEMBASSY LAGOS AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE USUN 1634

S. E. C. R. E. T LONDON 2170

NOFORN:

SUBJECT: AZIKIWE

REFR LONDON: 1749: (NOTALI)

1. FORMERI PRESIDENT AZIKUWEMSI WUFEL FLORA, ANDI SONI EMEKA. HAVEL BEEN: PERMITTED: TO: LEAVEL UMUAHA, BY QUUKWULANDI ARE NOW IN LONDON. WEL CALLED ON ZIKLYESTERDAY (MARCHI 191) AND LEARNED FROM HIM THAT THEY ARRIVED FROM LISBON WITHIN PAST FEW DAYS. EMEKANS LEG WOUND IS BETTER BUT ACCORDING TO ZIKA HE WILL NEED ADDITIONAL TREATMENTS BEFORE RECOVERING COMPLETELY GUARDIAN THIS MORNING CARRIES: BRIEFI ITEM REPORTING ARRIVALI

2. WELASKEDE AZIKIWEL WHETHERE THERELWASS ANY TRUTHE TO INIGERIAND PRESS REPORTS THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO RETURN TO LAGOS HE SAID INVITATION TO RETURN HAD BEEN RECETVED FROM GOWON BUT HE WAS STILL UNDECIDED WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT. HIS INCLUNATION WAS: STRUGGLE: IN HOPES HE COULD! PLAY USEFUL! ROLE! IN ASSISTING!
SETTLEMENT LATER HE SAID! HE WOULD! LET US KNOW BEFORE MAKING.
ANY MOVE BUT WAS CLEARLY UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT DISCUSSING!

Authority VV) By MNARA Date



# Department of State TELEGRAM

#### SECRET

PAGE: 02: LONDON: 02170: 201808Z

SUBJECT AT ANY LENGTH.

3. HEI TOLD. US. THAT HES ELDEST SON CHUKWOMA, (HARVARDI 163) WAS ON WAY TO UMUAHIA VIA LISBON AT VERY MEMENT. HEI HAD STOPPED OFFI IN LONDON DAY OR TWO AGO AND TOLD HIS FATHER HE HAD JUST COMPLETED AT OUUKWUPS REQUEST. MISSION TO PORT AU PRINCE TO TRY PERSUADE PAPA DOC TO RECOGNIZE BIAFRA. CHUKWOMA, CLAIMED MISSION WAS SUCCESSFUL AND STATEMENT "FAVORABLE TO BIAFRA" WOULD BE ISSUED MARCH 22. WE PRESSED ZIK FURTHER ON THIS A BUT HEI CLAIMED NOT TO KNOW! WHETHER HAITIAN GOVT WOULD ANNOUNCE FORMAL RECOGNITION OR SIMPLY CALL FOR SELF DETERMINATION FOR IBOS AD DE GAULLE HAD DONE

4. WE ASKED AZIKIWE WHAT HE EXPECTED TO COME FROM PRIMING WILSON STRIP TO NIGERIA, NEXT WEEK AND HE DOUBTED DIPLOMATIC BREAKTHROUGH COULD BE ACHIEVED WITH BOTH SIDES IN SUCH INTRANSIGENT MOOD HE GUESSED THAT WILSON WOULD TRY FOR MEETING WITH OUNKWU AND THROUGHT BIAFRAN LEADER WOULD BE TEMPTED. ALTHOUGH HE WOULD PROBABLY REFUSE TO MEET ABROAD BRITISH WARSHIP FEARLESS. WHICH PRESS WAS SPECULATING WILSON MIGHT PROPOSE.

5% ZIK! SAID HE HAD! RECETVED! NO DIRECT REACTION: FROM OUUKWU TO HIS: PEACE! PLAN PROPOSED LAST MONTH! IN OXFORD VARIOUS: BIAFRAN! EMISSARIES: HAD! APPEARED HOWEVERS. AND REPORTED! OUUKWU WAS! ANGRY BECAUSE: AZIKIWE! HAD! NOT! CONSULTED! HIM BEFORE! MAKING! PROPOSALS: PUBLICS ZIK! WAS! PHILOSOPHIC! ABOUT GENERALLY NEGATIVE! REACTION! IN! LAGOS! AND! SEEMED! TO! BELIEVE! SOME! PARTS: OF PLAN! MIGHT! YET BE SALVAGED! WHEN! TWO! SIDES! WERE! READY! FOR! SERIOUS! NEGOTIATIONS.

6. COMMENT: THERE IS: LITTLE DOUBT THAT AZIKIWE IS: UNDER PRESSURE TO: GOLTO LAGOS AND THAT DEPARTURE OF HIS: WIFE AND SON FROM BIAFRA REMOVES ONE OBVIOUS: RESTRAINT NEVERTHELESS WE ARE INCLINED TO: BELIEVE HIM WHEN HE SAYS HE IS: GENUTRELY RELUCTANT TO: CHOOSE SIDES ELDEST SON CHUKWOMA S RETURN TO BIAFRA WILL IN ANY CASE DELAY DECISION FOR TIME BEING.

7. FYI. ZIK: TELLS: US: HIS: YOUNGEST SON NWACHUKWU! (HARVARD!
168) IS: IN: ST. LDUST MISSORI; APPARENTLY STUDYING FOR ADVANCE!
DEGREE: DAUGHTER! NGOZI: HAS: JUST STARTED! AT MICHIGANISTATE!
KAISER:

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9 Z	TO : Department of State
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10/1/	DEPT PASS-DOD AND CINCSTRIKE
i.	do d
AGR COM FRB	FROM : Amconsul IBADAN DATE: March 20, 1969
	SUBJECT: Rusors About Higerian Army Officers Circulating In Ibadan
	OSD DEE
10 3 20	SUMMARY
	The Migerian Army and its top officers are frequent subjects of
SUGGESTED DISTRIBUT	the Thadan rumor mill. A few current stories are reported not
Pess 1	so wuch for factual accuracy as to reliect current loruse believe
7	and attitudes towards the army at this time.
: : }	NAMES AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PR
\$	1. Colonel Adekunle
	The pride which Yorubas have in the past expressed in the
POST ROUTING	provess of Colonel Benjamin Adekunle, the half-Yoruba Commanding
TO: Action info. ir	Officer of the Third Harine Commando, is less evident and one more frequently hears criticism. According to one Yoruba who
PO DCM	has contacts within the Supreme Military Council (SMC) there has
POL	been an effort on the part of the SMC to get Adekunle "to take a
E 6 Oh	rest. " He is supposed to be tired - both physically and mentally.
cóRs	Adekunle is said to have rejected this suggestion and also to have refused to delegate more of his duties to his principal
ADM (11)	subordinates. Reportedly there was a plan to give Lt. Colonel
AID C	John Avo Arivof Calabar Garrison Commander and Lt. Colonel Godwin
USIN II	Alley (Ibo-Tiv), Second in Command of the Marine Commando, more
	freedom of action in the day-to-day running of the Division, but Adekunle has indicated his opposition to such a move. The situa-
Š. l	tion supposedly has gotten to the point that some members of the
FILE Action Taken:	* (Yoruba)
1	GROUP 3
	Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified
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Authority VN ) 95 95 95

By MMARA Date 0 5 95

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SMC are trying to get Gowon to remove Adekunle from his command, a move which Gowon is reportedly reluctant to make. One source who commented that Adekunle is tired and needs a rest was Col. J. Obasanjo, C.O. of the Ibadan Garrison Command.

The "tiredness" of Adekunle is said to explain his frequent outbursts against "real and imagined" enemies, who seem to include the ICRC, visiting newsmen and his superiors in Lagos. His "tiredness" is also supposed to account for his lack of desire to take the offensive against the rebels until such time as he receives the support in men and material which he feels that he deserves. Robin Horton (protect), Associate Professor in the Institute of African Studies at the University of Ibadan, a British expatriate who has visited Port Harcourt on two occasions since the liberation, reports a great deal of dissatisfaction among the Ijaws (particularly the Kalabari Ijaws) over the manner in which Adekunle and his boys "interfere" with local affairs. He says the Ljaws seem to be more resentful of the Yorubas than of the Northerners and particularly disliked the manner in which the docks were operating. They told Horton that a Captain Sanni (Yoruba) was in charge of the dock area and all shipments had to be cleared through him. It seems that a number of Ijaws have been trying to get commerce started again and have ordered goods from Lagos; however, whenever they tried to clear the shipments through Captain Sanni, he would tell them to come back the next day. When they returned the next day, their shipment had disappeared. The Ijaws thought Sanni was in league with Adekunle.

### 2. Brigadier Hassan Katsina

The Yoruba fear of "the old North" is never far below the surface, and the epitome in their eyes of the unreconstructed Hausa-Fulani aristocracy is Brigadier Hassan Katsina, the Army Chief of Staff. The presence of Katsina in the Western State from March 4 to 9 led to considerable gossip.

As reported in Ibadan telegram 60, the announced reasons for his visit were to preside over the graduation of another class of recruits at the Army Training Depot at Abeckuta on March 4, to inaugurate a new TV series on the Army in Ibadan on March 6 and to participate in a polo tournament in Ibadan from March 7 to 9. Nevertheless, it was felt by some Yorubas that he must be up to something else and they were sure it was to no good. We have, for example, heard from a Yoruba source that Katsina is working with his fellow Hausa-Fulani officer, Colonel Murtala Muhammed (Inspector of Signals and former C.O. Second Division), in some unspecified way to restore the unity or power of "the old North." According to this story, neither officer was in agreement with the creation of 12 states (the only division commander who was is said to be

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Authority WND 95 9503

By Whara Date U 5 05

DEPT, DISTRIBUTION ORIONAL TION	DEPARTMENT OF STATE	1.0 FC A
EUR 6	AIRGRAM	POL 27 BIAFRA- NIGERIA
RS/R REP AF ARA	Original ta be Filed in Decentralized Files.	XR POL 7 UK FILE DESIGNATION
EUR FE NEA CU	UNCLASSIFIED	A-505
INR E P IO	HANOLING INDICATOR	No.
5 V 5	TO : Department of State	
5/p s/s /0	INFO: ABIDJAN, ADDIS ABABA, DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS, LIBREVILLE, LUSAKA, PARIS	
AGR COM FRB INT	FROM : Amembassy LONDON DAT	E: March 19, 1969
LAB TAR TR XMB	SUBJECT: Colin Legum Sees Nigerian Conflict as	
AIR ARMY NAVY OSO	Conflict of Two Rights	
USIA NSA CIA	_	_
10 3 PO 1	Colin Legum, Commonwealth corresponde	nt of the Observer
SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION	and Mandarin of British Africanists, has published a thoughtful defense of One Nigeria in the Observer	
C	for March 16. Expressing his skepticism about the value of Prime Minister Wilson's upcoming trip to Lagos, Legum argues that "collective diplomacy" is the	
	only kind with any chance of working situation. He goes on to say that th determination cannot be unconditional best chance of taking its proper plac	e right of self- and that Africa's
POST ROUTING	through a "structure of efficient, viable states that	
TO: Action Info. Initials	are not continuously threatened by tr secession".	ibal or regional
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By MWARA Date VD 105

damps downs the expectations of success, his visit is bound to raise hopes at, as seems most likely, he nopes an, as seems—most likely, ne fails to rachiëve any substantial results from his conversations with General Gowon and the other Federal leaders, Britain's ability to influence events will be further eroded.

Instead of embarking on ether round of personal diplo-macy. Mr Wilson should have marked more carefully what his Foreign Secretary, Mr Michael Stewart, said in the best defence of the Government's policies yet heard in Parliament. Britain, he said, does not hold this issue (of Nigeria) in the hollow of her hand.'

This should have been the starting point in considering what Britain might most usefully do in trying to achieve the four objec-tives on which both sides in Parliament were largely agreed; an International arms embargo, a cease-fire, political talks without pre-conditions, and the supplying to adequate relief.

By herself Britain can do very little, except possibly furtient complicate the already difficulty could rescue the Biafrans from their plight, and save the Federals from escalating both the war and the degree of international in-

The right way to approach the problem is to organise two diplomatic missions — involving African, European and North American countries — which should visit the two sides simultaneously. Regrettably, the Russians have indicated their unwillingness to co-operate in limiting the fighting.

Collective diplomacy is much more likely to work in this kind of situation; besides, unilateral approaches to one side or the other are bound not to get very

Both sides have their heads down like bulls and are past car-ing what the outside world thinks about them. All they are con-cerned about is the extent of help cerned about is the extent of help they can get from abroad to make possible the triumph of their respective causes. The Russians have made it clear that they are only waiting to be asked to assist in crushing the Biafrans, without being bothered by the moral issues which divide Britain. If the issues which divide Britain. If the Federals feel Britain is a doubtful ally, they will have no scripples about changing her for the Russians.

This then is a momental great danger. A major wang

nep by Britain could do in part able harm as a st Too many people, responding to different kinds of pressures and emotions, have become partisan, more thoughtful people share the feelings of Mr Richard Wood, MP: 'A struggle is going on within us all: there are issues of right and wrong actually struggling with each other on this question.'

The result of this personal conflict, as last week's debate showed, is that left- and right-wing MPs were united in voting against the Government; while other left-Government; while other left-wingers, like Mr Michael Foot, are with the Government. The confusion is understandable, since there are no easy, familiar guide-lines to follow.

If it were true that the Ibos

were facing genocide, one would have no difficulty in making up one's mind; but that irresponsible one s mind; but that tresponsible piece of propaganda was hardly strationed even by Biafra's criands in Partialprublass week and one or the line that

worse than the other worse than the other worse than the other worse of the decided that were often damaged by outrageous behaviour—Britain's bombing of Dresden is an outstanding example.

ing of Dresden is an outstanding example.

If it is true that deliberate Federal air attacks on Biafran eivilians have occurred—which is probably what has happened—the right answer, surely, is to bring all possible influences to bear on the Federal leaders to stop these mean attacks. It is not an adequate response merely to switch sides.

not an adequate response interest to switch sides.

The problem the world faces in the Nigeria-Biafra conflict is not peculiar. Moreover, it is almost certain that this kind of crisis is going to be repeated over and over again in the post-colonial situations inherited by the Third World, not just by Africa.

Already one sees not entirely

Already, one sees not entirely dissimilar situations in Iraq over the Kurds, and in India over the

cause we are living in a polarised world, with strongly competing power interests, this cry will of the body of th

world, with strongy even grower interests, this ery will grow him backers.

It is easy enough to argue Britain was wrong in coming the assistance of the Federal Government of Nigeria in a programment of Nigeria in the assistance of the Federal Government of Nigeria in the should either have chosen either a programment of Nigeria in the secess of the elements in barotseland degree (with the help of the Portugitation their rear) to break away from the congo?

The right of self-determination is properly entrenched in the Charter of the United Nations.

nental right of other.

In the Congo, Katanga right to self-determination could only have been exercised to the irreparable detriment of 10 million other Congolese. Many who now go into the Biafra lobby argued; then, that the Katangeso wife wrong. wrong.

wrong.

Clearly, one cannot insist, that the right of solf-determination must be an unconditional operiod one considers the case of the Nagas, one faces a different kind of problem—Naga self-determination against India's arkiteles about frontier security. To both sides have rights; the proper dues it to it is how they are to be open or ciled.

ciled. goisiquaz

The limits of federal of cond federal types of constitutions frave-hardly been tested as yet. If the property frame of the conceivable — as Goiglifon Ojukwu himself conceded at the confederal system of Niggirin States. Why not try to negotiated juch a system after achieving and cease-fire and a total armosphilis bargo?

In India, too, this approach In India, too, this approach might be developed along the lines of the Kingdoms of Bhutangand Sikkim; but with essential reforms in the Indian Lines of the Ready of the Charles of the Ready of the Indian Lines of the Indian Li

Authority WD 950 By MINARA Date 1015

LONDON ENCLOSURE A- 505 Page 2 of 2

COLIN LEGUM sees the Biafra crisis as the example of a problem bound to re-occur in many other parts of the world



in the shadows of a prolonged armed struggle.

What I am arguing here is that

armed struggle.

What I am arguing here is that the conflict of rights between Nigeria and Biafra should not be judged purely by emotional reactions to particularly nasty events; of course, these should be denounced and opposed. But there is the need to take a much longer view of the proper interests of all lbos, of all Nigerians and, indeed, of all Africans.

Mr Michaelt Stewart struck exactly the right note it seemed to me, when he told Parliament that one of the most important pivotal points in world politics today is that 'the peoples of Africa, who have for so many centuries been bullied, enslaved, kicked about by more powerful and sophisticated peoples, should now be able to take their proper place in the world'—and that they will not be able to do this unless they have a structure of efficient, viable States that are not continuously threatened by tribal or regional secessionism.

This, as Mr Stewart remarked, would condemn Africa to be for ever dragging behind other continuous.

Authority NN 1950 503

By MMARA Date 05 0

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POL 27 BYAFRA-NIGERIL

19 MAR 69 20

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS

INFO: Amembassy COTONOU

LONDON

PARIS
US MISSION GENEVA

USUN
CINCSTRIKE
Amconsul IBADAN
KADUNA

SUBJECT: Nigeria Press Summary - March 19

1. NYTimes carries R.W. Apple story Onitsha headed stalled Nigerian troops sip beer as they wait. Col Ibrahim Haruna, burly commander 2nd division, sprawled on blue carpet his living room, sipping gin and tonic, playing scrabble, eating bits peppery beef. "Come back at Easter time. Then you will see us moving. Then we will be near the end." It was familiar message. As long ago as last Aug 27 Gowon announced final offensive against Biafra had begun. Only week ago army's high command made same announcement. In fact struggle as seen from Nigerian side of lines has come to standstill. Between Sept 4 and Oct 1 last year fed forces captured Aba, Owerri and Okigwi, since then have made little significant progress. Col Haruna's division based Onitsha has succeeded linking up with Col Mohammed Shuwa's 1st div based Enugu. But fed control Onitsha-Enugu road tenuous. Troops travel it only in daylight, only heavily armed convoys and only at risk enemy ambushes. Slight fed gains in north accompanied by reversals in south. Rebels have surrounded Owerri,

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AF/P:RLPerkins:mb 3/19/69

Tel. Ext. 2105 Telegraphic transmission and

RMM/QB Task Force - Mr

classification approved by. Nigeria Task Force - Mr. Melbourne

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Authority VND 95 1503

BVMMARA Date 0 5 05

INDICATE: COLLECT

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ACTION.


Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

increased pressure on Aba, and put Col Benjamin Adekunle's 3rd division at Port Harcourt on defensive. In Onitsha-Enugu sector at least no sign big push coming. Far from being choked trucks bringing up war material, highway Lagos-Onitsha, 2nd div main supply link, almost barren military traffic. Birthplace Ojukwu at Nnewi, only 17 miles south Onitsha on Route 6. Airstrip between Uli and Ihiala 17 miles beyond that. But in 12 months since they took Onitsha, fed troops have moved less than 2 miles south. There they dug holes in rust-red earth, built huts canvas and corrugated tin, settled down pass wearying days and nights with bottles Lagos beer and small talk. Rebels have cut road with zigzag trenches up to eight feet deep just south this point, control bush on either side. Feds do little patrolling, no aggressive probing. Asked when he might be ready move south in earnest, slim dapper young major, trained at Sandhurst, leaned on shooting stick and said "Maybe Christmas." Part explanation current inactivity lies new sources supply Ojukwu found late last year. Reinforced French small arms, antitank weapons, rebel resistance stiffened remarkably. But much of explanation only be found fed side of lines. Froces that control air, sea and collar of territory around Biafra unable deliver coup de grace. Fed troops now on edge of or actually in Ibo heartland and further progress will be difficult. Col Haruna said: "Every step forward

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		classification approved by:
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ACTION: Page 3 of telegram to Amembasy LAGOS

we take now we have to garrison area. The people don't like us." Col already short of men. Element his 15,000 man division strung out all way back to Lagos, day's drive to west, attending to logistics and patrolling area already captured from rebels.

2. Balt Sun has editorial on Wilson trip headed Biafran mission. Military victory not even remotely in sight either side. Now Wilson going Lagos in effort bring about cease-fire. Position his govt difficult since officially supports unity Nigeria as Commonwealth member and supplies it weapons, yet desires see fighting stopped and peace achieved by political settlement. Reluctant cut flow arms because it fears leave way open Moscow monopolize trade, increase influence. Wilson must try persuade Lagos accept truce and also must hope way can be found obtain international arms embargo. Outlook not encouraging. Only last week FMG rejected Biafran offer month's ceasefire and despite fatigue, strain his country experiencing, Gowon still appears believe he can crush revolt. Biafrans have withstood attack and starvation, convinced defeat will mean their destruction. It time nevertheless new and stronger efforts halt war, and Wilson right making them even though his chances succeeding look very small.

END

ROGERS'

Drafted by: Tel. Ext. Telegraphic transmission and Clearances

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FORM DS-322

Classification

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State INDICATE: COLLECT CONFIDENTIAL Classification PRIORITY ACTION: AmEmbassy Addis 07z 29 HAR 69 00 INFO: AmEmbassy Lagos US Mission Geneva The Hague SUBJECT: Nigerian Relief FOR FERGUSON REF: A. State 47551 B. Addis 1374 1. Reftel A outlines action taken taken taken PANATAN CARACA MO CONCEDENCION DE OPERANTO DE COMUNICACION DE <del>US хадовитейну бинды арреамий миникимий миникимий остооно</del>с 2. This issue spotlights general ICRC organizational problems, to be Linds Discussion these problems / Part of agenda, Freymond's Washington visit. ROGERS U/CF:ADewey 8175 classification approved by: U/CF - Stephen

Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

AFR/CWA - Mr. North

FORM DS-322

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Authority VN) 95 95 95

BVMNARA Date V 5 95

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#### U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence Note - 194

27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

March 19, 1969

To The Secretary

Through: s/s

INR - Thomas L. Hughes

Subject; NIGERIA: Rainy Season a Minor Factor in Military Operations

for soon the rainy season will

begin."

--Newsweek, March 24, 1969

Many military and civilian observers of the civil war in Nigeria assert that the imminent season of heavy rains (April through October) will cripple the offensive Federal Nigeria plans for this Spring. While we agree that the operation will almost certainly not result in the quick victory Lagos seeks, the rainfall argument is specious. The performance of both armies in two previous rainy seasons (1967 and 1968) indicates that the weather is of little importance. What weighs against a quick Federal victory is not weather, but Lagos' seeming inability to cut Biafra's airborne supply line.

Some Historical Evidence. So far, both the Biafran and Nigerian armies have been better at maintaining offensives during the wet than the dry months of the year. For example, Biafran troops overran much of Nigeria's Mid-Western state during August 1967. later (October), Federal forces captured the rebel capital at Enugu. In 1968, Federal troops scored some of their most rapid advances in the

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This report was produced by the Barena of Intelligence and Research, Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

#### CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

swampy Port Harcourt sector during August and September. In all three instances, the elements of surprise, good communications, and superior firepower were determining factors.

Although heavy rains can slow the movement of material to the front, a well organized supply system can overcome this problem. The Biafrans have consistently taken good advantage of Eastern Nigeria's extensive network of roads. Their air supply has been affected even less. Thus, their arms airlift grew in volume during August and September 1963 despite some of the heaviest rains ever recorded in West Africa. The Federal supply system, too, was able to support sustained offensive actions during the rainy seasons of both 1967 and 1968—though it did break down after about six to eight weeks in both cases.

We attach rainfall tables and a map of the Southeastern Nigeria war zone.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority WN 959593

By Whara Date 059

#### SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA Makurdi • KWARA BENUE PLATEAU WESTERN BIAFRA Abakaliki • Benin Cily. .\* Enugu Onitshap MID-WESTERN OILFIELD: SHELL-BP (Resumed Production) SOUTH OKAN OFFSHORE OILFIELD (GUII) TRANS NIGER PIPELINE EASTERN Calabar CAMEROON Port Harcourt Oil Refinery Resumed Production O'l Execution Termin Resumed Processing Sonny Oil Evacuation Terminal EQUATORIAL GUINEA STATUTE MILES 92813 11-68 CIA

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Authority VVD 95 95 3


BVMNARA Date VD 95

AVERAGE MONTHLY RAINFALL AND TEMPERATURE IN NIGERIA'S EASTERN REGION [Biafra]\*

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# POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA TR POL 15 NIGERIA Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 02438 191742Z

53 ACTION: AF: 18

INFO EUR 15,10 13,NSA Ø2,CIAE ØØ,DODE ØØ,JPM Ø4,H Ø2,INR Ø7,L Ø3,

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NSC-10,P: 04,RSC-01,SP-02,SS: 20,AID: 28,ACDA-16,UCF-03,RSR-01,

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R: 191418Z MAR 69
FM: AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 5539:
INFO: AMEMBASSY ACCRA.
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USMISSION GENEVA
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USIA WASHDC:

UNCLAS: LAGOS: 2438

USIA FOR IBS

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PRESS ROUNDUP! MARCH 19

I. TRIBUNE FRONT - PAGELEDITORIALI TITLED. QTELWAY FORWARD UNQTELSTATES THAT QTELPRESENT MOOD UNQTELOF THE COUNTRY CALLS: FOR REALISTIC REASSESSMENT OF SITUATION. SAYS
THAT EDITORS: OFFER NO. APOLOGIES FOR THEIR VIEW WHICH IS:
THAT QTE TIME: HAS COMELFOR A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT UNQTE.
RECOGNIZING THAT SUGGESTION WILL NOT BE WELL RECEIVED IN SOME QUARTERS: AND GREETED WITH SUSPECION IN OTHERS. IT CONTINUESTHAT MOST IMPORTANT REASON; SUPPORTING THIS:
SUGGESTION IS: THAT QTELAT PRESENT NIGERIAN ARMY SADDLED WITH ENEROUS: TASK OF ADMINISTERING COUNTRY IN ADDITION TO FIGHTING CIVIL WAR UNQTE. STATES THAT WHEN MILITARY TOOK OVER. THEY NEVER ENVISIONED HAVING TO FIGHT A CIVIL

(2)

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Authority VVI) 959503

By Minara Date VI 500



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PAGE 02: LAGOS 02438 191742Z

WAR: NOW MILITARY NEEDS: TO: CONCENTRATE: ALL! RESOURCES
WINNING WAR. AND: QTE: CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT WILL! LEAVE! ARMY
FREE TO: DO: JUST THAT UNGTE: ADDS: THAT IN ASKING FOR
CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT THEY ARE NOT CONDEMNING THE MILITARY
QTE: INTERREGNUM! UNGTE: SINCE! ARMYJS: DECLAREDGOAL: HAS
ALWAYS: BEEN: TO RETURN COUNTRY TO: CIVILIAN: RULE: AT EARLIEST
POSSIBLE DATE: ÉNDS: QTE! MÉTHOD: OF: APPOINTING OR (PREFERABLY)
ELECTING SUCH CIVILIAN: GOVERNMENT IS: MATTER: FOR CONSIDERATION.
BUT ONCE NEED: IS: RECOGNIZED: METHOD: CAN BE: SETTLED: BY SMC:
THIS IS: WAY FORWARD UNQTE:

- 2. TIMES HEADLINES REPORT THAT CANADIAN HICOMER MALONE RETURNING TO LAGOS FROM OTTAWA WITH QTE INITIATIVES UNGTE ON NIGERIAN SITUATION WITH VIEW TO ENDING NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. FMG SPOKESMAN QUOTED AS STATING THAT FMG KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT NEW CANADIAN INITIATIVE.
- 3. MOST PAPERS REPORT THAT BRITISH TROOPS READY TO GTE INVADE UNDTE ANGUILLA IN CARIBBEAN TO PUT END TO REBELLION THERE AGAINST ST. KITTS GOVERNMENT! SKETCH USES NEWS AS SUBJECT OF EDITORIAL! ATTACKING UK FOR NOT USING FORCE TO END RHODESIAN REBELLION. ACCUSES BRITISH OF DOUBLE STANDARD BY REFUSING TO USE FORCE TO END UDI AND NOW USING FORCE AGAINST ANGUILLANS.

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By MMARA Date V 5 95



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LONDON Ø212Ø

ACTION: AFL 18

INFO: EUR: 15% 10: 13. ACDA/ 16. UCF | 03. UPW | 01. AID | 28. SR | 01. ORM | 03. SCA | 01.

SCS 04, NSA 025 CTAE 000 DODE 000 JPM 042HL 020 INR 072L 03, NSC 10,

P: 04. RSC: 01. SP: 02. SS: 20. USIA. VZ. RSR: 01./371 W

R: 191505Z MAR: 69

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO SECSTATE: WASHDC 9401 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY PARIS USMISSION USUN

SELCEREET LONDON 2120

NOFORN

SOVIET APPROACH TO BLAFRANS DENIED SUBU:

IN SOCIALI ENCOUNTER YESTERDAY WEI ASKEDI SOVIET FIRST SECTY

MAKAROV ABOUT FINANCIAL TIMES STORY (REFTELI) . MAKAROV . WHO SPEAKS WITH PUNGENT AUTHORITY ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS DISMISSED STORY AS: "COMPLETE! NONSENSES" HEI THEN WENT ON TO SAY BIAFRANS COULD LEARNI SOMETHENGE BY STUDYING STATUS: OF UKRAINES ALTHOUGHETHEY.
COULD! NOT HOPE FOR SEAT AT UNS WHICH HAD BEEN AWARDED! TO UKRAINTANS:
EOR! THEIR "CONTRIBUTION TO DEFEAT OF FACISTS: IN WW II."

2. COMMENT'S MAKAROV GETS: AROUND IN PRESS AND AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES: AND WE SUSPECT CASUALI REMARKS OF HIS TO LOCALI IBOS, OR EAST AFRICANS, MAY HAVE BEEN! INFLATED BY NEWSPAPER INTO SOVIET DIPLOMATIC APPROACH

3. MAKAROV CUSTOMARILY TAKES STRONG, UNYIELDING POSITION ON NEED TO PRESERVE ONE NIGERIA AND LIKELIHOOD THIS CAN ONLY BE DONE BY MILITARY DEFEAT OF BIAFRANS. IT WAS HE WHO ON TWO OCCASIONS

SECRET 12

Authority WD By MNARA Date



jijer.

### Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02: LONDON 02120 191628Z

ASSURED BRITISH THAT SOVIETS: WOULD SUPPORT FMG TO BITTER END OF CIVILIWAR. COLINI LEGUM OF OBSERVER TELLS US HE ASKED MAKAROV YESTERDAY WHETHER. AS BRITISH MINISTERS HAVE IMPLIED BRITISH GOV'T HAS SOUNDED OUT SOVIETS ON ARMS EMBARGO AND BEEN TURNED DOWN. MAKAROV DENTED FLATLY THERE HAD BEEN ANY SOUNDINGS WHAT SOUNDERS

4. WELKNOWE FROME FONDEF! THAT MAKAROV ISERIGHT ABOUT THIS.
BRITISH WANT IFEAT ALL POSSIBLENTO AVOID SITUATION IN WHICH THEY
WOULD HAVE TO INITIATE DISCUSSION WITHESOVIETS ABOUT ARMS EMBARGO.
THEY FEAR THAT SOVIETS WOULD IMMEDIATELY TURN DEMARCHE AGAINST
THEM BY INFORMING NIGERIANS. CONSEQUENTLY, WHENEVER SUBJECT
ARISES IN PARLIAMENT, BRIT MINISTERS PARRY QUESTIONS BY SAYING
SOVIETS HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR LACK OF INTEREST IN ARMS EMBARGO,
(THEREBY PERMITTING INFERENCE TO BE DRAWN THAT FORMALISOUNDINGS
HAVE BEEN TAKEN). WITH SOVIETS NOW DENYING THIS TO LONDON PRESS
IT SHOULD BE ONLY MATTER OF IMEE BEFORE GOVET WILL BE FORCED TO

50 GOVTTES LACKLOF! ENTHUSIASM FOR SIR ALEC DOUGLAS HOMERS CALLITO TAKELARMS EMBARGO PROPOSALITO SECURITY COUNCIL! IS INCIDENTALLY MOMIVATED BY SAME REASONING SIR ALEC IS RIGHT IN SAYING SOVIET VOTE WOULD ENABLE WORLD TO RECOGNIZE "SINISTER REALITIES" BEHIND CIVIL WAR. HE MIGHT HAVE ADDED HOWEVER, THAT BRITISH PROPOSAL FOR EMBARGO COUPLED WITH SOVIET VETO WOULD COMMUNICATE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT MESSAGE TO NIGERIANS. BRÜCE KAISER

SECRET 2

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Authority VN ) 95 95 9

BV MMARA Date 0 5 05

II)

March 19, 1969

Dear Congressman MacGregor:

I wish to respond to your recent inquiry about the Nigerian situation and the international relief effort in which the United States Government is participating.

The tragic Nigerian war began in July, 1967, after prolonged but fruitless negotiations among the leaders of Nigeria in the aftermath of the July, 1966 coup. These negotiations culminated in final estrangement between the Eastern Region led by Lt. Col. Ojukwu and the Federal Government of General Yakubu Gowon. In late May, 1967, the Eastern Region of Nigeria declared its secession from Nigeria and proclaimed itself the independent "Republic of Biafra." In July hostilities began and are still in progress.

The Biafran forces have been isolated from the sea and circumscribed in an area of about 7,000 miles, or one-fourth the territory which Biafra governed at the time of secession. Only the airplanes which operate into this enclave connect the secessionist regime with outside sources of food, weapons, or other commodities. A large number of people have fled into Biafran territory ahead of the Nigerian Army; the total population may be six million. These civilians are now living in an area which in peacetime was unable to provide adequate local food for its normal population of perhaps half that number.

The United States Government has not sold or otherwise supplied arms to either side. We have maintained a policy of non-involvement in the dispute except for normal diplomatic relations with the Federal Nigerian Government. Consonant with our desires to see an early

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The Honorable

Clark MacGregor,

House of Representatives.

AF/W: R. Wach

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peaceful settlement of the strife through negotiations, we have actively supported diplomatic initiatives undertaken by such agencies as the Organization of African Unity and the Commonwealth Secretariat in the hopes of bringing the war to an end.

Despite the fact that the various efforts to resolve the combat have not yet been successful, we are participating very actively in the non-partisan international relief effort which is endeavoring to bring food to the starving people on both sides of the fighting line. Our contribution to this effort now stands at more than \$39 million, of which over \$31 million was made available from the United States Government and the remainder from private American voluntary agencies. A more detailed discussion of the relief problem and our contribution to the relief effort is contained in the documents enclosed for your information.

On February 22, 1969, President Nixon appointed Mr. Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., as Special Coordinator of Relief to the civilian victims of the war. Mr. Ferguson is charged with assuring that the United States' contributions to the relief effort are responsive to increased needs to the maximum extent possible and that they are effectively utilized. His appointment is indicative of the deep concern felt for the human tragedy unfolding in Nigeria and our desire to do all in our power to alleviate the suffering.

I hope the enclosed information is useful to you. If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to ask.

Sincerely yours,

6 W

William B. Macomber, Jr Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations

Enclosures:
Nigeria, Information

Clearance:

Roy M. Melbourne Nigeria Task Force

AF/W: Rwach:pk 3/15/69

ext 2946

7-8h/LW

Authority Why 25 15 105

By Meara Date 10 5 105

March 19, 1969

Honorable Paul N. McCloskey, Jr. House of Representatives Washington, D. C. 20515

POLZTBIAFRA NIGERIA

Dear Congressman McCloskey:

I have received your letter of February 17 forwarding the views of the Nigerian Committee of Northern California and asking for the Department's comments on each of the points raised.

US Government to participate actively in the international relief effort in both the Federal-controlled and Biafran-controlled areas. while avoiding political and military involvement in this tragic civil war. We recognize that the civil war has brought about suffering and death for many persons, especially children, on both sides of the line of fighting. US Government and private American contributions have gone to meet the needs of the suffering in both areas.

Second, as stated in the letter, both sides have received extensive quantities of arms from external sources.

Third, we know of the several reports of the international observer teams which have visited the Federal-controlled areas of the war zone. We have no reason to take issue with the statement in the initial report that "there is no evidence of intent by the Federal troops to destroy the Ibo people". However, in the emotional atmosphere of civil war atrocities have occurred on both sides.

Fourth, the US Government recognizes the Federal Military Government as the government of Nigeria. We do not recognize Biafra. We are aware that the Biafrans, in support of their claim to independence, have argued that their goal is self-determination for the peoples of the former Eastern Region. The Nigerians have argued that the secessionists overlook the desire for self-determination of the non-Tho minorities in the former Eastern Region.

AF/w; D.7. Smith

By MNARA Date

BIAFRA-NIGERIA

As for the recommendations of the Committee, the US has supported appeals to the Biafran authorities for both overland relief corridors and daytime flights. We continue to hope that agreement on these issues will be reached in order that the relief effort to Biafra may be greatly expanded. Second, the US Government fully intends to continue its massive contribution to relief on both sides of the fighting lines. This assistance has included large quantities of foodstuffs, medical supplies, cash, and recently eight cargo aircraft no longer used by the US Air Force. Four each were sold at nominal cost to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the American church groups participating in the Joint Church Aid (JCA) airlift to Bisfra. The ICRC and JCA airlifts have made possible the saving of thousands of lives. We believe that both groups are worthy recipients of that portion of US official assistance going to Biafrancontrolled territory. Finally, I think you will agree with me that US Government encouragement to individual Ibo leaders would jeopardize our efforts to avoid political involvement in this crisis. We have, however, vigorously supported the Organization of African Unity and the Commonwealth Secretariat in their efforts to bring about peace. We shall continue, without intervening directly, to urge both sides to reach a peaceful settlement.

On February 22, President Nixon referred to the deep anguish felt by this nation for the terrible suffering in Nigeria and announced that the Secretary of State had at his direction appointed a Special Coordinator for relief. A self-explanatory press release concerning the Special Coordinator is enclosed.

I am also enclosing a discussion of the relief problem which deals in more detail with the humanitarian and political issues. I hope this information is helpful to you in replying to the Committee. If you would like more information on this situation, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

ьW

William B. Macomber, Jr. Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations

Enclosures:

Press Release dated February 22, 1969 The Nigerian Relief Problem

AF/W:DFS th:ba 2/27/69 RS# 5678 First page retyped inAF/W 3/12/69 Clearances:
AF- Amb Moore

H-Mr. Leahy

Authority ///) 95 9503

By My Ara Date /// 2/05

PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, Jr.

#### Congress of the United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

February 17, 1969

Mr. William Macomber Office of Congressional Relations Department of State Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I enclose herewith a letter I received from three Nigerians, one of whom is obtaining his Doctorate in Anthropology at Stanford.

Several of the facts set forth in this letter differ substantially from those which are generally understood, and I would much appreciate a point-by-point response from the appropriate individual in the State Department.

Thanks for your courtesy.

Best regards,

Paul N. McCloskey, Jr.

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5678

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
AND
COMMITTEE ON
MERCHANT MARINE
AND FISHERIES



ACTION is assigned to



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA



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CONFIDENTIAL: 276

PAGE: 01 USUN: NI 00801 180227Z

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ACTION 10 15

INFO: AF: 12. ARA. 08. EA: 10. EUR: 15. NEA. 13. RSC: 01. CTAE: 00. DODE: 00. JPM 04.

H: 02: INR: 07: L: 03: NSAE: 00: NSC: 10: P: 04: SP: 02: SS: 20: USIA 12: AID: 28:

SCS: 04, SCA: 01, SR: 01, ORM: 03, UCF: 03 (RSR: 01, /179: W

R. 180015Z. MARI 69: FMI USMISSION: USUN: NY TO: SECSTATE: WASHDC: 6456: INFO: AMEMBASSY LAGOS: AMEMBASSY ADDIS: ABABA AMEMBASSY LONDON: USMISSION: GENEVA.

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SUBUS NIGERIA

REFR USUNIS 416

MOON! (UK!) TODL! MISOFF! THAT: CARADON! HAD: CALLED! ON SYGUNDER! INSTRUCTIONS! TO URGE! SENDING! OF; SYG! REP! TO LAGOS TO REPLACE: GUSSING. ACCORDING! MOON! SYG. REPLIED! HE THINKING! OF! SENDING! REPLACEMENT FOR! GUSSING! BUT HAD NO NAMES! AS: YET. REPLACEMENT WLD! SERVE! IN! DUAL! CAPACITY AS: OBSERVER ON INTERNATIONAL! TEAM! AND! HUMANITARIAN! REP! WLD! BE! IN LAGOS. AT REQUEST OF! FMG BUT! THAT AS: HUMANITARIAN! REP! HE! WLD! BE! IN! LAGOS! FOR! AS: OBSERVER! OF MOON! REPORTED! THAT WHEN! ASKED! WHETHER! GUSSING! REPLACEMENT WLD! ACTUALLY! RESIDE! IN! LAGOS! SYG! AND! ROLZ. BENNETT! BOTH! SAID! YES.

(2)

MISOFF! SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED SOURCE! IN ROLZ-BENNETT'S:
OFFICE RELPOSSIBILITY SYG REPO SOURCE STATED SYG STILL!
THINKING ALONG LINES PARA 2 REFITEL THERE STILL! NOU
INDICATION WHO WLD BE GOING AND AT THIS POINT SYG DID
NOT APPEAR TO SEELANY URGENCY IN MATTER PARTICULARLY
IN VIEW OF JENSEN PRESENCE

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By MNARA Date 0 5 05



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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE: 02: USUN: NI 00801 180227Z

COMMENT: UNCLEAR AS: TO: REASONS: FOR DISTINCTIONS: MADE BY SYG TO CARADON RELAPPOINTMENT OF HIS REP. WHEN PRESSED ON THIS POINT; MOON COULD NOT EXPLAIN IT EITHER EXCEPT POSSIBLY IT WAS: STALLING TACTIC: IN ANSWER TO CARADON'S SPECIFIC QUESTIONS. BOUBT HOWEVER SYG SERIOUSLY THINKING OF SOMEBODY AT THIS JUNCTURE SINCE HE WLD HAVE HAD SOME BODY IN MIND BY NOW.

GP=4

YOST

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Authority VND 95 1503

By MNARA Date V 5 05



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CONFIDENTIAL 745:

PAGE 01 USUN N 00812 182114Z

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SCS: 04, SCA 01, SR 01. ORM 03, UCF 03 RSR 01,/179 W 060171

RE 182000Z MAR: 69: FM: USMISSION! USUN NY: TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC: 6467 INFO! AMEMBASSY ADDIS: ABABA. AMEMBASSY LAGOS: AMEMBASSY LONDON: USMISSION! GENEVA.

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NIGERIA

USUN 801

(2)

1. SUBSEQUENT: TO: SENDING: OF! REFTELL ROLZ BENNETT'S: OFFICE: CALLED MISOFF! TO: SAY THAT INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PARA.

2. REFTEL WAS: IN: ERROR: AND! THAT SYG! IS ACTIVELY SEEKING.
REPLACEMENT FOR! GUSSING. SOURCE: THEN REPORTED! OBSERVATIONS
MADE TO: CARADON! BY SYG! RE! POS! TION! REP! WOULD! HAVE. RE!
HUMANITARIAN: ASPECTS: OF! TASK. SOURCE! SAID! THIS: WAS: PRETTY:
MUCH! CONCLUDED: WHEN GUGSING! LEFT. ALTHOUGH! IT POSSIBLE:
THAT IF! IT AGAIN! BECAME! NECESSARY TO GET INVOLVED! IN!
HUMANITARIAN! RELIEF. REP! WOULD! BE! USED! IN! THIS!
CONNECTION.

2. REPUS: PRUMARY FUNCTION: WILLEBELTO SERVELON.
INTERNATIONAL: OBSERVER! TEAM. AND HELWILL RESIDE IN: LAGOS:
IN FULFILLMENT OF THIS: OUTY.

3. LENGTH: OF REPRSSTAY INCLAGOS WOULD BE DETERMINED BY WHETHER HIS MANDATE AS MEMBER INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER TEAM WAS RENEWED BY FMG. OR FAILING RENEWAL OF MANDATE HIS PRESENCE WAS FURTHER REQUIRED FOR OTHER DUTIES HE

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Authority VN 095 4503

By MMARA Date V 5 65




CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE: 02 USUN NE 00812 182114Z
HADE TO PERFORM ON BEHALF: OF SYG.

GP = 4

YOST

CONFIDENTIAL



Honorable Jack Miller United States Senate Committee on Finance Washington, D.C. 20510

POLZY BIAFRA-NIGERIA Dear Senator Miller:

The Secretary of State has asked me to reply to your note of February 7; enclosing a letter from Glen E. Haydon about the Nigerian civil war.

I have attached a copy of the acknowledgement sent to Mr. Haydon. We know of his very fine work in Enugu as Area Coordinator for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and his letter reflects an intimate knowledge of the complexities of developing relief arrangements acceptable to the two parties to the conflict. We are glad to have his suggestions which will be of help to us in our continuing efforts to increase the flow of relief supplies to the needy on both sides of the fighting lines.

On February 22, President Nixon referred to the deep anguish felt by this nation for the terrible suffering in Nigeria and announced that the Secretary of State had, at his direction, appointed a Special Coordinator for relief. A press release concerning the Special Coordinator is enclosed.

I appreciate your interest and that of your constituent in this program and shall be glad to furnish any further information you

Sincerely,

William B. Macomber, Assistant Secretary for

Congressional Relations

Enclosures (2)

AF/W:RWFaville:chg:2/22/69

AF:CRMoorevand 3/3/69

Clearances:

H - Mr. Leahy

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

TDM VAIL, CHIEF COUNSEL

#### United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510 is assigned to

**ACTION** 

February 7, 1969

Mr. William Macomber Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations Department of State Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The enclosed letter is forwarded to you with my request that it be given to the appropriate high-level State Department officers concerned with the Nigeria-Biafra conflict.

I have acknowledged the letter, but I would suggest that a note of appreciation be sent to the writer from the State Department.

Sincerely,

JACK MILLER

JM:bb

Enclasure att E. Haydon 7 rom Ellen E. Haydon

 $\Box$ 

4651

66

### OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS

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INFO: Amembassy ADDIS ABABA
LONDON

PARIS

US MISSION GENEVA

USUN

CINCSTRIKE

Amconsul IBADAN

KADUNA

SUBJECT: Nigeria Press Summary - March 15-17

1. CSMonitor Mar 15 has David Winder London piece on Wilson trip, posing question will he meet Ojukwu. Authoritative Commonwealth spokesman suggests he must make effort, Wilson has asked Emperor receive him Addis at end Lagos trip. Whitehall discreetly modest about mission - he not going as supercharged dove or to mediate, but purpose is feel ground, discuss situation firsthand with Gowon, generally sniff air. It not unnoticed previous peace conference participants that Wilson's earlier desire travel Nigeria in December was dynamited by Lagos opposition. Efforts by Cmth Sec Arnold Smith reach Biafra have also been frowned on by Lagos. Meanwhile Biafra timing calling for month's truce again underlines extent small besieged country turns to diplomacy reap benefits it cannot win on battlefield.

2. Wash Post March 16 reports Ferguson arrival Lagos. Times has Geneva article by Thomas Hamilton headed US offers aid airlift to Biafra - would help find personnel for ICRC flights. It understood Washington has already sounded out

Draffed by:

AF/P:RLPerkins:mb 3/17/69

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission end

Classification approved by: Nigeria Task Force - Mr. Melbourne

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FORM DS-322

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Authority VND 95 1503

BVMNARA Date VD 105

17 Mm 65 22

INDICATE: COLLECT

UNCLASSIFIED Classification

Origin

ACTION: Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

several volags on ability provide ICRC xxxxx with Western European traffic controllers, maintenance supervisors, other air traffic experts overcome technical difficulties. American experts believe will be necessary stockpile supplies Biafra as reserve against effect rainy season around May 1 on air traffic. At present there virtually no reserves and all foods, medicines delivered by ICRC and JCA airlifts distributed immediately. US has also offered help provide experts warehousing supplies tropical climate. Ferguson announced Thursday additional \$6 million to ICRC for both sides. However there has been no difficulty about deliveries federal side since both land and sea routes are open. Of two groups, JCA airlift considerably more successful. According official figures from Jan 1 through Mar 13 ICRC planes made 227 flights, delivering 2,872 tons relief supplies, average just under 40 tons/ night. JCA made 519 flights, totalling 7,057 tons Jan 1 to Mar 12, averaging 98 tons/night. JCA aid deliveries increased sharply recent weeks because now has in operation three of four Stratofreighters provided by US. Variety mechanical problems prevented ICRC putting in service any of four Stratofreighters it received at same time.

3. Times carries R.W. Apple report Ferguson arrival Lagos. He said airport news conference he hoped be able solve certain "technical logistical problems"

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		classification approved by:
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FORM 8-65 DS-322 Classification

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Authority VN) 95 9503

By MNARA Date 0 5 05

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT

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Classification

Info

ACTION: Page 3 of telegram to Amembasy RAGOS

very quickly, did not go into details. He acknowledged it might well prove difficult separate humanitarian purposes his assignment from political issues dividing FMG/Biafra, but said he had "an intellectual commitment as well as the President's mandate" try to accomplish this. After conferences Lagos Sunday and Monday, he planned fly Tuesday Enugu, see Gowon Wednesday, and later in week hopes enter Biafra on relief flight from Cotonou. Ferguson will also fly Addis Ababa for conference OAU leaders and Emperor.

- 4. Times reports from New York three-year aid program to Nigeria/Biafra by American Friends Service Committee, involving long range reconstruction as well as emergency relief. Program will provide help restore agriculture devastated area and help restoring some industry. Roger G. Frederickson, director overseas refugee programs for Quaker org, said they deliberated five months before reaching decision embark full scale operation. Org will begin million-dollar fund drive for program.
- 5. Balt Sun Mar 17 has AP Lagos story headed Nigeria says no to Pope. Nigeria has turned down offer Pope Paul mediate civil war, high federal sources said today. Rejection, they said, makes it unlikely Pope will visit Nigeria in any tour of Africa. Recent Rome and London reports indicated Pope planning African tour. Vatican officials including Archbishop Giovanni Benelli, deputy secretary of

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		classification approvad by:
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UNCLASSIFIED Classification

FORM DS-322

INDICATE: COLLECT

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Page 4 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

state, have visited several African countries in what believed prelude to journey. Pope toured Nigeria once when a cardinal. Sources said Govt refused mediation request from Pope last year, and believe Vatican relations chilly ever since. Other govt sources reported Anthony Enahoro in London try persuade Azikiwe support federal side. In Geneva ICRC spokesman said relief flights Fernando Po expected resume night March 17.

6. NY Times editorial reported septel. Times carries front page Garrison piece headed Biafra in six months moves from edge defeat. Cites differences in situation last September and now. France's intervention Biafra's behalf seems have been a factor in altering situation. Pain of isolation eased not only by de Gaulle support Biafra's right self determination but by French underwriting modest airlift small arms and ammo from Gabon. Some observers believe French arms aid arrived just in time turn tide against Nigerians. Final push blunted, Biafrans have since regained significant food-producing areas along Southwestern front. Turning point was recapture Oguta, which not only relieved Uli but led to recapture two oil wells farther south. No way measure accurately number daily French arms flights. Some French charters fly into Uli, but some also land at second heavily-guarded strip that off-limits


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non-Biafrans. Biafrans also own several planes that ferry in arms. Several known modest sources foreign income available Biafrans. One is purchase by church groups in Biafra locally grown food for distribution refugees, providing hard currency for Biafran pounds. JCA investment Biafran food runs about \$300,000 monthly. Second source is sale Biafran stamps abroad. Stamp merchants Amsterdam estimate Biafran issues earning govt up to \$1.4 million a year. To visitors to front, French arms appear have only slightly improved Biafran fire-power. Nigerians still pre seem possess almost unlimited supply small arms ammunition. Also fighting with latest model fully automatic Russian rifles, hold near monopoly heavy ordnance: mortars, artillery, Russian rockets and British armored vehicles.

7. A Garrison continues: at moment Biafra cannot produce enough food for people and heavily dependent on relief. Ojukwu in interview observed, "Until we at least menace Port Harcourt, I don't see Nigerians sitting down to negotiate, much less willing to compromise. Why should they?" Federal victory on battle-field can no longer be viewed as certainty. Prospect is for long, even more bloody war. Just where new Nixon administration stands subject expectation and puzzlement Umuahia. After 17-day tour Biafra one fact clear: Biafrans chosen —determined pursue course they have what consequences. And

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consequences are appalling. According most conservative estimates church and NE ICRC officials, 800,000 Biafrans have died starvation. Prof Jean Mayer of Harvard said "total number casualties, mostly from famine, has been of order of one and a half million." Ojukwu has repeatedly stated: "After what we've been through, never again can we put our security in hands of others. All we ask is be left alone." With this sentiment, one would be hard put find any Biafran disagreeing.

8. WSJournal has Calabar article by George Melloan headed Nigeria's bombs: danger to everyone. On hot tarmac Calabar airport casual looking Egyptian crew services IL-28 bomber. Nothing casual about plane's mission. It drops bombs on towns, villages of what left of Biafra. Often as not bombs hit civilians, hospitals, churches. Horrors this cruel exercise, which of questionable military value federal side in war, again tarnishing FMG image outside world. This self-inflicted damage could have serious consequences this crucial stage of war. One consequence could be finally alienate Britain. Continued bombing could also alienate US. Why then does FMG pursue bombing policy? Several possible answers, official and otherwise, none of them reassuring anyone who would like see quick humane end war and Nigeria rebuilt into peaceful independent republic friendly to Western democracies.

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Perhaps most likely answer that govt simply doesn't have any other tactics use. this stage of war. It has squeezed Biafran army and civilians under Biafran jurisdiction, 5 million people in all, into area only 3,000 square miles. Adekunle admits to try push his armies into area would mean heavy loss of life both sides. "We don't enjoy killing other Nigerians," he says. Thus he hints fed policy continue make things unpleasant for Biafra so Ojukwu will sue for peace and renounce secession without necessity final military push. Fed side also indicated would rather risk censure Europe and American over bombing than suffer losses final attack would entail. But while this might explain bombing, which accepted tactic warfare, doesn't explain bombing civilians. Pilots of Ilyushins are Egyptians trained by Russians who supplied aircraft. Not much known their arrival Nigeria. Nigerians say they paid cash for planes. Pilots apparently came with them. They treated well. At Harcourt they housed once plush Hotel Presidential, rise at seven, come down for hearty breakfast at tables set with white linen, good silver, leave for airport and day's work looking neat and fresh in summer khakis. Seem little troubled red tape and farcical interference many other foreigners, such as ICRC workers, subjected here.

9. Melloan concludes: Some western military observers attribute Egyptian propensity hitting wrong target ineptitude and perhaps outright cowardice.

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Ineptitude may be answer and govt toleration for it may be attributable difficulties proving or disproving pilot claim he aiming at troops, not civilians. But perhaps most remarkable \*\*x\*\*smmbhdimgmahmuh\*\* thing about bombing civilians this juncture is how well it serving interests anti-British and anti-American nations, which would of course include Russia and Egypt. While Nigeria obviously in difficult military position and there no guessing when war will end, also little likelihood Biafra could recover enough territory or independence become viable state. Barring Ojukwu decision negotiate, unhappy prospect war will drag on with perhaps rising rate suffering, starvation Biafra and heightened pressure in US, UK help Biafra, break with federal side, and rising level tension between FMG and western democracies.

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SUBJECT: FINANCIAL TIMES REPORTS SOVIET APPROACH TO BIAFRANS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ARTICLE APPEARING FIRST PAGE FINANCIAL TIMES TODAY (MARCH 17) UNDER HEADLING, "SOVIETS APPROACH BIAFRANS ON PEACE SETTLEMENT" &

"HIGH-RANKING BIAFRAN OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES: WITH: A SUGGESTION THAT MOSCOW COULD USE ITS INFLUENCE IN LAGOS TO SECURE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BIAFRAN LEADERSHIP, ACCORDING TO RELIABLE SOURCES.

"THIS WOULD ASSURE RUSSIANS OF MORE SECURE FOOTHOLD IN NIGERIA THAN MIGHT BE CASE IF BIAFRANS, DEFEATED OR UNDEFEATED, WERE TO REMAIN DEEPLY HOSTILE TO USSR AS ONE OF NIGERIA'S TWO MAIN ARMS SUPPLIERS.

"SOLUTION THAT RUSSIANS ARE EVIDENTLY ADVOCATING WOULD BE COMPROMISE. IT WOULD FALL SHORT OF FULL BIAFRAN SOVEREIGNTY. BUT WOULD LEAVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNDER BIAFRAN CONTROL AND GIVE TERRITORY CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL STANDING.

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"EXAMPLE OF UKRAINE" WHICH HAS SEAT AT UN, HAS APPARENTLY
BEEN CITED. HOWEVER, THESE POINTS WOULD NATURALLY BE SUBJECT
TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH NIGERIA AFTER TRUCE IF SOVIET PRESSURE COULD
SECURE ONE. MOSCOW'S AIM WOULD, APPARENTLY, BE TO TAKE CREDIT
FOR HAVING PRESERVED NIGERIAN UNITY, AT LEAST IN NAME, WHILE
BRINGING PEACE IN FACE OF IMPERIALIST MANOEUVERS TO PROLONG WAR.

"IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER: THESE: TENTATIVE: APPROACHES WERE BACKED: BY A TOP! SOVIET DIRECTIVE. BUT RECENT REPORTS SUGGEST RUSSIAN ARMS: DELIVERIES TO: LAGOS: HAVE: BEEN: AT MUCH LOWER LEVEL THAN EXPECTED: AND: WANTED BY NIGERIAN ARMY.

\*BIAFRA'S RESPONSE! SO: FAR SEEMS TO: HAVE BEEN NEGATIVE BUT THERE! IS FEELING IN CERTAIN BIAFRAN: QUARTERS THAT BIAFRA IS NOT IN POSITION TO CHOOSE! ITS FRIENDS. LAST WEEK'S BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE. HAS SHOWN THEM THAT BRITISH GOV'T POSITION REMAINS UNCHANGED.

"MR. WILSON'S DECISION TO VISIT LAGOS WITHOUT FIRST SOUNDING OUT BIAFRAN OPINION HAS ADDED TO CONVICTION THAT NOTHING CAN BE GAINED BY RELYING ON SYMPATHY OR SUPPORT FROM LONDON. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AMERICAN INTERVENTION MIGHT STILL INFLUENCE BIAFRAN RESPONSE.

"ACCORDING TO INFORMED: BIAFRAN SOURCES, LT COL. OJUKWU IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT ANY INVITATION FOR HIM TO VISIT LAGOS OR TO CONFER WITH MR. WILSON ON WARSHIP IN NIGERIAN WATERS. CONTACT WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE AFTER NIGERIA'S ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE OR, AT LEAST, A TEMPORARY TRUCE, AS SUGGESTED BY LT COL! OJUKWU LAST WEEK. SAME APPLIES TO SESSION OF OAU CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE! ON NIGERIA SCHEDULED FOR LIBERIA ON APRIL 18, DESPITE GEN GOWON'S READINESS TO ATTEND."

3. COMMENT: FINANCIAL TIMES IS EXTREMELY CLOSE TO LONDON IBOS AND HAS SOMETIMES SERVED AS PRESS OUTLET FOR BIAFRAN VIEWS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT PRESENT STORY IS SIMPLY EFFORT BY LOCAL BIAFRANS TO RATTLE LAGOS BY IMPLYING SOVIET SUPPORT FOR FMG IS NOT UNGUALIFIED. ON OTHER HAND, IT IS INTERESTING TO SEE IBOS QUOTED TO EFFECT BIAFRA "NOT IN POSITION TO CHOOSE FRIENDS", STATEMENT WHICH HAS CONSIDERABLY LESS BRAURA THAT MOST APPEARING IN LONDON PRESS. FONOFF! HAS NO INFO ON BACKGROUND OF STORY AND IS WATCHING TO SEE WHETHER SOVIETS WILL! DENY IT.

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SUBUR PROPOSED DAU CONSULTATIVE COMITE MEETING ON NIGERIA.

1. PRESIDENT TUBMAN INFORMED ME TODAY THAT ALL! MEMBERS OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMITE: HAVE AGREED TO ATTEND MEETING WHICH IS RESENTLY SET UP FOR APRIL 17 TO 20. HOWEVER THERE ARE ONE OR TWO PROBLEMS IN TIMING WHICH MAY REQUIRE ACHANGE OF A DAY OR SOFT THE APRIL TO 20 DATES. ANKRAH HOWEVER CANNOT ATTEND ON APRIL 17.

2. TUB AN SAID THAT HIS PROPOSALITO INVITE STATES NOT MEMBERS OF CONCOME TO ATTEND MEETING HAS BEEN AGREED TO BY ANKRAH BUT OBUECTED TO BY DIORI. THE ONLY TWO FROM WHOM HE HAS TWOFOLD.

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FIRST TO GET OTHER STATES TO ENCOURAGE OJUKWU TO COME AND SECOND TO HAVE AT THE MEETING HEADS OF STATE WHO HAVE RECOGNIZED BIAFRA SO THAT OUUKWU MIGHT FEEL HE HAD A FRIEND IN COURT. HE DOESN'T KNOW NOW WHAT POSITION TO TAKE IN VIEW OF DIORI'S OBJECTION FOR HE FEELS THAT IT WOULD TAKE A UNANIMOUS DECISION IN ORDER TO AUTHORIZE OUTSIDE ATTENDANCE.

3. HE HAS NO NEW IDEAS ON APPROACHES THAT MIGHT BE MADE BUT CONTINUES TO FEEL THAT MEETING IS ESSENTIAL IN EFFORT TO SETTLE CONFLICT. BROWN

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C. D. N. F. I. D. E. N. T. I. A. L. NIAMEY 0341

SUBJ: NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR:

1. PRESIDENT DIORI . IN MARCH 15 CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR, STATED THAT TO HIS KNOWLEDGE NO REPEAT NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE TO IMPLEMENT OCAM KINSHASA PROPOSED INITIATIVE FOR ARRANGING SETTLEMENT NIGERIAN CONFLICT.

2. DIRI CONFIRMED HE HAD ALREADY INFORMED TUBMAN THAT SHOULD OAU FIVE-NATION CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE BE CONVENED. IN MONROVIA, HE WOULD ATTENDE

3. IN COMMENTING ON FAILURE OCAM PROPOSED INITIATIVE DIORI EXPRESSEDI PARTICULAR: DISAPPOINTMENT, WITHOUT BEING

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
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EXPLICIT THAT "HOUPHOUET HAS DONE NOTHING!" WITH SOMEWHAT LESS EMOTION'S DIORI CONTINUED: "NEITHER HAS ANYONE ELSE DONE MUCH" IMPLIED THAT DEGAULLE'S ACTIONS FAVORING BIAFRA RENDERED ANY LIKELY NEW AFRICAN INITIATIVES STERILE.

4. HE REACTED MOST FAVORABLY WHEN TALKING ABOUT PRESIDENT NIXON'S DESIGNATION FERGUSON TO COORDINATE U.S. RELIEF ASSISTANCE. DIORI PRAISED CONTINUED IMPARTIALITY OF U.S. INTERVENTION SAID HE WISHED THAT DEGAULLE MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO ACT LIKEWISE. GP-3 ADAMS

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politically motivated, as opposed vast majority whose concern basically humanitarian. Foley said Greenhill in visit to Lagos had succeeded in getting FMG statement on bombing which was used in debate but had failed to win Gowon's agreement to permit international observers into Biafra.

3. Wilson's visit to Lagos. Foley noted that PM Wilson had wanted visit Lagos last year but had been unable to do so.

According Foley, PM hoped now to get something "forthright" from FMG on bombings, relief, and more precise FMG terms for cease-fire and settlement. He also hoped Wilson's visit might provide platform for FMG to say something really useful which might also be helpful in London and Washington. Palmer observed he had several times pressed FMG reps for more precision in their positions a on Ibo protection—for example in their ANNEXEM announcements made at Addis conference. He continued to hope for something more specific from FMG that would improve its image and perhaps assure Ibos on other side. He mentioned as example

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confusion on amnesty and whether or not Ojukwu would be covered. He also cited favorable impact that might be created if FMG should even now begin to discuss with other nations possible peacekeeping or observer forces.

4. Prospects for Negotiations. Palmer asked Foley what prospects were for further talks or negotiations. Foley was not optimistic, noting OCAM effort had gotten no where and forthcoming ConCom in Monrovia not likely to succeed either. Foley said he had succeeded in getting Awolowo to agree to see Biafran reps during London CW meeting but Biafrans km had received instructions not to talk to Awolowo. Foley had tried on personal basis, and had also gotten Arnold Smith to try to bring two sides together. Foley believed Biafrans either not sure that world support for protection of Ibos would be fath forthcoming or that Biafra still hoped for additional recognition and support, including perhaps new U.S. administration. Palmer said he had seen nothing to suggest narrowing of gap between two sides and could only speculate on what might produce it. This could include Federal military gains

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or possibility prolongation of conflict which would affect stability of FMG or its will to continue conflict. Foley believed basic problem is that despite our mutual contacts with Biafran envoys abroad, we really did not know what Ojukwu wkw would settle for. Palmer agreed.

5. Nigerian Jarring Mission? Foley said he inclined to view that asking price of each side is not last price. He therefore wondered if it might not be in our interest to get someone to do in-depth probing on both sides. He had something in mind like Jarring Mission, which would undertake to find out what Ibos really want and what they would settle for. Palmer agreed on usefulness of such information but noted another Jarring might be difficult to find for Nigerian mission. Foley concurred, noting akkinds attitude of U Thant and Biafran contempt of OAU make it difficult to get anything moving. UK out of picture because of arms supply. Palmer wondered if Canadians were possible. Foley thought someone like Lester Pearson (who he doubted available) would be ideal and added he failed understand

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why Arnold Smith had been vetoed by Biafrans. Tebbit pointed out possible dangers in well-known personality and suggested lower level person in first instance to carry out operational visit which might grow into something bigger. Foley then smilingly told Palmer that he personally had predeliction for American in above role. Palmer noted strict humanitarian nature of Ferguson mission and said our public emphasis on relief as opposed to any political involvement would make selection of American undesirable.

Nigerian dispute, suggestion which had been made in March 13 dankakaxkax debate by Conservatives. When, for instance, does Nigerian conflict become threat to world peace? Palmer said given present situation and problem already created in Dahomey and Equatorial Guinea, ways and means of bringing Nigerian problem to UN could amost certainly be found. Cost would be high, however, and outcome very much in doubt given likelihood of either Soviet or French veto in KKHKKKYK Security Council. Foley agreed.

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- 7. Arms Embargo. Foley said Fonsec Stewart had told House that arms embargo could be workable only in conjunction with cease-fire or truce and only if policed inside Nigeriax and Biafra. UN would probably shy off from latter role. He said Lord Shepherd had tried this approach with FMG in June without success, taking position that because of large FMG stockpiles cease-fire would actually be to FMG advantage. Palmer agreed that strict policing inside two areas would be absolutely necessary.
- 8. Soviet Influence in Nigeria. In response Palmer's question re Soviet influence, Foley said it would probably increase as long as war drags on. HMG sees FMG power structure comprised of (a) military, (b) civilian commissioners, and (c) civil servants. Latter group he regarded as realists who would be less inhibited than others about turning further to Soviets. Foley admitted to puzzlement at why Russians had not provided FMG with means to knock out Uli airstrip, particularly since it within range of rockets which we could be made available to

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FMG. Palmer said FMG had been very sensitive to our concern over Soviet influence and reassured us frequently of their intentions. USG response had been not to question FMG intentions but that of Soviets. Foley suggested we with use Soviet argument to better effect with Houphouet. Both agreed Houphouet very emotional on subject Biafra but more from fear Moslem encroachment. Foley said he saw no evidence that USSR becoming disenchanted with FMG. He believed Soviets ready to supply whatever arms FMG requires.

9. Military Situation and FMG Bombing of Civilians. Foley clearly disturbed at FMG bombing of civilians. He attributed them EXER to IL-28's flown by Egyptians under control division commanders. Foley said this would be one major subject of PM's trip. HMG had some hope of better FMG coordination among three FMG divisions and control of pilots. Tebbit believed Biafran commitment to battle around Owerri might permit Col. Shuwa and first division to move south. He continued believe Uli was key to military problem and could MK not understand why Feds did not hit it hard.

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10. Relief and Obilagu Proposal. Foley continues believe waxxxx offers best hope for relief corridor. He was garke that Congressman Lowenstein had pushed it and kg regretted that Lindt and private Canadian group (Dr. Johnson) now seemed to be complicating it by supporting idea of third airstrip in Biafra. He then asked how US would react if we were asked by FMG to fly relief supplies to Obilagu and call Ojukwu's bluff. Palmer said while he had fx for some time leaned in direction of forcing relief issue, he believed it preferable to await results of Ferguson's mission before considering any such action. Foley injected that he was anxious to see Ferguson as soon as possible. Palmer agreed agreed that Obilagu has fewer problems than most other suggestions and that fact of military action near airstrip need not preclude agreement on its use for relief purposes. Foley said he had recently written to Father Byrne urging him to prod Biafrans on this issue.

11. Dahomey. Palmer raised possibility serious consequences of

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current FMG-Dahomey dispute, saying he found it difficult to believe that karaassment at border caused only by Nigerian antismuggling actions. Dahomey now losing important trade due to border difficulties, thus creating serious problem for Zinsou. He believed that if Zinsou were toppled on this issue, consequences would be serious and far reaching for FMG as well, particularly if French were to become more heavily involved. Foley agreed these dangers and said HiComer in Lagos had been instructed to support our representations in Lagos.

12. <u>Diggs Report</u>. Tebbit raised Diggs Committee report and asked how we planned handle its call for informal talks looking toward arms embargo. Palmer indicated no decision had been taken but that hearings on report were probable in near future.

Foley and Palmer agreed that Diggs Report was generally helpful.

RXXXXX Palmer added that problem somewhat more complicated on Senate side where two quite different resolutions were pending.

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R 151130 MAR: 69: FM AMCONSUL: KADUNA TO: SECSTATE: WASHDC 1079: INFO: AMÉMBASSY LAGOS: CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA UNNI

CONFIDENTIALKADUNA 0217

POLZO BIMFRA-NIGERIA

REFL (A) KADUNA 121 (B) KADUNA 156 (C) KADUNA 167

1. SOURCE: (REFITEL') SAID! DC-4 (NO. N88891) AND DC-6 (NO. N480H) HAVE BEEN MAKING REGULAR FLIGHTS LAST WEEK: OR: TEN DAYS CARRYING AMMUNITION FROM LAGOS (ABOUT 30 RUNS) AND KADUNA (5 RUNS) TO BENIN. EACH: FLIGHT CARRYING ABOUT 16000 LBS. CARGO COMPOSED OF SMALL BOXES WHICH: LOOKED TO SOURCE LIKE SMALL CALIBRE AMMO. SOURCE: SAID: HE GATHERS FROM PLAN! CREWS THAT AMMO RESERVES: THIS TYPE IN LAGOS AND KADUNA ABOUT EXHAUSTED.

2. SOURCE SAID! BENIN RUNWAY HAS! BEEN EXTENDED 5,000 RPT 5,000 FEET TO TAKE FULLY-LADEN DC-6S BUT DUE HEAVY RAINFALL, RUNWAY (APPARENTLY UNSURFACED) IS: SLIPPERY WHICH RESULTED IN DC-(PARA 1) GOING OFF RUNWAY AND LOSING NOSEWHEEL AT BENIN THIS WEEK.

3. FMG HAS HAD VOR (VOICE OMNI-RANGE) AND LOCATOR BEACON INSTALLED AT PORT HARCOURT. INSTALLATION DONE IN RECORD TIME OF FIVE DAYS THOUGH NOT YET OPERATIVE. SOURCE BELIEVES:
INSTALLATION IS INDICATION FMG ANTICIPATES HEAVY RELIANCE ON PH AIRFIELD FOR MOST CRUCIAL LOGISTICAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS DURING RAINY SEASON NOW BEGINNING.

4. SOURCE WAS ASKED WHETHER HE HAD INFO THAT THERE GREATLY INCREASED NUMBERS SOVIET PERSONNELLIN KAND OR WHETHER THERE

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
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PAGE: 02 KADUNA 00217 151400Z

EVIDENCE OF RECENT NEW SOVIET AIRCRAFT ARIVALS. SOURCE SAID HE HADENO SUCH INFO BUT SAID HIS ABILITY COMMUNICATE WITH COLLEAGUES IN KANDOON SUCH MATTERS HAS BEEN GREATLY LIMITED DUE! INOPERATIVE! DIRECT TELEPHONE! CONNECTION FROM KADUNA TOWER TO KANO TOWER.

5. FURTHER TO DATT LAGOS BY POUCH. STOKES:

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INFO SS 20, INR 07, DODE 00, JPM 04, RSC 01, RSR 01, /051 W 037886

R 141218Z MAR 69 FM AMEMBASSY FORT LAMY TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2710 INFO AMEMBASSY NIAMEY AMEMBASSY LAGOS AMCONSUL KADUNA

S E C R E T FORT LAMY 399

NOFORN

JOINT EMBASSY/DAO MESSAGE

REF: STATE 38863

1. WE CONFIDENT THERE IS NO SUBSTANCE TO PARA. 2 REFTEL.

2. ALTHOUGH GOC CONTINUES CLEARLY TO SUPPORT FEDERAL NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT, WE CONFIDENT IT WOULD NOT WISH GET INVOLVED FORMALLY. MOREOVER, FRENCH, WHO TRAIN, EQUIP, AND HAVE SOME COMMISSIONED AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS SECONDED TO CHADIAN ARMED FORCES, WOULD NOT FAVOR SUCH DEVELORMENT. FINALLY, CHAD'S 1700-MAN ARMY IS FULLY OCCUPIED WITH LOW-LEVEL DISSIDENCE IN EASTERN. CENTRAL CHAD AND ALL BUT HEADQUARTERS COMPANY AT FORT LAMY ARE DEPLOYED IN SMALL UNITS THAT AREA.

3. WE SUSPECT THERE HAS BEEN CONTINUING TRICKLE OF VOLUNTEERS FOR FEDERAL NIGERIAN ARMY OVER THE MONTHS FROM AMONG PERSONS INHABITING CHADIAN TERRITORY; AS TRIBAL GROUPS STRADDLE BORDERS. HOWEVER WE DOUBT NUMBERS SIGNIFICANT.

GP-1 - VANCE

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 PARIS 03724 142003Z

53: ACTION AF 18

INFO EUR 15 JPM 04 NSC 10 SP 02 SS 20 RSC 01 CIAE 00, INR 07 NSAE 00

UCF 03, ACDA 16, 10 13, SR 01, ORM 03, AID 28, RSR 01,/142 W

R: 141820Z MAR: 69 FM: AMEMBASSY PARIS: TO: SECSTATE: WASHIC: 1987 INFO: AMEMBASSY LAGOS: AMEMBASSY LONDON:

SEEL CORE ELT PARITS 3724

SUBJECT : FRANCEL AND NIGERIA/BIAFRA

REF PARIS 2879

1. SUMMARY: NIGERIAN HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION EXPECTED VISIT PARIS
IN APRIL IN EFFORT CHANGELFRENCH POLICY. QUAL APPARENTLY CONTINUING SEARCH FOR FORMULAS LEADING TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BUT
THERE ARE NO REPEAT NO INDICATIONS OF CHANGE IN BASIC FRENCH
POLICY. SUPPORT FOR BIAFRA.

2. DURING CURTESY CALLIONINIGERIAN AMBASSADOR ADEL MALIKI MARCH 13. AMBASSADOR SHRIVER WAS TOLD THAT HIGH-LEVEL NIGERIAN DELEGATION WILL PROBABLY VISIT PARTS EARLY IN APRIL SUBJECT TO APPROVAL OF FINAL DATES BY ELYSES VISIT OF DELEGATION HAS BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION FOR SOME TIME. IT WILL PROBABLY INCLUDE AT LEAST ONE SENIOR MINISTER AND ONE HIGH-RANKING ARMY OFFICER. OBJECT IS TO MAKE DIRECT CONTACT WITH GENERAL DE GAULLE IN MAJOR EFFORT EXPLAIN ERROR OF FRENCH SUPPORT FOR BIAFRA. FEDERAL MILITARY GOV LOG AGO CAME TO CONCLUSION THAT THERE IS NO HOPE GAULLE.

3. CONCERNINGPOSSIBLE DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN PRES GOWON AND OUUKWUS MALIKE SAID HE BELIEVES GOWON WILLING MEET OUUKWUS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS PROVIDING HE HAS REASONABLE ASSURANCES SOMETHING USEFUL WILL BE SERVED BY SUCH MEETING ON BROADER ISSUE OF SIDPPING HOSTILITIESS MALIKE EXPLAINED FMG HAS ONLY ONE

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By MMARA Date 05/05

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## **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 PARIS 03724 1420032.

PRECONDITION: THAT OUUKWU AND OTHER IBO LEADERS RENOUNCE SECESSION:

4. IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF MARCH 14. QUAI DESK OFFICER FOR NIGERIA (PIERRET) SAID THAT QUAI BELIEVES DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN GOWON AND OUVEWUNTHOUT PRECONDITIONS ARE POSSIBLE SO FAR AS OUVEWUNIS CONCERNED HOWEVER PIERRET SAID THAT MORROVIA, WHICH HAS BEEN MENTIONED AS POSSIBLE SITE, WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY UNA ACCEPTABLE TO OUVEWU. PIERRET THOUGHT DOUALA WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO OUVEWU. ALTHOUGH IN COUNTRY WHICH IS SYMPATHETIC TO LAGOS. OUVEWU WOULD PROBABLY FEEL HIS SECURITY COULD BE PROPERLY ASSURED IN DOUALA. ACCORDING TO PIERRET.

5. EMBOFFI NOTEDI THAT FRENCHI POSITION, BOTH: IN OFFICIAL: STATE MENTS: AND UNOFFICIAL: STATEMENTS: BY VARIOUS UNOFFICIAL: SPOKESMEN
WHO: ARE: STALWART GAULLISTS: IS THAT UK, MUST CEASE: ARMS DELIVERIES.
ALMOST NO MENTION: IS: MADELOF: SOVIET ARMS: DELIVERIES; AND: SOVS ARE
NOT CALLED! UPON! TO: STOP! THEM: PIERRET REPLIED! THAT IF: UK:
WOULD: ONLY AGREE TO: STOP! ARMS: DELIVERIES; IT NOT UNLIKELY THAT
FRANCE MIGHT MAKE APPROACH TO: SOVS: "AT AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT
LEVEL!", URGING! THEM! TO: DO! LIKEWISE. EMBOFF! REPLIED! THIS: FORMULA
MIGHT BE HARD! TO: SWALLOW! IN LONDON! AND ELSEWHERE! AND! WONDERED
ABOUT FRENCH: POSITION ON COMPLETE! ARMS: EMBARGO! WHICH HAS: RECENTLY
BEEN! DISCUSSED! IN BRITISH! PRESS. PIERRET THOUGHT FRANCE WOULD!
BEAFRA. AS! WELL! AS NIGERIA. HE! THOUGHT IT WOULD! BE RELATIVELYSASY
TO: ENFORCE! EMBARGO! ON DELIVERIES! FROM ABIDJAN! AND! LIBREVILLE
TO! BIAFRA. HOWEVER. SO! FARLAS! BIAFRA CONCERNED. SAO! THOME! WOULD!
BEEN VERY HARD! TO! CONTROL! SINCE! PORTUGAL! UNLIKELY! COOPERATE.

6. INI DISCUSSING POSSIBLE MEANS: MOVING TOWARD SETTLEMENT.
PIERRET NOTED THAT OUDKWU HAD STATED OVER CANADIAN TELEVISION ON
FEB. 17 THAT BIAFRA WOULD NOT REPEATNOT INSIST ON SOVEREIGNTY
AS: PRECONDITION FOR SETTLEMENT WITH FMG. WHETHER OR NOT OUDKWU
MEANT WHAT HE SAID. IT MIGHT NOT BE BAD, IDEA TAKE HIM, AT HIS
WORD IN TRYING FIND SOME MEANS: OF MOVING TOWARD SETTLEMENT.

COMMENT: ALTHOUGH! PROBBIAFRAN, PROPAGANDA, IS: BUILDING: UP! AND THERE! ARE! CALLS: FOR FULL! RECOGNITION: FROM: VARIOUS: GAULLIST ORGANIZATIONS: (SEE) SEPTEL!) WE! HAVE! NO FIRM! INDICATION THAT FRANCE! WILL! ACTUALLY RECOGNIZE: BUAFRA. NOR! DISPITE! RANDON! INDICATIONS: IS: THERE! ANY FIRM! EVIDENCE: THAT FRANCE! INTENDS TO: LIMIT ARMS

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PAGE 03 PARIS 03724 1420032.

DELIVERIES, WHICH: DELIVERIES: WERE: IMPLICITY ADMITTED: BY MINDEF!
MESSMER: IN RECENT COMMENT TO: LOCAL! PRESS. NEVERTHELESS, QUAI IS
APPARENTLY CONTINUTING SEARCH: FOR MEANS OF MOVING TOWARD PEACEFULE
SETTLEMENT WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF FRENCH: POLICY. GP-2. SHRIVER

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By MMARA Date V 5 105



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NSC 10,P: 04,RSC: 01,SP: 02,SS: 20,USIA 12,IO 13,UCF 03,UPW 01,SR 01,

ORM Ø3. RSR Ø1./148 W

R: 141443Z MAR: 69 FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6295 INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA AMEMBASSY LAGOS: AMEMBASSY NIAMEY AMEMBASSY KINSHASA AMEMBASSY COTONOU AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MONROVIA 1250

SUBJECT: NIGERIA - DAU CONCOM MEETING

1. PRESIDENT TUBMAN CONFIRMED PUBLICLY MARCH 13 THAT MONROVIA MEETING OAU CONCOM PROVISIONALLY SET FOR APRIL 18. PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD! EARLIER MADE: SUGGESTION FOR MEETING TO EMPEROR WHO HAD COMMUNICATED WITH EACH COMMITTEE MEMBER. EMPEROR SAID HE HAD HEARD FROM ALL BUT ONE COMMITTEE MEMBER. (MISSING REPLY PRESUM-

ABLY MOBUTURS: PER KINSHASA 1510) • ALL ACCEPTED MEETING SUGGESTION:

2. PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD SUGGESTED MEETING BE CALLED WITHOUT PRESENT

SPECIFICALLY: IMPLICATION IS THAT THIS PROPOSAL ACCEPTED BY OTHER

3. TUBMAN SAID WORLD COUNCIL CHURCHES PRESIDENT BLAKE HAD OF FEREDISERVIES WCC DIRECT TELEX LINK WITH OUUKWU WHICH HE USING TO

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
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SEND MESSAGE

4. TUBMAN ADDED THAT HE HAD ALSO SUGGESTED THAT AFRICAN STATES NOT RETENOT MEMBERS OF CONCOME BE PERMITTED SEND OBSERVERS MONROVIA MEETING IF THEY DESTRED BROWN

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### Department of State

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PAGE 01 PARIS 03725 142005Z

44 ACTION: AF: 18

INFO EUR 15.CIAE 00.DODE 00.JPM 04.H 02.INR 07.L 03.NSAE 00.NSC 10. 50. CV. P. 04.RSC 01.SP 02.SS 20.USIA 12.UCF 03.UPW 01.IO 13.SR 01.ORM 03.

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R: 141825Z MAR: 69 FM: AMEMBASSY PARIS TO: SECSTATE: WASHDC 1988 INFO: AMEMBASSY LAGOS AMEMBASSY LONDON:

SHELCUR ELT PARIS 3725

REFR PARIS 3724

I.SUMMARY: PRO-BIAFRA PROPAGANDA IS AT WHAT SEEMS TO BE ALL TIME: HIGH: IN' FRANCE AS AID FOR BIAFRA WEEK DRAWS TO CLOSE. HOWEVER, DESPITE STRONG PUBLIC SYMPATHY FOR BIAFRAN CAUSE, PUBLIC SQUABBLING HAS BROKEN OUT BETWEEN THOSE WHOSE MOTIVATION IS: HUMANTIARIAN: AND THOSE WHOSE MOTIVATION IS POLITICAL.

2. FRENCH: NATIONAL "AID: BIAFRA WEEK" BEGAN MARCH 10 UNDER SPONSORSHIP OF FRENCH RED: CROSS AND FRENCH COMMITTEE OF WORLD CAMPAIGN AGAINST HUNGER. CAMPAIGN IS RECEIVING OFFICIAL GOVT SUPPORT IN FORM: OF: FREE TV ADVERTISING, USE OF POST OFFICES AND TOBACCO SHOPS FOR SALE: OF: BIAFRA LDTTERY TICKETS, AND APPEAL BY FONMIN DEBRE: IN: FAVOR OF: CAMPAIGN WHICH WAS PUBLISHED IN MARCH 14 SPECIAL EDITION OF GAULLIST ORGAN LA NATION DEVOTED EXCLUSIVELY TO FRANCE AND BIAFRA (COPIES POUCHED ADDRESSEES).

3. IN: ADDITION TO SPECIAL EDITION OF LA NATION, GAULLIST CIRCLES ARE: PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR BIAFRA WEEK THROUGH MEMBERSHIP OF NUMEROUS GAULLIST DEPUTIES AND FORMER MINSTERS IN "PRIVATE" ORGANIZATIONS: OSTENSIBLY DEDICATED TO HUMANITARIAN AID FOR BIAFRA: GAULLIST DEPUTY AND: FORMER AMBASSADOR TO LAGOS, (RAYMOND OFFROY) RECENTLY CREATED ACTION COMMITTEE FOR BIAFRA WITH MEMBERSHIP OF SEVERAL OTHER GAULLIST DEPUTIES, INCLUDING ALAIN TERRE-NOIRE AND JEAN CLAUDE FORTUIT AND MARETTE WHO, LIKE OFFROY, HAVE

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VISITED BIAFRA AND BECOME ITS ARDENT DEFENDERS. THIS GROUP HAS ITS: HEADQUARTERS: AT 52 RUE: SOLFERING (HEADQUARTERS: FOR SEVERAL GAULLIST SEMI-OFFICIAL) ORGANIZATIONS) AND IS: ACTIVELY SUPPORTING BIAFRA, WEEK IT HAS: CALLED: FOR OFFICIAL: RECOGNITION: OF BIAFRA. ANDTHER MAJOR: PRO-BIAFRA ORGANIZATION: ISTHE: FRANCE-BIAFRA COMMITTEE, WHICH: ADVOCATES: DIPLOMATIC: RECOGNITION: LEFT ALSO CALLED: ON MARCH: 14 FOR: OFFICIAL: RECOGNITION: BY FRANCE: OF: BIAFRA AS: ANI INDEPENDENT STATE:

THE ACTION COMMITTEE AND THE FRANCE-BIAFRA COMMITTEE HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE ON MARCH & TO LAUCH BIAFRA WEEK, IN WHICH USUALI CHARGES OF GENOCIDE BOMBING OF CIVILIANS DELIBERATE STARVATION, ETC., REPEATED EVEN LARGER RALLY PLANNED FOR MARCH 12 BUT IT FELL FLAT AND BROKE UP IN DISORDER DUE TO SPLIT BETWEEN GROUPS (MOSTLY RELIGIOUS) GENUINELY MOTIVATED BY HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS AND THE HIGHLY POLITICIZED GROUPS MENTIONED IN PARA 3. WELL ROOW. CATHOLIC PRIEST (ABBEIPIERRE) SUPPORTED AIDLEOR BIAFRA BUT DENOUNCED PUBLICLY THE LOTTERY (WHICH IT IS CLAIMED WILL AWARD UP TO HALF MILLION DOLLARS IN PRIZES). SAME TRUETOF PROTESTANT PASTOR (BAUMONT) AND FORMER GAULLIST MINISTER (ROBERT BURON). DEPUTIES OFFROY AND FORTUIT AND FRANCE-BIAFRA PRESIDENT VERON DEFENDED IDEA OF LOTTERY UT WERE HOOTED DOWN

NEGATIVE REACTIONS TO VULGARIZATION OF BLAFRA APPEAL BY
LOTTERY DEVICE HAVE ALSO BEEN MADE PUBLIC BY NEWSPAPERS HUMANITE
AND COMBAT, BY CFDT TRADELUNION, BY CATHOLIC COMMITTEE AGAINST
HUNGER AND FOR DEVELOPMENT. AND TERRES DES HOMMES. ON OTHER
HAND, RECENT PUBLIC OPINION POLLIBY IFOP FOUND THAT 34 PERCENT
OF FRENCH PEOPLE POLLED THINK GOVERNMENT "NOT DOING ENOUGH FOR
BLAFRA". 32 PERCENT THINK IT IS "DOING JUST ENOUGH" AND ONLY
4 PERCENT THINK GOVERNMENT "DOING TOO MUCH". (COMMENT WORDING
OF QUESTIONS IS VAGUE BUT EMBASSY CONSIDERS THAT POSS REFLECTS
GENERAL SENTIMENT OF FRENCH PEOPLE).

6. EMBOFFI ASKEDI PIERRET OFI QUAI WHAT HE THOUGHT ABOUT PUBLIC FUSSING AND FEUDING BETWEEN SUPPORTERS OF BIAFRA. HE ADMITTED THAT SITUATION QUITE EMBARRASSING FOR FRENCH GOV AND BLAMED IT ON GENUTINE RESENTMENT OVER USE OF LOTTERY WHICH HAD BEEN GOVERNMENT DECISION. TAKEN ON GROUNDS THAT MERE VOLUNTARY APPEAL UNLEKELY PRODUCE SUFFICIENTLY HIGH LEVEL OF CONTRIBUTIONS. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION. PIERRET ALSO ADMITTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE

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By MNARA Date 0/5/07



## Department of State

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DIFFERENES BETWEEN THOSE MOTIVATED BY HUMANITARIAN SENTIMENT AND THOSE WHOSE MOTIVATIONS ARE SO OBVIOUSLY POLITICAL, DESPITE WHAT HE SAID WAS MAJOR EFFORT BY GOVERNMENT "TO REMOVE POLITICAL ASPECTS" FROM BIAFRA WEEK.

GP-4 - SHRIVER

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TR XMB AIR	January 14 - March 6, 1969
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ARMY CIA NAV	<del> </del>
OSD USIA NSA	Attached is the full text of the report issued on March 10, 1969, by
34 10 3	the team of International Observers from Canada, Poland, Sweden and the
MST ASSIS NSC	
_19	United Kingdom. Reftel gives a summary of the report.
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	Attachment: all m.m.
40	Observer Team Report for Jan. 14 - March 6, 1969
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# FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION - PRESS RELEASE 10. 3. 69 NO.F. 266

OBSERVER TEAM REPORT FOR JAN. 14 - MARCH 6, 1969

LAGOS, NIGERIA 7 March, 1969

To: The Federal Government of Nigeria

The Government of Canada

The Government of Poland

The Government of Sweden

The Government of the United Kingdom

COPIES TO: The Organization of African Unity

The Office of the Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

### OBSERVER TEAM TO NIGERIA

REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF CANADA, POLAND, SWEDEN AND THE UNITED KINGDOM DURING THE PERIOD 14 JANUARY 1969 - 6 MARCH 1969

NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC BEFORE 1800 HOURS (GMT)

10 MARCH 1969

#### INTRODUCTION

(i)

- 1. This report gives an account of activities of the Observers representing Canada, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom during the period of 14 January 6 March 1969.
- 2. Separate reports will be submitted, at their discretion, by the representatives of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) in accordance with the Terms of Reference for the Observer Team to Nigeria.
- J. During the period covered by this report, the Observers visited each division in turn, leaving a small group in Lagos, on standby. They also visited states not part of the war KOFO/HAG.

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By MMARA Date V 5 167

- 4. The Observers continued to follow the procedures developed during their previous visits and described in earlier reports. Tours included visits to troop positions in the operational areas, camps for displaced persons, hospitals, orphanages, food distribution centres and civil administrators. Members of the press accompanied the Observers on most of their tours.
- 5. A list of places visited and members taking part in the visits is given at Annex B to this report.

#### FIRST NIGERIAN DIVISION

- 6. Visits were made to Enugu, Abakaliki, Afikpo, Awgu, Obinagu, Okigwi, Awka and Abagana. The Observers noted the continued satisfactory conduct of the troops in this area and saw evidence of good relations between them and the civilians in all places visited.
- 7. A number of educated Ibos have returned to the area.

  Interviews with them indicate that teachers are now available to make possible the opening of schools as mentioned in our last report.
- 8. Funds are now available to the civil administration in Enugu for road clearance and repairs. Work is in progress on schools and the University of Nsukka. Funds are available and plans ready to upgrade the Enugu Airport to international standard. There is evidence that the absence of telephone and postal communications between Lagos and Enugu causes considerable delay in the work of reconstruction. The lack of mail service was commented on in the Observers' last report, both from this aspect and from the point of view of the value of communication in helping to locate missing relatives.
- 9. The plan of the State Administration for the recordind and KOFO/HAG.

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care of abandoned buildings and property, until owners return, is well in hand. This subject is dealt with more fully in paragraphs 31-33.

10. The work of the Red Cross and Civil Administration continues to reduce the need for assistance from the Federal troops. The Observers noted weekly increases in numbers reporting to ICRC feeding teams. The number of persons being fed at the time of the visit was approximately 90,000.

#### SECOND NIGERIAN DIVISION

- 11. The Observers divided into two teams for their visit to this Division. One team visited Benin City, Asaba and Onitsha; the other, Benin, Warri, Kwale and the areas close to the West bank of the River Niger from Asaba-Ase in the south to Iselegu in the north.
- 12. The team which visited Asaba noted that the administration and care of displaced persons in the area is being conducted efficiently under the Army and the Rehabilitation Commission. Of the approximately 22,000 people being fed in the Mid-West State, some 15,000 are in this area.
- 13. There are no significant changes in numbers of civilians in Onitsha which is still very much in the operational zone.
- 14. Displaced persons were being moved from Warri to Benin City during the team's visit. Two camps were visited in Benin City; the old camp visited a number of times previously, and a new camp which opened the day of the Observers' visit. The new camp housed 90 men and boys from the East Central State. Accommodation was adequate and food was cooked in the old camp and delivered to the new. The Observers noted that family units were being kept intact and that the opening of the new camp reduced considerably the congestion in the old.
- 15. The Chairman of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Committee of the Mid-Western State expressed particular concern for the welfare of about 7,000 people who in normal times lived on the east bank of the River Nigeria in the area of "The rivers" which is from Adobu in the south of the State to Azagba in the west. These people lived KOFO/HAG.

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by fishing and were driven from the east bank by the secessionists. For awhile they lived on the sand banks but were forced to fice from here by the rains. They are now provided shelter and food by the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Committee. Their diet is different to other people and this has caused some difficulty. There is little that can be done for them as far as a return to normal life is concerned until they can move back to their own area and resume their lives as fishing people.

- about 35 per cent of the Ibos who had fled the State had now returned. Records for the care of property in the State were reported upon previously. A detailed check on the circumstances of the returnees will be made on the next visit of the Observers.
- 17. The Observers noted that a large proportion of the displaced persons now being cared for in the Mid-Western State are people who have fled from other states principally those in the East. This puts a heavy burden on the funds allotted to the Mid-Western State for such care.
- 18. The Observers visited <u>fifteen</u> wounded prisoners of war who were receiving care in public wards of the Benin Hospital. They noted that medical treatment was good and was of the same quality as that afforded the wounded soldiers of the FMG forces and civilian patients.

### THIRD MARINE COMMANDO DIVISION

19. The Observers visited this Division February 18 - 20. Upon arrival at Port Harcourt, the Observers were told by the Divisional Commander that on orders from Lagos the visit was restricted to Port Harcourt and Calabar. Since this meant a restriction on movement, a protest was lodged with the FMG on the Observers' return to Lagos. As a consequence of the protest a meeting was held with the Chief of Staff Army and the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence.

20. It was established that the restrictions resulted from a misunder-standing between the Chairman of the Observer Team and the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence. The Observers stressed that KOFO/HAG.

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a continuation of the visit and tour of the battle areas as soon as possible was essential. On 24 February, the Observer team returned to Port Harcourt to continue this tour. Visits were made to Port Harcourt, Elele, Ahoada, Uyo, Ikot Ekpene and Abak.

21. The Observers investigated secessionist charges relayed by the Canadian Government on shooting of refugees at Ilele on 13 February. Village leaders and Red Cross personal were interviewed and no evidence of any such atrocity could be found. It was noted that the inhabitants of this village are Rivers people and not Ibos.

22. An investigation into allegations received from the Canadian


Government that one hundred and twenty refugees in Port Harcourt were shot on 13 February and that all male refugees in refugee centres were in danger of being shot was also investigated. Ibo leaders in the camps in question emphatically denied the allegations. They, and many of their people, assured the Team that they were receiving much assistance from the Federal forces and felt no danger from them.

They did state that their integration with people of other tribes in the Port Harcourt area was being carried out with caution because of inter-tribal animosity. It is considered of interest that several Ibos are employed daily in the Port Harcourt area returning to the refugee centre each evening. There have been no incidents, up to the time of the Observers' visit, as a consequence of their employment.

The conditions in displaced persons camps in the area of the Third Marine Commando Division have improved a great deal since September 1968. People are well fed and are receiving basic medical care. The Observers were told that the living standard of displaced persons is better than that of villagers in some areas, and that this has resulted in local villagers moving into displaced-persons camps in a number of locations. In the opinion of the Observers it would greatly facilitate the refugees' rehabilitation and benefit their morale if some useful employment were provided.

KOFO/HAG

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION ...



24. In the opinion of the Observers, the civil administration in the area of 3 Marine Commando Division is less well established than in any other sector of the war-affected areas. Business people with huge investments in the area have complained of their lack of access to and from the area. Others have complained of the arbitrary seizure of goods and vehicles. Civil administrators have complained of the restrictions placed on their movement through Port Harcourt.

25. As suggested in previous reports it is desirable that civil administrative control be re-established as soon as possible.

#### PRISONERS OF WAR

**(**6)

- 26. The Observers have had discussions on this matter with government authorities since their last report.
- 27. Visits to a number of camps during the period covered in this report show some improvement in the conditions therein. Red Cross visits are more frequent and attempts to start a mail service are underway.
- 28. Other recommendations made by the Observer team in earlier reports with regard to the improving of general conditions, room for recreation, separation of officers from other ranks, separation of prisoners of war from civilian prisoners, etc., will proceed as new camps are established. The Observers will continue their discussions with the authorities and expect to visit the first new camp in March.

### VISIT TO REFUGEE CAMPS SURULERE

29. On 14 February the Observers visited two Refugee Camps at Surulere, a few miles from Lagos, both housing Ibos from the area of Calabar. In one of the camps over 300 women with children have been quartered since November 1967. The conditions of the camp were satisfactory. Some women had obtained permission to work. A primary school was operating in the camp and older children were sent to a secondary school outside the camp. The refugees had full freedom of movement.

30. Forty-two male refugees have lived in the other camp since 6 December

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/1968. These refugees .....

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By MNARA Date VD 5 90

1968. These refugees are not permitted to leave the camp and have no opportunity for exercise or work. It seems to the Observers that the conditions of this latter camp could be improved if the men could be gainfully employed.

#### REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

- 31. The Observers visited Military Governors and civil administrators in Lagos State, Western State, Mid-Western State, North Western State, North Eastern State and Rivers State during the period covered by this report.
- During each visit the Observers have had an opportunity to examine and discuss plans for the rehabilitation and reconstruction necessitated by the war. They have also been shown plans for the care of Ibo property until the owners return.
- 33. Plans seen are satisfactory and it is the opinion of the Observers that positive steps are being taken to repair the many damages of war. However, the Observers consider it beyond their Terms of Reference to audit such plans in detail, since this is a function of the civil administration.

### ACTIVITIES OF THE NIGERIAN AIR FORCE

- 34. The Observer Team being cognizant of allegations of the bombing of civilians in secessionist held territory, requested a meeting with the Commander of the Nigerian Air Force on 5 March, 1969.
- 35. As it was impossible to receive proof that such allegations are false, the Observers can make no conclusions. However, the Observers received assurance that the policy of the Federal Military Government and the Nigerian Air Force is to reduce civilian casualties and damage to property in the secessionist held area to a minimum.
- 36. During the discussion, the Commander, Nigerian Air Force made the following points:

/(A) The Code of Conduct.....

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BVMNARA Date W 5 105

- (A) The Code of Conduct applicable to all Nigerian
  Air Force units states that "The aim of the war is
  to keep Nigeria and the Nigerians together. To
  ensure this noble task, maximum and sincere efforts
  will be made to preserve as many lives as possible.
  You will NOT repeart NOT bomb any non-military
  target. Any gathering of the civilian population
  will be avoided. Military targets will NOT normally
  be in towns. You will endeavour to maintain a'
  maximum restraint on your activities over the rebel
  areas".
- (B) The reports of civilian casualties and damage to property have been greatly exaggerated.
- (C) Targets are selected based on the best available intelligence. There is no indiscriminate bombing.
- (D) The onus rests with the secessionist to site their Headquarters, ammunition and supply dumps, training establishments which are all considered to be legitimate war targets, outside towns and villages.
- (E) In the execution of the war there are bound to be casualties and the prosecution of the war must take precedence over public opinion.
- (F) World public opinion would better serve the interests of Nigeria if it called for the secessionists to capitulate.
- 37. The Nigerian Air Force Command was much disturbed by recent allegations concerning the bombing of civilians.

  Although these were considered partially inaccurate and largely exaggerated, earlier instruction to all field commands had been repeated with a covering signal dated 5 March requiring "complete compliance".

/SUMMARY ....

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By MMARA Date 05 705

#### SUMMARY

- 38. In summary, the Observers representing Canada, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom found during their visits from 14 January to 6 March 1969:
  - (a) That troops of the Nigerian Army seen by the Observers continue to adhere to the instructions in their "Code of Conduct";
  - (b) That malnutrition problems in the Federally-held areas of the war zone being rapidly brought under control;
  - (c) That plans for rehabilitation and reconstruction, and the care A Ibo property, are in effect in all areas visited;
  - (d) That action has been taken by the FMG to improve conditions in prisoner-of-war camps;
  - (e) That progress is being made in all areas, but to a lesser degree in Port Harcourt and Rivers State, in reaching a condition of normalcy;
  - (f) The FMG has reiterated its determination to avoid the bombing of non military targets. As the Observers were unable to obtain proof that such bombings do not take place, they can reach no conclusions in the matter.

Brigadier General C.J.A. Hamilton CANADA

Colonel Alfons Olkiewicz POLAND

Major General A. Raab SWEDEN Lieutenant Colonel D.J. Cairns
UNITED KINGDOM

ANNEX A .....

AROS/BAM

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Authority VND 95/5/3

BVMMARA Date 0/5/65

ANNEX A

TO OBSERVER TEAM'S REPORT ON ACTIVITIES 14 JANUARY -6 MARCH 1969

LIST OF MEMBERS OF OBSERVER TEAM
(as of 3 March 1969)

Janada

Brigadier General C. J. A. Hamilton
Lieutenant Colonel E. B. M. Pinnington

roland

Colonel A. Olkiewcz

Mr. T. Kumanek

Lieutenant M. Byczy

Sweden

Major General Baron A. Raab

Major C. E. S. P. Tamm

United Kingdom

Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson

Lieutenant Colonel D. J. Cairns.

Organisation of African Unity

Captain O. Yilma

Mr. O. Lefgoum

United Nations

Dr. E. H. Jensen

ANNEX B....

AROS/BAM

Authority WN 05 503

By MM ARA Date 05 05

TO OBSERVER TEAM'S REPORT ON ACTIVITIES 14 JANUARY -6 MARCH 1969

#### SUMMARY OF VISITS

- Second Nigerian Division 13-16 January 1969
   Benin, Asaba, Ogwashi-Uka, Onitsha.
   Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson, Colonel Olkiewcz, Major
   Tamm, accompanied by Mr. Lefgoum (OAU) and Dr. Caulfield (UN).
   Warri, Akiewe, Usere, Okpe, Ashaka, Kwale, Obiaruku.
   Major General Raab, Lieutenant Colobel Pinnington, Mr. Kumanek.
- 2. Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division 20-21 January 1969

  Port Harcourt, Ilele, Owerri.

  Major General Milroy accompanied by Mr. Gussing (UN).
- Maiduguri
  Major General Raab, Major General Milroy, Colonel Olkiewicz,
  Mr. Kumanek, Major Tamm, Lieutenant Byczy, accompanied by
  Captain Yilma (OAU).
- 4. Commissioner for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 27 Jan. 1969
  Major General Raab, Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson, Colonel
  Olkiewcz, Lieutenant Colonel Cairns, Lieutenant Colonel
  Pinnington, accompanied by Mr. Gussing (UN), Dr. Caulfield (UN)
  and Captain Yilma (OAU).
- 5. First Nigerian Division 3-7 February 1969
  Enugu, Abakaliki, Afikpo, Awgu, Obinagu, Okigwi, Awka, Abagana.

  Major General Raab, Brigadier General Hamilton, Mr. Kumanek,
  accompanied by Mr. Lefgoum (OAU).
- 6. North Western State 7-9 February 1969
   Gusau, Sokoto, Argungu.
   Colonel Olkiewcz, Lieutenant Colonel Cairns, Lieutenant Colonel
   Pinnington, Major Tamm, Lieutenant Byczy accompanied
   by Captain Yilma (OAU).

/7. Displaced.....

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By MMARA Date 0 5 05

- 8. Third Migerian Marine Commando Division 18-20 February 1969.

  Port Harcourt.

  Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson, Brigadier General Hamilton,

  Mr. Kumanek, Major Tamm, accompanied by Captain Yilma (OAU).
- 9. Fried Figurian Commando Division 24-27 February 1969
  Port Harcourt, Elele, Ahoada, Uyo, Ikot Ekpene, Abak.
  Major General Raab, Brigadier General Hamilton, Colonel
  Olkiewcz, Lieutenant Colonel Cairns, accompanied by
  Captain Yilma (OAU).
- 10. Visit to Commander Nigerian Air Force 5 March 1969
  Lagos
  Major General Raab, Brigadier General Hamilton, Colonel
  Olkiewicz, Lieutenant Colonel Cairns, Major Tamm, accompanied
  by Dr. Jensen (UN) and Captain Yilma (OAU).

AROS/BAM

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Authority WN 095 1503
By Whara Date 05 05

POL 27 BAFRA-NIGERIA .66 OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT ☐ CHARGE TO UNCLASSIFIED Classification 13 Mar 69 20 Origin ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS INFO: Amembassy LONDON Info PARTS US MISSION GENEVA USUN CINCSTRIKE Amconsul IBADAN KADUNA SUBJECT: Nigeria Press Summary - March 13 1. Wash Post carries Reuters Lagos story headed Biafra proposes cease fire, based on Radio Biafra report Ojukwu proposal one month truce. Broadcast said proposal in message to foreign ministers six EEC countries. Ojukwu called on them to press Britain halt arms shipments to Lagos and obtain total embargo arms delivery to both warring sides. FMG last week rejected earlier Biafra call for ceasefire followed by negotiations. Meanwhile ICRC report said emergency relief both sides in civil war has cost more than \$53 million and situation in federal areas has "vastly improved" in last six months. 2. Times carries Garrison piece dateline with Biafran forces near Owerri, March 3 (delayed) headed Biafrans are besieging Nigerians cut off for month in Owerri. Last armored relief column got through Feb 9. If Owerri falls would be major psychological victory for Biafra. Nigerians have been on offensive for more than year now steadily reducing Biafra in size. Owerri capture would free Biafrans for thrust at Port Harcourt. First stop entering Owerri sector heavily camouflaged HQ 14th Division. While nearby villages have been bombed

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Telegraphic transmission and Nigeria Task Force:RMMelbourne

Tel. Ext. 2105

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ACTION: Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

Info

and strafed, HQ has never known air raid. Motor pool completely shielded from air. Nearby oil refinery which produces all division's gas, diesel oil, kerosene, also completely shielded. Viewfrom main road running south toward Owerri from Onitsha explains good deal why Nigerians find it difficult break out much less break in Owerri. Biafran belt around Owerri more than ten miles deep at narrowest point and heavily fortified. Mile after mile of road studded waist high tree trunks, sunkinto holes four feet deep beneath both macadam surface and roadbed, can withstand shock heaviest  $exttt{N}_{ exttt{i}}$ gerian armored car. In-depth defense includes "elephant traps", eight foot deep tunnels furrowed just beneath two-inch macadam surface. Remains several Nigerian trucks can be seen where they plunged through thin macadam into pit below detonating Biafran-made mine. 47th Battalion entrenched 400 xxxx yards from Nigerians, about one mile south Owerri Cathedral. It scrub country and neither side can see other through thick bush. Hour before dark two of battalion's three under-strength companies move forward in picket line, aiming to sweep Nigerian positions east of main Owerri-Port Harcourt road. Move out fast, crouched low, many barefoot, only few with helmets, most wwxingxkox wearing torn makeshift uniforms. Biafran machine gun on right opens up covering fire. Nigerians reply with three 81-mm mortar rounds. First Lt Emmanuel Anizeha, former

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ACTION: Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

Info

student University of Nigeria comments: "Month ago they would have dropped 30 rounds mortars and probably called in artillery as well. Now they really rationing." First wounded filtered in, first dozen all mortar victims.

Medics move up and down line, patching wounds with gauze compresses, giving each man tetanus shot. No plasma, no morphine. Another dozen Biafrans carried back with gunshot wounds. First wave wounded cartied back rear on stretchers, bearers weaving through mile-long stretch tank traps, fallen trees to waiting truck. Without warning rain begins fall in torrents, thunder drowns out firing. After half hour rain and thunder stop. Biafrans have crossed road, pushed 400 yards beyond it, are digging in for night. Casualties include six known Biafran dead, forty carried away with wounds of which 10 probably fatal.

3. CSMonitor March 12 carries David Winder London article headed Biafran bombings jolt London. Described growing parliamentary pressure for UK policy reappraisal, troubled mood at Westminster. British note USG has similar concerns bombing attacks. As result possibility soon some joint unofficial action or at least some reappraisal of war will be initiated by both govts gaining currency London. MPs critical HMG status quo policy have been smarting ever since senior govt spokesman filibustered long enough to prevent vote being

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Origin

ACTION:

Page 4 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

Info

taken before end of last foreign affairs debate on Biafra. Whether govt can continue postpone or sidetrack issue again increasingly doubtful since many MPs feel course war taking turn for worse. Correspondingly great deal more skepticism re govt previous attempts explain away civilian sufferings as products Biafran propaganda. Frank Allaun, Labor MP just back from Biafra reported seeing 20 bombing sites. Backbenchers believe govt claim exercise moderating influence Lagos by upholding traditional military supplies not borne out by recent bombing attacks on civilians. HMG embarrassed by apparent credibility gap between stated military policy Lagos and conflicting on spot action taken by pilots several hundred miles away, prompting some observers doubt whether Gowon fully in command. Overall problem and solution not easy as succinct New Statesman editorial says: QTE Past is not simple: Ibos have been subjected enough barbarity justify secession but their choice boundaries cynical and initial attempts enforce them particularly in Mid-West often ruthless. Present not simple: Federal pilots clearly bombing civilian targets and interfering with medical relief, but Ojukwu obstinacy clearly condemning to death thousands of people who do not greatly care whether they live in Ibo state of Nigerian province. Future not simple: Nigerian unity could now be maintained

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ACTION: Page 5 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

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only by permanent policing Iboland, with running-sore guerilla resistance in bush, but Biafran secession would establish precedent encouraging destructive tribalism everywhere and a state which might well join in enfeebled ranks of France's West African clients. UNQTE

END

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### Department of State

**TELEGRAM** 

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PAGE: Ø1 LAGOS Ø2253: 132025Z.

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TRUCE! FOLLOWED BY A PERIOD OF CEASEFIRE IN CONJUNCTION WITH GTE UNCONDITIONAL TALKS UNGTEL ALSO HIS ALLEGATION OF TRANSMITTAL OF MESSAGES TO FRANCE WEST GERMANY ITALY BELGIUM HOLLAND LUXEMBOURG ASKING THEM APPEAL GREAT BRITAIN HALT ARMS SHIPMENTS TO IMPOSE TOTAL ARMS EMBARGO QTE BOTH WARRING PARTIES UNGTE

2. ALL PAPERS: (EXCEPTA INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH)
THE GOVERNMENT OWNED POST)

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By MNARA Date VD 105



## Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 02253: 132025Z

DEVOTE MUCH SPACE EDITORIAL COMMENT TO UPCOMING BRITISH HOUSE COMMONS

DEBATE: ON: NIGERIA: AND YESTERDAYS: RETURN OF SIR

DENIS: GREENHILL! TO: LONDON' TO GTE: REPORT TO PM WILSON,
FORSEC: STEWART; FOLLOWING: BRIEF: MEETINGS GEN. GOWON:
TUESAAY NIGHT, WEDNESDAY MORNING. TIME: DETAILS BRITISH PM
WILSONS: REPORT TO: COMMONS: ON DISCUSSIONS WITH PRES.
NIXON: CONCERNING: NIGERIAN; SITUATION, HIS: STATEMENT THAT PM,
NIXON; UN SECGEN ALL! BELIEVE GTE! MEDIATORY INTERVENTION: NOT
LIKELY TO: BRING: EARLY RESULTS UNGTE! THAT USG AND BRITISH
GTE! MAKING: WHAT ENQUIRIES: WE CAN! ZNGTÊ: CONCERNING CHARGES
OF: BOMBINGS: OF: REBEL! CIVILIAN AREAS. EDITORIAL! COMMENT INCLUDES
SKETCHS: FRONT-PAGE: STATEMENT THAT COMMONS: DEBATE: SIGNALS GTE:
TRIUMPH: OF: SENTIMENT OVER: REASON! UNGTE; CALLS ON NIGERIA
TO: GTE: CONTINUE! ITS: STRATEGY NOT MINDING: WORLD: OPINIONUNGTE; TRIBUNE: SUGGESTS BRITAIN WORK WITH: U.S., FRANCE TO
GTE: CONVINCE: REBELS: OF! FUTILITY OF! CONTINUING WITH USELESS WAR
UNGTE; RATHER! THAN ENGAGE! IN GTE: NOISEMAKING UNGTE ON: ALLEGED!
BOMBING: OF: CIVILIAN TARGETS: OBSERVER DEVOTES ENTIRE: FRONT

WHICH FIRST NOTES HYPOCRISY BETWEEN

COMMONS DEBATE AND FACT OF BOMBINGS OF CIVILIAN AREAS BY BRITAIN GERMANY JAPAN DURING WW II. CONTINUES WITH ACCUSATION THAT WHOLE SITUATION IS NIGERIAS QTE OWN FAULT UNDTE. THAT FMG QTE CARES TOO MUCH FOR A PUBLIC OPINION IT MAY NEVER WIN UNGTE. THAT IT IS FACING QTE NATURAL SYMPATHY FOR THE UNDERDOG UNGTE. CHARGES GOVT QTE TO DECIDE IF IT ABLE TO CRUSH REBELLION OR NOT UNQTE. IF REPLY IS LATTER. TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS OTHERWISE GET ON WITH WINNING WAR.

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By WMARA Date 05 05

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### POL 3 OAU

## Department of State TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KINSHA 01510 131345Z

50 ACTION AF. 18

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NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 20,USIA 12,AID 28,E 15,UCF 03,

ACDA 16.MC 01.SR 01.ORM 03.RSR 01./179 W

R 131200Z MAR 69 FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0558 INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN AMEMBASSY ACCRA AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA AMEMBASSY LAGOS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MONROVIA AMEMBASSY NIAMEY

CONFIDENTIAL KINSHASA 01510

SUBJECT: MEETING OF DAU CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON NIGERIA

REFERENCE: ACCRA 00746 /

Ö

1. WE EXCEEDINGLY SKEPTICAL OF CHANCES MOBUTU'S TAKING PART IN COCOM MEETINGS DURING MÎD-APRIL PERIOD NOW BEING AIMED AT, MUCH LESS HIS PLAYING POSITIVE ROLE IN SUCH INITIATIVE. MOBUTU DEPARTED THIS MORNING FOR TOUR OF EUROPEAN CAPITALS WICH IS SCHEDULED LAST THROUGH END OF MARCH. THEREAFTER, HE HOPES SPEND AT LEAST TWO WEEKS VACATIONING AT MONTE CARLO. WE UNDERSTAND MOREOVER THAT PRESIDENT INTENDS PARTICIPATE IN EAST AFRICAN SUMMIT SCHEDULED FOR TO LEAVE LITTLE. BE HELD IN LUSAKA LATER IN APRIL. THIS WOULD SEEM TO LEAVE LITTLE TIME FOR COCOM.

2. APART FROM SCHEDULING PROBLEMS, MOBUTU HAS SHOWN NOT THE SLIGHTEST SLIGHTES!
INTEREST IN THE NIGERIAN PROBLEM SINCE HIS OCAM COLLEAGUES DEPARTED:
KINSHASA IN JANUARY. NOR HAS HE SEEMED TO ATTACH MUCH VALUE TO
BEING MEMBER OF COCOM BEYOND THAT OF ENHANCING HIS OWN PRESTIGE.
PERHAPS ANKRAH OR HAILE SELASSIE WILL BE ABLE PERSUADE MOBUTU TO

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

## Department of State TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 962

PAGE Ø1 KADUNA ØØ2Ø8 141749Z.

45 ACTION AF 18

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RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, ACDA 16, 10 13, SR 01, ORM 03, 0

SCS 04, SCA 01, UPW 01, UCF 03, EUR 15, RSR 01,/169 W 03883

R 131600Z MAR 69: FM AMCONSUL KADUNA TO: SECSTATE WASHDC: 1074 INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS AMCONSUL: IBADAN

CONFIDENTIAL KADUNA 00208

SUBJECT: UNREST IN NORTH-CENTRAL STATE

#3

1. IN UNUSUALLY FRANK DISCUSSION WITH CONSULATE OFFICER,
GARBA JA BUDULKADIR, NORTH-EENTRAL STATE SMG, STATED THAT
THERE WAS NOTICEABLE INCREASE IN POPULAR DISGRUNTLEMENT
WITH WAR IN NORTHERN NIGERIA. HE SAID REOPLE ARE "BORED"
WITH THE WAR AND ARE FRUSTRAED BY LACK OF MEANS TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS. GARBA JA CITED RECENT ARREST OF NBC.
(NIGERIAN BROADCASTING COMPANY) EMPLOYEE WHO HAD PUBLICLY
CRITICIZED GOWON IN HIGHLY INFLAMMATORY TERMS FOR FAILURE
TO PROSECUTE WAR WITH GREATER DILIGENCE. POLICE WOULD
RELEASE THE MAN, BUT GOVERNMENT FEARED REPERCUSSIONS FROM
INCIDENT IF IT BECAME COMMON KNOWLEDGE.

QARBA JA OBSERVED THAT IN CURRENT POLITICAL VACUUM I
NIGERIA, GOVERNMENT HOPED TO WIN POPULAR SUPPORT IN
NORTH-CENTRAL STATE THROUGH LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORMS:
ALTHOUGH THEY REALIZED THAT THIS WOULD: INCUR WRATH! OF
EMIRS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. IM HIS VIEW, SOME OF EXTREME
"HAWKISH" VIEWS ON WAR ISSUE BEING CIRCULATED ORIGINATED
WITH EMIRS WHO HAD PRESSURED GOWON IN VAIN IN RECENT
MONTHS TO BLUNT LOCAL GOVBENMENT REFORM PROGRAM. IN FACT
ACCORDING GARBA UA, GOWON AT ONE POINT HAD AGREED TO
SUSPEND ACTION ON FURTHER CHANGES IN NATIVE AUTHORITIES.

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By MNARA Date 0 5 97



## Department of State TELEGRAM

#### CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KADUNA 00208 141749Z

GOVERNMENT REFORM ISSUE, EMIRS REACTED BY INCREASING CRITICISM OF FMG'S FAILURE TO PURSUE WAR VIGOROUSLY IN MANNER WHICH WOULD ENSURE EARLY END HOSTILITIES. GARBA JA SAID NORTH-CENTRAL STATE GOVERNMENT WAS CONSISTANTLY WALKING A TIGHTROPE TO KEEP SITUATION IN BALANCE AND ADDED THAT IN THIS RESPECT STATES HAD RECEIVED LITTLE OR NO SUPPORT FROM FIG WHICH HAD FAILED TO "COMMUNICATE WITH THE PEOPLE."

3. COMMENT: IN SPITE OF THEIR DETERMINED OPPOSITION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM, EMIRS CANNOT PUBLICLY CONDEMN A PROGRAM INITIATED BY MILITARY GOVERNMENT WHICH ENJOYS WIDESPREAD PUBLIC SUPPORT. HOWEVER, THEY CAN HOPE TO DRAW ATTENTION AWAY FROM REFORM ISSUE AND BRING COUNTER-PRESSURE TO BEAR ON FMG BY ESPOUSING EQUALLY POPULAR DEMAND FOR VIGOROUS PROSECUTION OF WAR WITH MORE ATTENTION TO GOAL OF ULTIMATE VICTORY AND LESS REGARD FOR HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. THE NORTH HAS NOT BEEN WIDELY AFFECTED BY WAR. THE FRUSH TRATION HERE REFERRED TO BY GARBA JA COULD BE PRODUCT OF NEW NATIONALISTIC EMOTIONS AS WELL AS INJURED PRIDE AMONG ELITE DUE TO FACT FEDERAL ARMY HAS BEEN TIED UP IN CON-FLICT FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS DESPITE REPEATED ASSURANCES REBELLION WOULD BE PUT DOWN WITHIN NEXT COUPLE OF MONTHS. IN ADDITION ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS HAVE SPAWNED DISSATISFACTION AMONG TRADERS AND OTHERS WHO DEPEND ON IMPORTED ITEMS NO LONGER READILY AVAILABLE. PRESS, RADIO, AS WELL AS PUBLIC ASSERTIONS OF INTELLECTUALS IN NORTH SUPPORT HARD LINE TOWARD QUESTION OF PROSECUTION OF WAR-EXTENSION OF GARBA JA'S THESIS WITH REGARD TO EMIR'S HOSTILITYTOWARD MILITARY GOVERNMENT WOULD BE THAT FRUSTRATIONS OF INCONCLUSIVE WAR COULD SET ACCOMPANYING REACTIONARY WAVE IN MOTION WHICH COULD HAVE PROFOUND NEGATIVE EFFECT ON ATTEMPTS NOW UNDERWAY TO REFORM TRADITIONAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS IN NORTH STOKES

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Authority WN ) 95 9503

By MNARA Date 0 5 05

ORIGIN/ACTION DEPARTMENT OF STATE EUR-6 RM/R 5 ARA A-264 UNCLASSIFIED Department of State PERSIMED 12 INFO LAGOS, LONDON 12 ترإد FRB CO FROM Amembassy VIENNA "DATE: March 12, 1969 3 INT SUBJECT: Austria's Biafra Activities TR ARM CLA 3. 20 5 In a parliamentary interpellation on March 10, Foreign OSD NSA Minister Waldheim was asked to report on Austria's activities 34 3 10 in connection with the Nigerian-Biafran war. HEW 150 Waldheim recapped the Austrian initiative in dispatching a special envoy to Lagos, Geneva, London, and New York in JEC JF August 1968 in order to probe opportunities for an end to the conflict and to investigate possibilities for Austrian relief activities (see A-1409 and A-1639). Waldheim also took note of the Foreign Ministry-inspired "Action Committee," composed of 25 private organizations and official agencies, for the purpose of creating two medical teams for four month assignments to Biafra (see A-1639 and A-1482). Waldheim stated that GOA donations of medical supplies, surplus foodstuffs (such as powdered milk) and cash in connection with the medical teams' work had a value of about 1 million schillings. (This is in addition to the approximately 1.5 million schillings raised by the private organizations—see A-1482.) Waldheim also noted that the Austrian Ambassador in Addis Ababa had been in contact with the Ethiopian Government to support Emperor Haile Selassie's appeal for a Christmas truce in the conflict, and had supported HIM's efforts to intercede with the authorities in Equatorial Guinia in order to lift the ban on relief flights from Fernando Po Island., In a new development, the Foreign Minister noted that the city of Vienna is prepared to admit 10 war victims from Biafra to Vienna hospitals for the treatment of eye injuries Land for plastic surgery. gery. UNCLASSIFIEDWHITE FOR DEPT. USE ONLY FORM DS-323 Out Drafted by: POL:JDRendahl:sm 3/11/69 POL:EBPord, Jr. Clearances: ECON: CBrown B

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### PEC 3 CALL

## Department of State TELEGRAM

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NSC 10.P 04.RSC 01.SP 02.SS 20.USIA 12.AID 28.E 15.RSR 01.UCF 03.

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R 1214454 MAR 69 FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5793 INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN AMEMBASSY KINSHASA AMEMBASSY ADDIS AHABA AMEMBASSY LAGOS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MONROVIA AMEMBASSY NIAMEY

CONFIDENTIAL ACCRA 746

NOFORN

SUBJECTS MEETING OF GAU CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON NIGERIA

REF: ADDIS AHABA 1344

1. ANKRAH CONFIRMED IN CONVERSATION MARCH 12 HE HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE ATTEND CONCOM MEETING IN MONROVIA. HOWEVER HE SAID HE COULD NOT BE AWAY FROM GHANA ON APRIL 17 SINCE IT IS ANNIVERSARY KOTOKA'S DEATH IN 1967 ABORTIVE COUP AND WILL BE NATIONAL DAY OFMOURNING. HE IS TRYING CHANGE DATES OF MEETING TO APRIL 19-22 BUT MIGHT BE ABLE GO IF AGREEMENT REACHED HOLD MEETING APRIL 18-21. HE DOUBTED WOULD BE WORTHWHILE FOR HIM TO ATTEND IF CONCOM STICKS TO PRESENTLY PLANNED DATES SINCE HE WOULD MISS AT LEAST ONE DAY OF THREE. DAY OR SHORTER MEETING. 1. ANKRAH CONFIRMED IN CONVERSATION MARCH 12 HE HAD AGREED

2. HE HAD NO FIXED IDEAS ON WHAT CONCOM SHOULD TRY ACCOMPLISH OTHER THAN MAKE EFFORT BRING TWO SIDES TOGETHER. HE

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Authority WWD By MNARA Date



# POL 27 BIAFRA-MIGERIA TR DEF 19-8 FR-NIGERIA Department of State TFIFGRAM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5420
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CINCSTRIKE
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C. D. N. F. I. D. E. N. T. I. A. L. LAGOS: 2188

#### LIMDIS

SUBJECT: REPORTED FRENCH ASSURANCES TO GOWON.

- COMMISSIONER EXTAFF PREDICTED TO HIM ON MARCH 10 THAT WAR WOULD END IN APRIL BECAUSE FRENCH WERE GTE STOPPING UNGTE MILITARY SUPPLIES TO REBELS ARIKPO SAID FRENCH AMBASSADOR BARBEY HAD SO INFORMED GOWON ON MARCH 9.
- 2. AMBASSADOR ENCOUNTERED BARBEY AT SOCIAL FUNCTION LAST NIGHT AND ALLUDED TO LATTER SCALL ON GOWON.
- 3. BARBEY CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD SEEN GOWON AND HAD MADE FOLLOWING POINTS TO HIM:
- A. DE GAULLE WAS DE GAULLE AND THERE WAS NOTHING ANYONE COULD DO TO CHANGE HIM.
- BO GIVEN THIS SITUATION PLUS: PRESSURE OF PUBLIC OPINION, NO FRENCH GOVERNMENT COULD PURSUE AS DIFFERENT POLICY ON THE NIGERIAN WAR.
- C. THERE WOULD, HOWEVER, BE NO CHANGE, IN THAT
- · COMMENT: BARBEY DID NOT SPELLI OUT IMPLICATIONS OF

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#### Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 02188 121402Z

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HIS ASSURANCES TO GOWON, BUT WE SUSPECT ARIKPO READING MORE INTO THEM THAT WARRANTED, I. E. NO RECOGNITION AND SUSPENSION FRENCH MILITARY AID. WE UNDERSTAND THAT GOWON SUMMONED BARBEY ON SATURDAY EVENING TO APPEAR: ON SUNDAY AND READ! HIM RIOT ACT ON UPCOMING BIAFRA WEEK IN PARIS. WHAT BARBEY TOLD GOWON APPEARS TO BE LITTLE MORE THAN REITERATION OF STANDARD FRENCH LINE. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT BARBEY COULD HAVE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS. RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS GP-3 MATHEWS

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### OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS

INFO: Amembassy LONDON
PARIS
US MISSION GENEVA
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USUN NY CINCSTRIKE Amconsul IBADAN KADUNA

SUBJECT: Nigeria Press Summary - March 12

- 1. NYTimes has brief item Ferguson arrival Geneva, saying he conferred with Lindt evening March  $11.\,$
- 2. Post, Times, Sun all feature Umuahia AP account Nigerian air raid killing 35 Biafrans. Nigerian jet dropped eight bombs, wrecking market place and truck repair shop. Doctors Queen Elizabeth hospital said 18 persons treated for wounds, many in grave condition. White Soviet-made Ilyushin flew over Umuahia twice. Biafran gunners opened up with automatic weapons but missed. Mutilated bodies dragged from wreckage, children screamed in streets. Bearded man asked: "Those were military targets? I ask you. I ask you." Closest military target to bomb craters was railway line about half mile away. At hotel people crowded under concrete stairwell, bombs falling about mile away shook two-story concrete building. Biafran military command said later village of Oboro, 7 miles south of Umuahia, also hit with eight killed and 20 injured according command.



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classification approved by, Nigeria Task Force:RMMelbourne

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ACTION:

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

3. Post adds from UPI account Irish missionary Rev. John Ryan administered last rites to dying, told UPI correspondent George Nnadi: "This is terrible. It shows one thing. Those who give the orders and those who pilot the planes are bent on doing what they have been doing." Sun and Post make point FMG has not acknowledged its aircraft have intentionally struck civilian targets during war.

END

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
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34 1450	10	Federal Military Government on February 28 to the appeal of the Nordic governments on January 19 concerning relief for the civilian population						
	7	•	in the combat areas of Nigeria.					
	Also enclosed is the full text of the Nigerian reply which was made available to the Embassy by an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.							
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#### INFORMAL TRANSLATION

#### Press Release

#### Communique from the Nordic Prime Ministers on Nigeria

The Nigerian Federal Government on February 28, 1969 delivered a reply to the statement on relief for the civilian population in the war-torn areas of Nigeria, which the prime ministers of the Nordic countries issued in Stockholm on January 19 this year. The main contents of the reply were as follows:

The Federal Government expresses its gratitude for the extensive and generous contributions which the Nordic governments and peoples have made to the humanitarian relief projects for the distressed civilian population.

The Federal Government explains in detail its views on the question of how the relief can be organized in the most efficient manner. It points out that it has launched a number of proposals for establishment of land, air and river corridors. Particular emphasis is laid on the so-called Obilagu project, which was launched recently, and which, among other things, includes a land corridor under surveillance of an international observers group and representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the voluntary relief organizations.

The Federal Government maintains that it has agreed to the International Committee of the Red Cross request for permission to conduct relief flights during the night time, but at their own risk. It claims, however, that certain relief organizations have failed to comply with its request that they coordinate their work through the International Committee of the Red Cross and that these relief organizations, without contacting the Federal Government in advance, are flying over Nigerian territory. The Federal Government now invites the voluntary organizations concerned to participate, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross in the relief operations in a manner which in the opinion of the Federal Government would be more effective.

The governments of Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway, joined by the Icelandic government, have studied the Federal Government's reply with interest. A closer examination should now be made of the practical possibilities that the Federal Government proposals might imply for a more effective humanitarian relief work. The Nordic governments are prepared, as hitherto, to support all measures designed to further the objective of reaching a solution for an effective and adequate supply of humanitarian relief which will be acceptable to both parties.

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On the background of the recent reports of bombing from airplanes the governments lay stress on the statement in the reply that the Federal Government seeks to avoid unnecessary suffering for the civilian population.

The Nordic governments request that everything be done to avoid that the civilian population be subjected to suffering and loss in connection with military operations.

The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo

March 1969

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### Statement by the Government of the Federation of Nigeria on 28th February 1969

The Federal Military Government has noted the joint statement made in Stockholm on January 19, 1969 by the Danish, Finnish and Swedish Prime Ministers and the Norwegian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs and Education. The Federal Military Government regrets the delay in replying but the results of informal contacts which were being made with the secessionist authorities through interested individuals were being awaited so that the Nordic Governments could be informed of the current state of affairs regarding methods of transporting relief supplies to the secessionist area in massive quantities.

The Federal Military Government is grateful for the concern on humanitarian grounds being shown by the Governments of Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway for the suffering population of the war-afflicted Nigeria.

The Federal Military Government trusts that the governments concerned noted that a truce was declared and observed by the Federal Armed Forces during the Muslim holidays preceding Christmas and during the Christmas holidays as well. Furthermore, the Nordic governments will have noted that a truce was also declared by the Federal Military Government during the recent Muslim festival of Id-el-Kabir which took place on 26th and 27th February, 1969. It has been the practice of the Federal Military Government since the commencement of hostilities to declare a truce on religious festival days. This practice is in evidence of the absolute religious freedom which exists in the country.

The Federal Military Government has noted the appeal of the Nordic Governments for both parties to do their utmost to reach agreement on a cease fire and negotiations. It is the view of the Federal Military Government, however, that negotiations should precede a cease fire and that, in fact, a cease fire would be the result of negotiations if an agreement is reached during the negotiations.

As regards the humanitarian assistance operations to which the Nordic Governments and the Nordic public have contributed in a very generous and substantial measure the Federal Military Government regrets that repeated negotiations and informal contacts have been unsuccessful in persuading the secessionist authorities to accept the most effective means of getting relief supplies on a massive scale into the secessionist area. The Federal Military Government has always been concerned about privation and suffering in the war-affected areas. It was in order to

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avoid unnecessary suffering to innocent civilians that the Federal Military Government invited the ICRC at the commencement of hostilities to carry out its humanitarian task under the Geneva conventions. At the same time, the Federal Military Government announced that any voluntary relief agency wishing to operate in the war-affected areas should coordinate their efforts through the ICRC. Much to the disappointment of the Federal Military Government some voluntary relief agencies chose to operate independently in total disregard of the Federal Military Government's authority over its own airspace and in a manner unknown to any international laws, conventions or practices. These voluntary relief agencies have continued to operate illegally from the Portuguese-held island of Sao Thome and have never at any time consulted the Federal Military Government or even offered to hold discussions with the Federal Military Government.

The sole concern of the Federal Military Government has always been that the relief operations in the secessionist area should be as effective as possible. Therefore, the Federal Military Government offered land corridors for massive relief supplies to go into the secessionist area. Because of the refusal of the secessionist authorities of this offer the Federal Military Government permitted the ICRC to fly relief supplies into the secessionist area by daylight. This offer was also rejected by the secessionist authorities and the ICRC therefore demanded, and obtained, the concession to fly relief supplies by night at their own risk. The voluntary relief agencies which had at no time entered into discussions with the Federal Military Government announced that they were not concerned with the sovereignty of Nigeria over its own airspace and that they would continue to fly by night time. The voluntary relief agencies did this even though they were aware that, by flying at night time from Sao Thome, they were in effect giving cover to the planes which were engaged in an illegal airlift of arms and ammunition to the secessionist area and using the same facilities as the relief flights of the voluntary agencies.

When it became obvious that night time relief flights would not solve the problem the Federal Military Government made offers of land, air and water corridors which the secessionist authorities turned down at the talks held in Niamey and Addis Ababa. Nevertheless the Federal Military Government continued exploring through private sources the possibility of getting relief supplies organized in the most effective possible manner. The latest proposal is that relief supplies from wherever they may originate should be flown during daylight hours to Obitagu airstrip which is held by the federal army and which is very close to the secessionist area. From this airstrip, the relief supplies would be taken by road under the supervision of an international team of observers and representatives of the ICRC and voluntary relief agencies to the secessionist area.

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The Nordic Governments will observe that, true to the declarations which the Federal Military Government has always made, its concern is that humanitarian efforts should be coordinated and should be effective. The Nordic Governments will also note that the night time humanitarian operations have not so far been effective and that reports from various sources indicate that they cannot be effective. Furthermore, the Nordic Governments' willingness to consider that an operation of this nature will bring the federal and secessionist authorities into cooperation which might contribute towards restoring some confidence . It is unfortunate that the activities of the voluntary relief agencies have so far tended to heighten tension and exacerbate relations between the federal and secessionist authorities. One other advantage of the Obilagu proposal is that it will enable the voluntary relief agencies once and for all to operate their mercy flights in total independence of the flights carrying arms and ammunition to the secessionists. Finally, the Nordic Governments will note that in spite of the illegal activities of the voluntary relief agencies the Federal Military Government is now inviting them to participate with the ICRC in relief operations in a manner that will be legal and effective. The Federal Military Government therefore hopes that the Nordic Governments will use their considerable influence to persuade the voluntary agencies to coordinate their activities with the ICRC and bring the proposal for the use of Obilagu into effect so that the problem of privation and suffering in the secessionist area can be effectively solved.

The Federal Military Government is grateful for the interest that is being shown by the Nordic Governments in the problems of alleviating distress caused by the war in Nigeria. Anything that the governments can do to separate the humanitarian from the political aspect of this conflict in Nigeria will not only be helping the war affected populace but might also be a substantial contribution towards ending the war.

Kagos, 28th February, 1969

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## Department of State TELEGRAM

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INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA
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CONFIDENTIAL LONDON 1913

SUBJECT: SIR DENIS GREENHILL'S TRIP TO NIGERIA

REF: LONDON 1892

I. FONOFF'S JOHN WILSON (HEAD, WEST AFRICAN DERT) TELLS US SIR DENIS GREENHILL IS EXPECTED RETURN LONDON SOMETIME TOMORROW, MARCH 12, TO BRIEF PRIMIN ON RESULTS HIS MISSION TO LAGOS BEFORE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE NEXT DAY, WHEN HE SEES GEN. GOWON AND OTHER FMG LEADERS, GREENHILL WILL URGE NIGERIANS: A) TO MAKE CLEAR PUBLICLY THAT THEY INTEND TO REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT INFLICT AVOIDABLE CIVILIAN DAMAGE AND WHICH DO NOT HAVE CLEAR MILITARY VALUE: B) TO REPORT OF THE WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE ANY ISSUE WHICH DOES IT INVOLVE DISMEMBERMENT OF NIGERIA: C) TO REAFFIRM FEDERAL GUARANTEE FOR WELFARE OF IBOS AND ACCEPTANCE OF PRINCIPLE THAT CARRYING OUT OF GUARANTEES CAN BE SUPERVISED BY OUTSIDERS AND: D) TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN FMG'S WILLINGNESS TO FACILITATE RELIEF SHIPMENTS BY AIR OR LAND CORRIDORS INTO SEEESSIONIST AREAS.

2. FONOFF IS OF COURSE AWARE THAT FMG HAS MADE ALL OF FOREGOING POINTS IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER

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## Department of State TELEGRAM

#### CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LONDON 01913 1118197

IN PAST. BRITISH, NEVERTHELESS, BELIEVE RESTATEMENT IN MORE EMPHATIC TERMS THAN BEFORE WOULD HELP CLARIFY PERSISTENT MIGUNDERSTANDING OF FMG\*\*S ATTITUDE IN UK; AND ELSEWHERE.

IN THIS CONNECTION, VALUE OF DOVE-LIKE STATEMENT BY NIGERIANS IN ADVANCE OF DEBATE THURS IN HOUSE OF COMMONS
IS OBVIOUS. ACCORDING TO WILSON, GREENHILL WHILE IN LAGOS
WILL ALSO EXPLORE WITH FMG PROSPECTS FOR CEASEFIRE AND
TALKS ABOUT TALKS.

3. COMMENT: WILSON INFORMS US THAT FONOFF WOULD LIKE TO FIND WAY TO BOOST OBILAGO RELIEF PROPOSAL DURING COURSE OF DEBATE. PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECTY MAURICE FOLEY. WHO! IS MAKING LEADOFF SPEECH FOR GOVET FONSECTY STEWART WILL BE ANGHOR MAN! MAY PLUG PROPOSAL. ALTHOUGH HE AND WILSON ARE BOTH AWARE OF DANGER THAT PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT BY BRITTISH MIGHT LEAD TO REJECTION BY BIAFRANS. THEY ARE LOOKING FOR FORMULA WHICH WOULD GIVE MOMENTUM TO PROPOSAL WITHOUT PROVIDING REASON FOR OJUKWU TO COMPLAIN OF BRITTISH, THREATS OF PRESSURE.

4. WE SPOKE AT NOON WITH LABOUR MP ALEX LYON WHO RECENTLY RETURNED FROM VIBIT TO FEDERALIST AND SECESSIONIST AREAS WHERE HE TALKED WITH BOTH FMG AND BIAFRAN LEADERS. LYON INTENDS TO MAKE STRONG DEFENSE OF GOV'T POLICY AND URGE! WIN WILLTARY AID TO FMG BE INCREASED TO ENABLE NIGERIANS TO WIN VICTORY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE EXPECTS MAJORITY OF SPEAKERS TO BE CRITICAL OF GOV'T BUT BELIEVES: IF MATTER IS BROUGHT TO VOTE, GOV'T WILL WIN HANDILY.

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By Meara Date 05 05

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R 1017112 MAR 69 FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6272 INFO: AMEMBASSY ACCRA AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA AMEMBASSY LAGOS AMEMBASSY NIAMEY AMEMBASSY KINSHASA AMEMBASSY COTONOU AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS CINCMEAFSA MACDILL AFBIFLA

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REF: MONROVIA 652 - POL 27 Biofro - Tuyur 1. AT CEPENT

1. AT CEREMONIES WELCOMING TUBMAN HOME FROM VISIT MAURITANIA PRESIDENT APPEALED FOR END NIGERIAN CONFLICT WHICH HE SAID "HAS GONE ON TOO LONG ALREADY". SPEAKING FIRST AT THANKSGIVING CHURCH SERVICE AND IN MORE DETAIL SUBSEQUENTLY AT EXECUTIVE MANSION RECEPTION, TUBMAN NOTED THAT "MOST" NATIONS HAD CONTENDED THAT THEIR CONSCIENCES DEMANDED THAT THEY CONTRIBUTE BOTH TO FMG AND TO SECESSIONISTS IN ORDER CURB MALNUTRITION AND SUFFERING. PRESIDENT THEN SAID HE WONDERED IF THESE CONTRIBUTIONS ARE NOT CAUSING WAR TO BE PROLONGED.

2. PRESIDENT ADDED THAT THESE CONTRIBUTIONS DIRECTED NOT AT CAUSE OF WAR BUT AT ITS EFFECTS. WAY TO END EFFECTS IS TO

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## Department of State TELEGRAM

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
PAGE 02: MONROV 01195 101934Z

STOPL WAR.

3. TUBMANI RESTATED HIS VIEW THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD MEET WITHOUT PRESENT AGENDA AND DISCUSS HOW WAR! CAN BELSTOPPED.

4° COMMENT: AT BOTTOM TUBMAN'S STATEMENT RE CONTRIBUTIONS IS HIS ANNOYANCE WITH OULKWORS USE OF "HUMANITARIAN" ISSUE TO PROLONG WAR. AS NOTED REFITEL TUBMAN BELIEVES TALK OF MILLIONS STARVING NOT BASED ON FACT AND THAT IF LEADERS WANTED SAVE. LIVES THEIR PEOPLE THEY WOULD END WAR. BROWN

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# POL 27 BIAFRA-HIGERIA TR POL 17-8 US Department of State TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 749

PAGE Ø1 LAGOS Ø2051 Ø71721Z

40 ACTION AF 18

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20; USIA 12, NIC 01, 10 13, AID 28, SR 01, RSR 01

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R Ø7153ØZ MAR 69 FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5344 INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 2051

SUBJ: SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S STATEMENT

REF: STATE 18168 \$127 beafin Sugaran

1. DURING PAST SEVERAL WEEKS I HAVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS DISCUSSED SOVIET AMBASSADOR ROMANOV'S STATEMENTS REPORTED IN TWO NIGERIAN NEWSPAPERS ON JANUARY 28 WITH HIM AND INFORMALLY WITH FMG OFFICIALS IN EXTAFF AND MINISTRY OF INFORMATION.

2. ROMANOV HAS CONSISTENTLY TAKEN POSITION HE DID NOT MAKE STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM AND HAS EXPLAINED VOLUBLY EFFORTS HE AND MEMBERS HIS STAFF HAVE MADE TO PERSUADE FMG OR NEWSPAPERS CONCERNED TO ISSUE RETRACTION. EXTAFF CONFIRMS THAT SOVIET EMBASSY HAS SENT NOTE AND MADE ORAL REPRESENTATIONS ON SUBJECT. SOVIET APPROACH TO LAGOS: DAILY TIMES AND THAT PAPER'S POSITION REPORTED IN LAGOS 775. I HAVE TOLD ROMANOV THAT IT IS HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO CORRECT RECORD E EITHER THROUGH FMG OR BY LETTER TO TWO NEWSPAPERS.



3. MY INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH FMG OFFICIALS WERE DELIBERATELY LOW KEY. I TOOK LINE THAT PROBLEM IS REALLY BETWEEN FMG AND ROMANOV SINCE LATTER HAD ACCORDING TO PRESS ABUSED HOSPITALITY OF HOST GOVERN-

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By MMARA Date V 1909



## Department of State TELEGRAM

#### CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE Ø2 LAGOS Ø2Ø51 Ø71721Z

MENT BY ATTACKING USG. AS ROMANOV HAD DENIED PRESS REPORTS, IT WAS UP TO FMG TO CORRECT RECORD ITSELF; OR SEE TO IT THAT SOVIET EMBASSY DID SO. FMG OFFICIALS WERE EMBARRASSED, DEFENSIVE AND EXASPERATED WITH ROMANOV. EXTAFF AND MINISTRY OF INFORMATION HAVE PASSED BUCK BACK AND FORTH BUT OFFICIALS INVOLVED HAVE BEEN IN AGREEMENT THAT FMG SHOULD NOT ISSUE

4. I RAISED ISSUE MORE FORMALLY WITH COMMISSSIONER EXTAFE ARIKPO YESTERDAY. I RECOUNTED HISTORY AND EXTAFF ARIKPO YESTERDAY. I RECOUNTED HISTORY AND EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION THAT THERE HAD BEEN NEITHER RETRACTION BY NOR ALTERNATIVELY FMG REBUKE TO ROMANOV. I CITED SPEECH OF SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHE ON FEBRUARY 21 (LAGOS A-110) AS EVIDENCE THAT SOVIET SPOVESMEN HOURS CONTINUE ATTACKS ON OTHER GOVERNMENTS IF THEY THOUGHT THEY COULD GET AWAY WITH IT. I COMPLAINED GENTLY THAT EXTAFF OFFICIALS DID NOT SEEM SUFFICIENTLY AWARE OF FMG RESPONSIBILITY TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM. ARIKPO AGREED THAT SITUATION WAS UNSATISFACTORY AND SAID HE WOULD TALKE WITH HIS OFFICIALS.

5. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT ROMANOV MADE STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM, BUT IT SEEMS PROBABLE HE DID NOT REALIZE HE WOULD BE QUOTED IN PRESS. HE IS VOCIFEROUS IN PROTESTING THAT HE KNOWS RULES OF DIPLOMATIC CONDUCT TOO WELL TO MAKE PUBLIC ATTACK ON ANOTHER GOVERNMENT.

6. INCIDENT HAS HAD SOME BENEFITS FROM US POINT OF VIEW. WE HAVE SEEN TO IT THAT ROMANOV'S DENIAL TO ME IS WIDELY KNOWN WHICH HAS PUT HIM IN LUDICROUS LIGHT. INCIDENT HAS BEEN SOURCE OF FRICTION BETWEEN SOVIET EMBASSY AND NIGERIAN OFFICIALS AND PRESS. MANY NIGERIANS RESENTED ROMANOV'S REVERSION TO COLD WAR TACTICS.

MATHEWS

CONFIDENTIAL 11

Authority WD By MNARA Date

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA outgoing telegram Department of State UNCLASSIFIED Classification ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy ADDIS ABABA

LONDON

PARIS

US MISSION GENEVA

USUN

CINCSTRIKE

Amconsul IBADAN

KADUNA

SUBJECT: Dept Spokesman Briefing - March 7

1. Following is excerpt transcript Department Spokesman briefing March 7: QUOTE Yesterday we were asked a question about what the U.S.G. may have done in connection with reports of air raids by Nigerian Air Force planes in Biafra.

2. Our Ambassador in Lagos has expressed to the FMG our deep concern over repeated press reports in recent days of bombing of markets, hospitals and clinics in Biafra by Nigerian aircraft. We have also raised the matter with the Nigerian Ambassador here. The Nigerian Govt has assured us that it is not the policy or the intent of that Government to attack civilian populations, although there may be instances where civilian casualties will unavoidably result from attacks on what they say are legitimate military targets. Lastly, we are informed that the federal government is investigating such reports and that measures will be taken to improve control and coordination of its military air operations.

Drafted by: AF/P:RLPerkins:mb 3/7/69

resegraphic transmission and classification approved by Nigeria Task Force: RMMelbourne

P/ON - Mr. McCloskey (substance)

ROM/BJG

UNCLASSIFIED Classification

FORM DS-322

INDICATE: COLLECT

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

about

QUESTION: Can you comment on reports  $\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}$  the Egyptian pilots flying these aircraft?

ANSWER: We have noted these reports. We have no comment on them. UNQTE

3. COMMENT: Previous day's question referred to NYTimes reports by Apple
and Garrison (State 24841) and said:

QTE: There are two stories this morning, two correspondents each reporting from different parts of Nigeria, said the Egyptians seem to be bombing civilian targets in Biafra. Since we have just appointed a coordinator for relief, is the USG doing anything to see if we can reduce the bombing? Are we intervening at all with Lagos to see if we can get any sort of reduction in that sort of bombing of civilian targets? UNQTE

END

ROGERS.

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext. Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Clearances:

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DECLASSIFIED Authority WN ) 95 950 BV MV ARA Date 0 5 0



## Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 LONDON 01835 072022Z

45 ACTION AF 18

INFO EUR 15, 10 13, UCF 03, UPW 01, AID 28, IGA 02, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04,

SCA 01, AGR: 20, CIAE: 00, DODE: 00, JPM 04, H: 02, INR: 07, L: 03, NSAE 00,

NSC 10,P: 04,RSC: 01,SP: 02,SS: 20,USIA 12,ACDA 16,E 15/RSR 0),/206 W

R 071945Z MAR: 69:
FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9219:
INFO: AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS:
AMEMBASSY PARIS:
USMISSION GENEVA
USUN: NY 1609:
AMCONSUL KADUNA.
AMCONSUL IBADAN:

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SUBUS NIGERIA: NEW DEBATE LIKELY NEXT WEEK

REF: LONDON 1659-Pol 27 Biafra - Kugeria

I • PRESS THIS MORNING (MARCH! 7) REPORTS CONTINUING BACKBENCH PRESSURE ON GOVERNMENT FOR FULL SCALE DEBATE ON NIGERIAN BOMBING INCIDENTS NEXT WEEK IN HOUSE OF COMMONS ACCORDING TO TIMES, DEBATE IS LIKEY TO OCCUR MARCH IS OR IS AND MAY RUN ENTIRE DAY SO THAT BACKBENCHERS ON BOTH SIDES (CAN) PRESS THEIR PASSIONATE CASE FOR REASSES MENT OF GOV TIS POLICY OF SUPPLYING ARMS TO FEDERAL NIGERIA.

2. IN LEAD EDITORIAL, TIMES CALLS ON GOVERNMENT TO GET OUT OF ARMS SUPPLY BUSINESS AND WORK ACTIVELY FOR CEASEFIRE IN NIGERIA. "MR. WILSON AND MR. STEWART CAN NOW BE IN NO DOUBT", PAPER ASSERTS, "THAT TIME HAS COME FOR GOV'T TO FOLLOW NEW POLICY OVER APPALLING WAR: IN NIGERIA". CONTENDING THAT GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN MISLED BY ERRONEOUS ADVISE FROM BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION IN LAGOS, TIMES SAYS THAT IN GENERALLY MURKY SITUATION TWO THINGS ARE CLEAR!

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By MMARA Date 05 505

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### Department of State

### **TELEGRAM**

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"FIRST, IS THAT ANY BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN OR SUPPORT FOR, FIGHT TO FINISH THROUGH DENSLY POPULATED IBO HEARTLAND WOULD BE UNFORGIVEABLE. SECOND IS THAT GOVERNMENT MUST RECONSIDER THEIR RELUCTANCE TO SEE AN INTERNATIONAL BAN ON ARMS TO BOTH SIDES...
NEW START COULD BE MADE WITH A FOUR-POWER MEETING AT SOME LEVEL.
IF BRITAIN IS ILLEPLACED TO CALL ONE, UNITED STATES MIGHT".


3. REFERENCE: IN: TIMES EDIT TO FOUR POWER MEETING APPEARS TO DERIVE FROM: DOPE STORIES CARRIES IN SEVERAL PAPERS. INCLUDING TIMES: AND GUARDIAN THAT PRESIDENT DE GAULLE TOLD PRESIDENT NIXON FRANCE WAS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN FOUR POWER TALKS ON POSSIBILITY OF ARMS EMBARGO TO BOTH SIDES IN NIGERIAN CONFLICT.

4. TIMES THIS WEEK HAS BEEN DEVOTING VAST AMOUNT OF SPACE TO BOMBING ISSUE FINAL TWO ARTICLES BY WINSTON CHURCHILL APPEARED MARCH 5 AND 6. CHURCHILL CONTINUED TO MANNER HOME ARGUMENT THAT BIAFRANS WERE DETERMINED TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN NATIONAL IDENTITY. THAT BRITISH ROLE IN CONFLICT WAS IGNOMINIOUS AND THAT NEW EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO BRING ABOUT CEASEFIRE AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. IN ADDITION, LETTERS COLUMN OF TIMES HAS BEEN FILLED DAILY WITH CORRESPONDÊNCE ABOUT NIGERIA, MOST OT IT CRITICAL OF BRITISH GOV T. JEAN MAYER HARVARD NUTRITIONIST WHO ACCOMPANIED SENATOR GOODELL TO AFRICA. CON-TRIBUTED LONG LETTER MARCH 4 IN WHICH HE EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT TOTALI NUMBER! OF BITAFRAN CASUALITIES HAS BEEN ABOUT ONE AND ONE HALF MILLIONS THAT FEDERAL AIR FORCE IS DELIBERATELY ATTACKING HOSPITALS AND REFUGEE CAMPS! THAT SOME OF FOOD DELIVERED AS RELIEF FROM FEDERALI AREAS HAS BEEN POISONED: AND THAT BRITAIN HAS REGRETABLY FAILED TO WORK EFFECTIVELY FOR CEASEFIRE OR FOR "CESSATION OF MOST OBVIOUS ASPECTS OF GENOCIDE" .

S. IN ANOTHER LETTER, NIGERIAN MICOMER OGUNDUPE REPLIED TO CRITICS BY REVIEWING FMG POSITION ON NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

ACCORDING TO OGUNDUPE FMG FAVORS: A) PARTICIPATION BY IBOS IN WORK OF FEDERAL GOV'T, BI) IBOS MILLITARY GOVERNOR IN EAST CENTRAL STATE, C) REINSTATEMENT OF FORMER FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVANTS WHO HAVE FOR "ONE REASON OR ANOTHER" LEFT THEIR POSTS IN PAST FEW YEARS. D) REHABILITATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS. E) ADMINISTRATION OF EAST CENTRAL STATE BY GOVERNOR ASSISTED BY CIVILIAN COUNCIL: "DRAWN FROM PEOPLE OF STATE", F) POLICING OF EAST. CENTRAL STATE BY IBO POLICE FORCE. G) PRESENCE OF EXTERMAL

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## Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE: 03 LONDON: 01835 072022Z

OBSERVER: FORCE: IN AREA UNDER REBELL CONTROL! H) SHARP LIMITATION OF ROLE: OF FEDERAL ARMY IN: EAST CENTRAL STATE; AND: I) DIS-ARMING: OF REBELL FORCES: TO: BE: ACCOMPANIED: BY REABSORPTION OF IBOS INTO: FEDERAL ARMY AS: CONFIDENCE: RESENTABLISHED.

6. TEXT OF FINAL TWO CHURCHILL ARTICLES. TIMES LEADER AND LETTER TO EDITOR BEING FOUCH TO ADDRESSEES.

7. COMMENT: PRESS TORTES: ABOUT WHAT DE GAULLE IS ALLEGED TO HAVE TOLD NIXON ARE APPARENTLY COMING FROM FRENCH SOURCES IN LONDON. FLEET ST. CONTACT YESTERDAY TOLD: PRESS ATTACHE HE HAS BEEN INFORMED BY FRENCH PRESS COUNSELOR THAT IN MEETING OF TWO PRESIDENTS. DE GÂULLE HAD STATED FRANCE WOULD BE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN FOUR POWER TALKS TO BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

8. FONOFF'S: TEBBIT (ASS'T UNDER, SECTY) TELLS: US: COMMONS:
DEBATE: WILL: BE: ETTHER: NEXT WEEK, IN: WHICH: CASE: IT WILL: BE: ON
OPPOSITION: TIME: AND: LAST THREE: AND: ONE-HALF: HOURS, OR: ON: MARCH: 26,
IN: WHICH: CASE: IT WILL: LAST ENTIRE: DAY AND: INCLUDE FULL-SCALE
PRESENTATIONS: BY BOTH: GOVIT AND: OPPOSITION.

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By MNARA Date 0 5 95

3 5 6 4 OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State INDICATE: COLLECT SECRET Classification ACTION: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY NODIS REVIEW LONDON INFO: MOSCOW fignsterred to O/FADRC LAGOS Transferred to O/FADRC USUN New York controlled by S/S Caption and cus retained by S/S STATE 035641 Reviewed by: Ambus: \_1975 Date: \_ Secretary's Meeting March 1st (10:00 a.m.) Subject: FonMin Debre and Party: Biafra Debre set forth French views, saying Biafra was important problem because of moral aspect - situation is morally Ü "unbearable" - and political considerations. Repeated familiar French case, based on France's own decolonizing experience, that independence should have been given to individual African states, not to federations. Argument that Biafra has seceded is not very valid since Ibos are separate people, hence are not repeat not seceding from something to which they never really belonged. 2. External political factor in Biafran problem is equally important because of Soviet arms shipments to Nigeria and support of Arab countries, which in turn are helping Moslem elements against non-Moslem elements, i.e., the Ibos. As result there is now a Soviet presence in heart of Africa. Amb. Pedersen

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PAGE 2

Info:

- 3. Noting that Ibos, who constitute majority of Biafran population, number from 9 to 10 million, Debre argued that independence for Biafra would not mean creating another very small state. Most African countries do not have that much population. Debre rejected argument that UN is not competent to deal with Biafran problem because of OAU opposition. He asserted that France is not pursuing any material interests there. If that were case they would have to support Lagos Government.
- 4. French policy is to stop all arms shipments and get peace talks going with help of African leaders on basis of self-determination for Ibos.
- 5. Secretary thanked Debre for his presentation and said we especially respect French views and advice because our own experience in area is rather limited. We realize gravity of situation and advice because our own experience in area is rather limited. We realize gravity of situation and advice because our own experience in area is rather limited. We realize gravity of situation and advice because our own experience in area is rather limited. We realize gravity of situation and advice because our own experience in area is rather limited. We realize gravity of situation and advice because our own experience in area is rather limited. We realize gravity of situation and advice because our own experience in area is rather limited. We realize gravity of situation and advice because our own experience in area is rather limited. We realize gravity of situation and advice because our own experience in area is rather limited. We realize gravity of situation and advice because our own experience in area is rather limited. We realize gravity of situation and advice because our own experience in area is rather limited. We realize gravity of situation and advice because our own experience in area is rather limited. We realize gravity of situation and advice because our own experience in area is rather limited.

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members and we mean it when we say we respect their sovereignty.

Many of boundaries in Africa are illogical and fortuitous

but attempts to change them could lead to revolts and

rebellions. Hence we support existing governments.

- 6. As a government, Secretary emphasized, we are not involved openly or covertly in political aspect of problem.

  However we are doing much on the humanitarian side 25 million dollars worth of food and other supplies, planes to transport this food, an appointment of an American (Dr. Fergusen of Howard University) as relief coordinator. We stand ready to provide even more humanitarian assistance.

  The problem is how to get the food to Biafra. We have talked about this to representatives of neighboring states. We unwilling cannot understand why Biafra is wikkking to allow day—

  Tight relief flights.
- 7. As regards external factor we recognize threat from Soviet involvement. However UK says that if it stops supplying arms Soviets will make up difference and thus

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gain greater influence. US does not intend become involved either by taking sides politically or by sending equipment. However we would support any initiative by France or anyone else toward UN involvement. We would, as Debre noted, have to deal with problems of OAU's negative attitude. We would support cessation of all arms deliveries. What else could US do to be helpful?

8. By way of reply Debre insisted that present and all possible future humanitarian efforts are inadequate as compared to immensity of tragedy. Anyway, problem is political. Ibos will never consent to becoming Nigerian citizens again. He has talked to Soviets about their involvement and found that as matter of policy they support Arabs and Moslems. Thus problem takes on aspect of religious war. As to OAU's opposition to UN jurisdiction, Debre explained it on grounds that OAU does not want peace because of substantial number of Moslem states it includes.

9. US and UK, Debre continued, should put pressure on

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Authority WD 95 1503

BV MMARA Date 0 5 05

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Info:

Nigeria to agree to peace talks with Biafra based on right of self-determination for Ibos. There could however be confederal links between two areas.

- 10. Secretary declared that US view on right of self-determination, especially in African context, is that whole population within state has right to determine its own future. Right of self-determination is not tantamount to right of secession. Hence it is better to start peace talks without pre-conditions for foregone conclusions, i.e., that Biafra would necessarily end up independent. Would Biafra be
- 11. France thinks, Debre replied, that it is Lagos that will not agree to peace talks unless Biafra agrees to forego secession. On other hand French "have a feeling" that Biafra would be willing to talk without pre-conditions. It would be easy to find this out. Secretary said it would be worth pursuing this point. Reverting to Soviet involvement he asked how to answer British argument about necessity for UK to supply arms. Debre's reply was to get peace

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PAGE 6

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talks started. Evolution of talks could change the course of events. Without such talks we are locked in a vicious cycle of continuing arms shipments.

- whatever
  12. Secretary stated that apart from moral merits of
  present British policy it could be logically argued that
  UK should increase its arms shipments so as to obviate
  further shipments by Soviets. Moreover, in this way
  British could get credit from Lagos for helping it win
  the war.
- 13. Debre emphasized concern of Zambia, Tanzania and particularly Houphonet-Boigny over danger from Sowiet involvement. Nation at war gets arms wherever it can. Only answer to this problem is peace.
- 14. Secretary said we agree on that. We will talk further to French about types of humanitarian assistance we could give. As we see it US should increase such assistance although we recognize it will be inadequate. We should also get Federal Government to talk without

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Authority VV) 95 95/3

By MMARA Date VV 5/6

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Origin

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Info:

conditions. We would welcome any initiative by France or any one else that holds out hope of progress. Debre said statement by Lagos that it is ready to talk without pre-conditions would be decisive step. He foresaw that cease fire would accompany start of talks. Secretary demurred saying more likely assumption is that there will not repeat not be a cease fire. Federal Government may well think it can win war with major effort in next month or so. All parties concerned should therefore be urged to start talkingswithout pre-conditions including cease fire.

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By MMARA Date 1015 67

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Authority VN 095 1503

By MMARA Date 05105

Honorable Donald M. Fraser House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Congressmen Fraser:

March 7.1969

The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of January 28 about Nigeria/Biafra relief activities. I sincerely regret the delay in this

I assure you that the Department of State shares the urgent concern of Congress about the need to increase the flow of relief supplies to afflicted areas on both sides in the Nigerian conflict. The Department has done, is doing, and will do everything possible which would be useful in augmenting the relief effort. As you may know, over \$30 million or 60% of the relief received as of the middle of this month was financed from American sources. The U.S. Government is directly responsible for five-sixths of this total. At the present time, the principal obstacles to getting more supplies into the areas in need are political, not technical. We are neglecting no proposed solutions to this problem.

On February 22, President Nixon referred to the deep anguish felt by this nation for the terrible suffering in Nigeria and announced that the Secretary of State had at his direction appointed a Special Coordinator for relief. A self-explanatory press release concerning the Special Coordinator is enclosed.

I have also enclosed current information relating to the Nigerian situation and the problem of relief which may be of interest to you. I appreciate your concern for the Nigerian problem and I shall be happy to furnish any additional information you desire.

Sincerely,

William B. Macomber, Jr. Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations

Enclosures:

Press release.

Current information on Nigeria.

Clearances: Nigeria Task Force - Mr. Melbourne Af-Ambassador Moore AF/W:RWFaville:sg 7573 2/25/69 PBR:1jh:3/7/69

RS/R

Dear Congressman Fraser:

The Secretary 28 about Nigeria/Biafra relief activities. Should the delay a feet that the delay a feet that the legal of State shares

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The Honorable
Donald M. Fraser,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C. 20515

Authority VND 95 9503

By MNARA Date 105 0

I have also enclosed current information relating to the Nigerian situation and the problem of relief which may be of interest to you. I appreciate your concern for the Nigerian problem and I shall be happy to furnish any additional information you desire.

Sincerely,

William B. Macomber, Jr. Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations

#### Enclosures:

Press release

Current information on Nigeria

Clearances: Nigeria Task Force - Mr. Melbourne

AF - Ambassador Moore

H -

AF/W:RWFaville:sg 7573 2/25/69

FORM DS-1563	DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT	CONTROL NO.
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AF - Mr	· Heubeck	DATE 1/30/69
SUBJECT Ltr to of over sense o to Nige *Prompt handling is	the Secy fm Congressman Donald Fra whelming support for bi-partisan r of Congress that the Pres. should i cria-Biafra. ACTION sessential. Return basic correspondence with reply. I	user dtd 1/28 informing S resolution expressing the ncrease relief activities f delayed call telephone extension below
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By MNARA Date 0550

DONALD M. FRASER 5TH DISTRICT, MINNESOTA

507 House Office Building 202-225-4756 202-225-4757 202-225-4758

EIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

STATE DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND MOVEMENTS

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE

700

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

ACTION is assigned to



Hon. William P. Rogers Secretary of State Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you know, last week more than 100 members of the House and more than 50 members of the Senate introduced a bipartisan resolution expressing the sense of Congress that the President should increase relief activities to Nigeria-Biafra.

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515 January 28, 1969

The large number of signatories on these resolutions is a clear indication, I think, of the urgent concern of Congress for the humanitarian aspects of the conflict. Urge you to do everything possible to expedite effective measures that will help to bring a prompt end to the indes-cribable suffering brought on by the conflict.

Best wishes.

48 M 歪 ্ৰ N.YS Sincerely Donald M. Fraser

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56	SUBJECT - Personal Property Survey Team Report
0	REFERENCE
<u> </u>	Herewith, as Attachment A, is a copy of the report of findings at  Enugu and Naukka prepared by the Mission personal property survey
	team. Also attached are pictures taken of some of the project sites
.9	and residences.
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	Attachment:
j.	Attachment: A. Report of Personal Property Survey Team B. Pictures (21) unclassified
	MIT to AFR 3/18/69
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By MM ARA Date V 5 05

Wednesday, February 12, Charles W. Edwards and Arthur R. Thompson with Dr. Anita Whitney, went to the dozestic airport for our charter AERO airlines flight to Enugu. After processing and military clearance we got away at 8:80 a. m., one hour late, and arrived in Enugu about 9:50 a.m. We were not met, but a bit of trading got us all a ride to ICRC headquarters in a military vehicle.

At ICRC about 10:20 a.m., we met Gene Nummally (American) Area Administrator in charge and talked over the program for personal property survey and arranged for transport. With Mrs. Whitney driving we set out for USAID Enugu. ICRC furnished the transportation. At USAID we made a complete coverage of all areas and tallied the following:

Toon	Bunker		Estimated Serviceable
USAID Vehicles	(11)		
Rambler Wagons	L.		0
Carryalls	3		0
Pickups	້		0
Seout	ī		0
Cargo truck	ī	the contract of the	The second secon
Privately owned vehicles (POV)	ē		0
Refrigerators	i.		č
Water tanks (besters)	55		ž
Stoves	19		h
Washing machines	28		6
Air conditioners	11		ŏ
Supply cabinets	4		ő
Files	10		6
Desks	6		. <u> </u>
Caskets	4		Ĭ,

Our observations found that many of the water heaters, stoves, washing machines and air conditioners were in the warehouse and shop because they were inoperable before the war. Some of the five USAID vehicles found in the storage/were probably there for the same reason, as were the truck and two other USAID vehicles in the repair shed.

We observed that car USAID offices were ransacked and looted and that no chairs, office squipment, typewriters, adding and calculating machines were evident. It appeared that some dash and file drawers had been opened with bayonets or other instruments and badly bent out of shape. Our cashier's safe was there with the door blown for burned off. We estimated the useful items that could be recovered now. In our rounds of the USAID offices we were confronted by a police officer. We showed him our Nigerian ID cards and told him our business.

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He informed us that he was the building guard and if we intended to remove anything we must get the approval of the commendant. We told him we were cally counting.

Cur USAID warehouses, repair shop and atores were completely ransacked and looted. There was a great deal of disorder throughout. The tool shop was bare aff all tools. The motor pool supply room was bare of all parts. What remained was records, forms and shelving. The records and forms were mostly on the floor. Throughout most windows were broken. The Rambler station wagons had no wheels and were stripped as were most of the other vehicles. The USAID standby power generator was gone. On return to Lagos Mr. Pere told was this had been taken out for the ICRC compound. We did not have this information at our discussion with ICRC. As they talked of the unpredictability of power we can now assume that their recent exchange of quarters with the military was without the power unit which remains with the military in ICRC's former location over nearer town and USAID offices. The power unit was removed by knocking down part of the rear wall of the USAID. This was the same way it had been installed.

Returning to ICRC we stopped at an ICRC warehouse which had been a marke store before the war. Alongside was the UTC garage and service compound for Bebicles. Here we noted carryall LM 727 from "YAJI" which was not on our lists, but looked like a USAID vehicle. We also saw HEA 505 Fontiac as the only "possible" employee wehicle. We discompled the prospect that any of the dozen or so European make private vehicles could be 45070 or Contractor employee POV. the way to this stop from former USAID offices we saw LM 3069 being driven by an unknown person. This was one of our UNAID remblers and it was going is the opposite direction. As we stopped before the ICRC storehouse we noticed a man coming down the road with two rate in his hand. He held them by their tails belly to belly. Our driver said "good chop" and we agreed. As he came along side we asked "how much for one" and he said 10 shillings". They had good coats and bright eyes and looked healthy. A bit of bargaining indicated 10 shillings was his best price, and that they were to be eaten now rather than later that evening. As I estimate these animals weighed about two pounds each, we concluded that the price was high for this kind of meat in Enugu. Emigu is practically unoccupied. There is no trade or commerce, no public transport, no utilities or communication. We had checked in at the Government Catering Rest House. Our rooms were adequate and prices were reasonable. however was limited. J Driving out of the rest house grounds we drove over uniusulated sheafs of telephone pairs. We returned to the ICRC for lunch. a main street corner we busped over the fallen large main telephone cable. We turned at the corner where Barcleys Bank was and turned in just behind the bank building at the ICEC compound. No street signs remain in Emugu.

At lunch we were informed that the ICRC had recently been moved to this location, which had been quarters for the banks' employees, by the military in exchange for their former location. We planned our afternoon safari and a trip to Naukka for Thursday morning. Lunch was furnished by ICRC and we ETHITED OFFICIAL USE

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very informed that all ford must be brought in as there is nothing available in the local market. We failed about USAID property and ICRC agreed to give us a receipt for the USAID items they had taken for their use with USAID approval. The survey team assured ICRC that any items they could liberate and use and add to their estated would be exicused. An orphunage was reported to have some USAID property and we asked ICRC to get a receipt for these items also.

After lunch with ICRC we observed out on a round of house inspections and a survey of the university of Migeria campus in Raugu. We were looking at employee housing to assess the condition and extent of employee and V.S. Government owned personnel property.

First we went to the Garden Avenue Flats. USAID had held #13 through #18, ell in one building. Thus of the six were occupied. A steward let us in #15 and we saw no USAID property. We looked in 13 and 14. We concluded that #14 had an item or two of USAID property. If so, it was liberated after USAID closed as Mr. Aure told us, after our return to Lagos, that the USAID had emptied these flats of all USAID contents before the departure of [ TD from Enuga and had stored the times in the Asher house 46 Encle Avenue.

We next tried to find Engle Avenue where USAID had 5 houses. Mr. Pare reported on two of them, his and Asher's in his October report. We thought we found this street. But we didn't. With all signs down, roads going to bush, and the uscless efforts to get direction from half a dozen pedestrians and military types we were unable to find Engle Ave.

We found a garage between two buspalows, somewhat in the bush, back from the read which we thought for a time was Emple. The garage contained three USAID washing machines stripped. In the left bungalow we saw an airconditioner and a refrigerator which appeared to be working and of USAID type. This house contained a USAID type dining room server and other dining room items of USAID vintage. We could not enter.

The bouse on the right had a Norge washing machine outside in the rear. It could have been a USAID madel. In front there were black boxes marked J. A. Taylor. We could not find this mass on our lists, or subsequently upon our return to Lagos. In the living room, which was open, we observed a Westingboxes seed matematic washing machine which we identified as USAID property. In front of the boxes set a spinner piano, to the elements. The drive, on our way out through the weeds, had a mail sign R. G. Clouder #7. The occupants of both houses were every. We learned that the occupants were significant military officers.

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We went next to #1 Hospital Road, around the corner from the church where the freshly marked graves of two foreigh missionaries, shot during the early stages of the war, are clearly visible from the road. Here we counted a Wettinghouse hot water heater in apparent good condition, a dresser with no drawers, 3 lounge chairs with no cushions, a buffet badly weathered.

Next we went to the University of Nigeria campus. We examined houses 1 through 6 jof the Independence Layout which had been occupied by USAID contractors' employees. These houses had no living or dining room furniture. Also there were no beds or mattresses. We found USAID water heaters which appeared to be OK, and in each house a chest or two of drawers, of USAID property in disuse.

The Enugu compus faculty house (Sheppard M.S.U.) had a USAID stove and refrigerator, one stripped and the other beyond repair.

We stopped at the building of the Modern Aids to Education Project 11.600-208. Besides many educational aids this project had AID commodities such as tape recorders, radios, TV sets, photographic and visual aids equipment is the Emugu Schools Broadcasting Unit. All equipment was gone. The airconstioners (2 holes) were gone. Everything remaining was through down to the floor and in complete ruin. The eads of projector screen had been torn off. Chemicals were dumped out. 35 MM slide magazines were dumped out. The metal bottoms of the magazines had set so long on the wet floor they were rusted out. The building was completely ransacked. We estimated this location a 100% loss. On our way out we saw an electric typewriter in the street. The platen and some keys had been removed.

At the university we stopped at the Economic Development Institute Libbary which USAID had assisted. Most of the stacks were in disorder. Most books, panyalets and materials were on the floor.

On our say to the university campus we stopped along the road and made our way into the army motor pool and repair yards somewhat informally. Wrecks and inoperable vehicles covered several acres. Mrs. Whitney and Mr. Edwards walked over hoods and found numbers while the writer recorded the vehicles identified as USAID. We found these:

EEA-2406	Chevrolet	P.O.V.	
LE -8773	Chevrolet	P.O.V	•
IV =7894	Rambler wagon	USAID	stripped
M -3297	· ·	**	
IH -9275	Scout	1.77	wrecked
LJ -3267	Rombler wegon	, <b>41</b>	stripped
IN -4187	n n	17	stripped
A7KS85F 11087	American	?	
IM -8814	Rambler wagon	USAID	inoperable
lh - 9136	Carryall	USAID	¥7
IM = 9830	?`		

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At this point we were inless to the commendant of the actor pool and after being adminished we were allowed to proceed because we were already there.

> MA 713 (military musbor ?) carryull USAID vehicle wrocked E-3615 Roublar ungun Serial No. A-68367418933

This ere was running, and we builted it down. The military driver got the point we only content the engine member. We described this USAID merked car did not have a USAID blocker. Jaffer we returned to Lagor Mr. Pare told us that E-3615 was a District member and he had reregistered some USAID vehicles under Eletran requirements.

\* These last three vehicles were found in the yards of the Ministry of Wrote. One other car RE 8484, a white Impala sedan, F.O.V. was found down the street from the M.O.V. and had no wheels.

On our way out of the military meter pool a truck drove up and stopped. A group of soldiers gathered accused. From the back of the truck one coldier was ladding out food to the troops. He noted that fully half the men in line had abiley inhough for mose goer and we commented on their ingentity.

It was reported to us that the ECN has a USAID Humbler wagon LN-3296 in running condition. On this trip we see no drayeries, no rugs, no bedding, no employees property (except the spienet, which we assumed later was not AID related). We items of furniture were observed, other than a few chests of drewers mentioned. In our tour we can a few pieces of furniture about military and other "squatters" quarters that leaded like the furniture USAID issued.

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We returned to the rest hands smill added up the USAID identified portions of the foregoing, giving approximate values to each. The total came to \$68,540. This is to be compared with a current control total for U.S. Government property in Masteria Migistria of \$287,700. The \$88,540 does not include the ICRI or the crystalization has have premised us receipts. In the rest house labby and her to not some Massay people (Mr. & Mrs. Kinzbeber) who had arrived second \$400 Mi. This was Massady and they had left larges Monday norming. They experienced only a minimal delay at the troublesom Monday norming. They experienced only a minimal delay at the troublesom forcy crosseng at lokally. These people were headed for Calabar, via the Camerocca, in the massing. Suppor was adequate (as was the next morning breakfast). Later we compared notes and talked to ICRC staff. That might was along through a slow Findles bath. It was 90° in large. The air conditioning and all power vent off at 5:00 M.

Thursday morning we started at 7:30 A.M. for Haukha. Five miles out no sew IM-6172 Carryell, USAID, a wrock, alongside the read. Seven miles out we saw IE-222, a two door Chevrolet cloth top, convertible, P.O.V., a wrock. On the way in to Naukha we excepted to obtain information about the causes and military procedures and the same of the communicat and his locatio.

This paragraph contains some general comments from our tells, travels and observations. They are not presented as findings: 1) There was no public transport between within, or around Enugaeur Newble. Iraders carried that few stocks (mostly foods) many miles to market. 2) There is no under certice in many places and the locals walk long distances for vater.

3) Starvation is minimal, where it can be Electrical, but protein is generally conceded to be lacking. We were told all protein use brought in before the war. 4) The roads, except for a few places where they have been cut and patched with earth and rock, are good. 5) Except for people the only living things it we saw were three vultures in a yard maiting for kitchen scraps, plus the two rate. 6) In comparison to lagos, Ibadan etc, few wasen were carrying babies.

th extinct at the University campus in Haukka we wend to the Students Unica, headquartees of the commanding officer. There we received permission to look at facelity (USAID) heasing and take inventory. As many of the houses were occupied by military we were assigned a young Limitenant to go with us to make suitable introductions and suplain car mission.

We started looking for ISAID property at the upper end on Margarite Cartney Around where we had 9 advicers in residence. At #329 we found a GE Refrigerator, a weaking machine and but water bomber. There was no furniture, dimlag, living, bedroom.

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By WARA Date 05 5

At #312 breaser, CE sir conditioner, North refrigerator, Whirlpool automatic washing mechine, water bester. There was no functioner-only see Greaser chest and it had no drawers. #515 part of washer on the perch, atore, air conditioner desaged, water heater. He functioner. #310 (Deans) piano, ruined; atore, stripped; hitches chest (word-oneld value); Washing machine-condition doubtful; there chests an drawers. #311 (Viscent) private refrigerator, ruined; store, stripped; chest, dising room sidebased, in very bad shepe; chest, no drawers; one need lithered with small things. These included children's game, habitally galden, family books, passiblets and keepsakes. This appeared to be the concepts of appearing to be continued. The services of goods that had been ripped come and remarked; weaking machine and air conditioner, ruined. Heat we went to Ibejient Anomal where we had 6 advisors in residence. #228 (Carolus) G. B. volvigorator, Wallypool and successive washing machine, electric store, chest of drawers and card table; two air conditioners were working.

#227 Frigidaire, rained; wathing machine, as good; stove, rulned; chest, broken and so decears. A watere plant was out in the yerd; it was near ruin.

#241 Frigidaire, wathing; chest, private; 2 Will chaire, 2 air conditioners.

This house had a large connect of chietz of all openings, doors and window perhaps 50 yards. We did not leave where this suverial came from and it to the only house we see with any material hanging. We wont on to the administration building of the University. The faculty and characteristic effices were remarked and littered; Files were damped out; penjagiste natural ste, was on the floor. We see no occipant, typewitters, satisface machines etc. which could have been reserved, or larged and/or sold off. Went us now the University library. The book states had been handed down and card files were upset and spilled onto the floor. With responsible speed on estimated that 80% of this installation could be recovered.

Our next stop was the Continuing Education Center, a modern first class complex of staff offices, dising facilities, conference rooms and quarters for visiting educators. The first fixer was beent out by a fire set by petrol. Some aluminum killiam was, sizhs, miners etc. may be 6% but receives, motors, atoves etc. are downtule. This kitches part might be up to 50% salvaged now. Two stripped air conditioners and a refrigerator were laying in an inside colorade. There was thereoff associated therefore the including looting of the residential quest quarters. In our remade of the University we concluded that low cost labor, water processional supervision, could now, not later, salvage thousands of deliars worth of laboratory supplies, backlets, teaching materials, etc. After continuous training associatory. Your survey town went on to the College of Agriculture buildings. We did not get to the salual and plant experimental facilities due to a land of time and our conclusion, from observations so far, that there would be suthing living there. This is the dry season and the University caspes is bused up and dead weeds absent in lands, paths, etc. All about are increasing place of debric.

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By MNARA Date 05 05

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USAID/LAGOS AID/W TOAIT A LILL

At the Department of Applications we observed some desks and files that could be salveged now. All offices, however, were remarked. Test equipment and microscopes were found in the halls and on the walks disessembled, mirrors and small parts were removed.

We wondered, what was have this cabinets without drawers? On the right side of the building els faculty offices had the contents of files drawers dunged on the floor. The frances were laying there. But the files cobinets were gone. So were the deals and all office equipment.

The Agriculture library was reaccited and programine vendelism was evident throughout the building. In animy stated that orgitious were progressively makes there easy our pain the American Aleipe' was so Lacent as spines made

It was reported to we by one charren that habitaline was hall fires were best burning by breaking up truckloads of serviceable furniture taken from bouses in the area. We came occount the remains of one occaide fire and observed the uncomment fuel to be furniture stock as chair legs, etc. Sees charred ruins lay alongaide.

There were 30 bosses occupied by USAID associates in the Nouten area; equipment valued at \$900 was estimated to be in each bouse. This amounts to \$27,000; and our tests indicate parerolly the condition and prospects for recovery. Progressive stripping for verious parts goes on. This portion of our survey brought the survey tesm's tally of USAID personal property to an excess of \$115,000.

Special mention is made of the College of Agriculture laboratories. Along with the Modern Aids to Essection offices and the Complinaing Blucation Center the great destruction and discriber in those quarters represented a senseless vengeance, a a shambles. Everyone of the half dozen laboratories we visited was ruthlessly Chesicals were danged, glass was broken. Drawers were pulled and dumped on the floor. Shock room abelies were cleaned. Beakers, test tubes, slides, filters were handled to the floor, smeahed and water scaked. Windows were brocked out and rain came in. Thomsands of dollars of unused supplies vere destroyed. All test equipment was guited or missing. Items we expected to find were not in evidence.

We returned to Dangs at 1820 Ms, gater packed up, said goodbye and arrived at the sirport at 2:15 FM. Our plane schooleded for a 2:00 FM take off had not arrived. We returned to the rest bouse at 3:30 FM, checked in end sat. We considered some of the factors operating in this theatre. As armics moved, and Houske for one and fought over two or times times, equipment was constined pulled out on requisition. Then too, as the reports went, dealers in trucks drove up and bought loads of looted perchanteble goods and moved it north and west. USAID on two occasions has been able to establish its claim to such cargo. The soldiers believe themselves to the leavings. It was inevitable, perhaps, that galvenierd shorts were pulled from roofs to make brail-like shelters for unberracked, un-lented soldiers, and that the beeds of golf

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By MNARA Date

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cludes were broken off to make transfer sticks. Anythe would grab a bad,

Dr. Whitney tolddes show her ICO friend who she discovered, on returning from Newke, was undergoing an exceptive appendictory. A surgeon, fortunately, was in town. At 200 kM water constitution he still felt pretty good. At 4:00 kM water constitution he still felt pretty good. At 4:00 kM water constitution he still felt pretty good. At 4:00 km he was accumulated the result of the formal in the hospital, the temperature was ever you, and there had been no water in the hospital for a make. He showed a room with a women who had just delivered and who had many visitures. Ithis hoped to bring their man to their quarters the most day. So goes life in Engal.

At 4:30 PM me ICEC see rushed in to may a small place flow over Raugu and it could be ours. We desired to the airport and got easy at 4:55 FM arriving in lague of 6:25 FM. It was the third time in a see area for each of us, and I believe we coldised our way with a chalmen of emotion. The team was impressed by the grin resilities of this area as a ver region.

The survey team does not have any recommendations to make at this time, due to the logistic problems and to the very limited area over which USAID at retain some control. In conclusion the survey team found: 1) That US Government and contractor's employees last little paraceal property behind which remained visible to the survey team, catcapt due the occasional privately owned vehicle which we have not no put been ship to 1250h 4p.

- 2) That U.S. Government count property had been substantially rensached and located by persons unknown and that then will further deteriorate the current status.
- 3) That USAID project examplifies in the area under review were almost a 160% less.
- 4) That the ecocapt of "see specifically lost" is an unreal, hypothetical someopt a fatility.
- 5) That use war time conditions culpatts are swamme.
- 6) That when the time comes DEATH will count when it can lay its bands on. USATO will then covery all which is uncovariable and beyond repair.
- 7) That implications and claims were, at this time, beyond the purview of this curvey team.

Both Mr. Charles W. Misside and Mr. Arthur Thompson wish to commed Dr. Whitmay for the invaluable assistance and expert driving given to them. She know ber may over the trails we wished to follow. Her valuable assistance cut these time in half by Ensuing how to get there and often making the right inquiry or masser.

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DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence
Note - 147

March 6, 1969

The Secretary

Through: s/s

INR - George C. Denney, Jr. A.C.D. From

Subject: NIGERIA: Indiscriminate Bombings of Biafra Will Probably Continue

"Gowon's bombs kill plenty people, but dey no kill de peoples' spirit."

--Anonymous Biafran civilian quoted by Lloyd Garrison in the New York Times

Federal Nigerian leader General Yakubu Gowon has ordered his air force to attack only military targets in Biafran territory. He knows that the repeated and well-publicized air attacks on Biafran villages are damaging Nigeria's already battered international image and stiffen Biafra's will to resist. Nevertheless, bombings of civilian targets will probably continue since Gowon probably cannot effectively control his free-wheeling field commanders and the unreliable Egyptian pilots who fly Nigeria's jet bombers.

Army Politics is a Major Factor... Gowon gives the impression that he has almost no leverage over his field commanders, who control both air and ground operations at the front. The least amenable to his control has been Colonel Benjamin Adekunle, the flamboyant Yoruba commander of the Third Division. Senior civilian and military advisors in Lagos have repeatedly demanded that Adekunle be sacked, but Gowon has refused--probably because he fears that the dismissal of Nigeria's best known troop commander could further weaken the somewhat lagging Yoruba support for the war, and might even DEF spark a mutiny among Yoruba troops.

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

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BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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the field commanders themselves have much control over tactical air operations. The Egyptian Air Force pilots who fly most of Nigeria's Soviet-made jets are not eager to risk their lives for the Federal cause and often jettison their bombs over civilian population centers in order to avoid Biafran anti-aircraft fire. Presumably, they report that they have carried out their assigned missions. Federal Ilushin and MiG airwith craft are not equipped/sophisticated bomb sights or radar; detailed and reliable maps and charts are apparently not available; and air force communications are rudimentary. Under these conditions, not even the most talented and humane field commander can exercise more than marginal control over the air operations in his sector.

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## POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

## Department of State TELEGRAM

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SÚBUECT: NEW NÍGERÍÁN CONDEMNS APOLOGETIC ATTITUDE OF FMG TOWÁRD CRITÍCS OF BOMBING

MARCH S. NEW NIGERIAN EDITORIAL ENTITLED: MA. USELESS EXCERCISE ...

SEVERELY CRITICIZES REPORTED: STATEMENT BY NIGERIAN HICOM: LONDON
OGUNDIPE: TO EFFECT THAT FMG: WOULD INVESTIGATE WINSTON CHURCHILL'S:
CHARGES: THAT FMG: PLANES HAD BOMBED CIVILIAN TARGETS: IN AND
AROUND UMUAHIA AND WOULD PUNISH PILOTS RESPONSIBLE. EDITORIAL
COMPARED OGUNDIPE'S STATEMENT TO THOSE MADE BY ENAMOTING FROM
LAGOS. MALL OF WHICH SOUNDED CONSISTANTLY APOLOGETIC". NEW
NIGERIAN ARGUES: THAT THESE DELIBERATELY APOLOGETIC.
STATEMENTS ARE USELESS: SINCE! IT NOT POSSIBLE GENERATE SYMPATHY
FOR NIGERIAN CAUSE IN EUROPE AND SUCH SYMPATHY VALUELESS: IN
ANY CASE. EDITORIAL AVERS THAT MOOD OF THIS COUNTRY IS NEITHER
PLACATORY NOR APOLOGETIC! AND THAT "NIGERIAN PUBLIC KNOWS THAT
THIS MOOD MORE CAREFULLY IN DEALINGS WITH EUROPE.
STOKES:

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By Mr. Ara Date 015105

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## Department of State

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INFO EUR 15,10 13,CIAE 00,DODE 00,JPM 04,H002,INR 07,L 03,NSAE 00,

NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 20,UCF 03,UPW 01,SCS 04,SCA 01,SR 01,

ORM Ø3,AID 28,ACDA 16,SSO ØØ,NSCE ØØ,USIE ØØ,RSR Ø),/157 W

P R Ø61500Z MAR 69 PM AMEMBASSY LAGOS: TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5324 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA AMEMBASSY COTONOU AMEMBASSY LONDON: AMEMBASSY OTTAWA AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE USMISSION GENEVA

SUBU: BOMBING OF CIVILIANS PARTIETY STATE 322 REF: STATE 32362. LAGOS 1898

[ . I TOLD COMMISSIONER EXTAFF ARTKED THIS MORNING THAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DISCUSS WITH HIM REPORTS OF NIGERIAN AIR FORCE (NAFI) BOMBING OF CIVILIANS IN REBELL TERRITORY • I THEN MADE POINTS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 5 STATE REFIEL AND PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 LAGOS REFIEL •

2. ARIKPO RESPONDED THAT UK HICOMER HAD DISCUSSED BOMBINGS WITH HEAD OF FMG ON MARCH 3, AND FMG HAD SINCE BEEN ASSEMBLING INFORMATION ON NAF OPERATIONS FMG RECOGNIZED WITH DEEP REGRET THAT RECENT NAF OPERATIONS HAD RESULTED IN LARGE NUMBER CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN SOME INSTANCES THIS HAD BEEN UNAVOIDABLE AS COVILLIANS DESPITE WARNINGS REMAINED IN VICINITY MILITARY TARGETS FMG WAS HOWEVER TIGHTENING CONTROLS OVER ALL NAE OPERATIONS TO MINIMIZE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES ARIKPO SAID SPEAKING FOR FMG HE

> SECRET 46

Authority WM By MNARA Date



## Department of State TELEGRAM

#### SECRET

PAGE 02 LAGOS 02010 061644Z

ASSURED USG ONCE AGAIN THAT IT WAS NOT POLICY OR INTENT

3. ARIKPO EXPLAÎNED THAT SOME NĂF AIRCRAFT WERE ASSIGNED FIRST DIVISION COMMANDER SHUWA AND THIRD DIVISION COMMANDER SHUWA AND THIRD DIVISION COMMANDER ADEKUNLE. IT HAD BEEN ASCERTAÎNED THAT SHUWA EXERCISED STRICT CONTROL OVER HIS AIRCRAFT AND RESTRICTED THEIR USE TO CLOSE SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES. ADEKUNLE HOWEVER HAD BEEN USING HIS AIRCRAFT TO ATTACK MILITARY TARGETS REPORTED BY HIS INTELLIGENCE. ARIKPO INTIMATED ADEKUNLE SINTELLIGENCE REPORTS NOT VERY GOOD, AND ADEKUNLE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW SHUWA'S PROCEDURES. ARIKPO EMPHASIZED THAT NAF OPERATIONS WOULD HENCEFORTH BE CLOSELY MONITORED FROM LAGOS.

4. RE ATTACK ON OZU ABAMA ADEKUNLE ADMITTED VILLAGE HAD BEEN DONE FEBRUARY 25, NOT ON FEBRUARY 26 DURING TRUCE PERIOD.

GP-4 MATHEWS

SECRET

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Authority (M) 956

By Mr. Ara Date (U)

0 3 4 8 4 OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT UNCLASSIFIED Classification 6 Mar 69 | 9 4 | 2 ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS INFO: Amembassy LONDON PARIS US MISSION GENEVA IISIIN CINCSTRIKE Amconsul IBADAN KADUNA SUBJECT: Nigeria Press Summary - March 6 NYTimes has twin stories by R.W. Apple, Jr. in Lagos and Lloyd Garrison in Umuahia under head bombing of Biafra also hurts Lagos regime. Apple writes: why do bombings go on? Why doesn't fed govt realize it only hurting own cause? In short, why doesn't someone do something? This tenor conversation Lagos among diplomats friendly military regime Gen. Gowon, among visitors from Europe, and US, among some middle-level govt officials. Succession bombing raids Biafran villages, culminating last Wednesday strike on hamlet Ozu-Abam in which more than 120 civilians killed, has been established as fact by reports  $\mathsf{from}_{\,\underline{i}\,}\mathsf{Biafra}$  by responsible witnesses. Almost no one in Lagos any longer questions that raids taking place almost every day.

UNCLASSIFIED Classification

Govt officials, while publicly denouncing reports as "wild exaggeration" and "Biafran propaganda," privately concede their validity. "There no way

continued, certain give regime bad name Washington and London--something it

of sweeping this under rug. Something is happening - from Nigerians' viewpoint, something very, very bad," said western diplomat. Raids, he

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By Whara Date VD 5 105

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### outgoing telegram Department of State

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ACTION: Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

Info

can ill afford--and may well convince Biafran rebels more than ever they would be exterminated if they agreed end secession. "To use old bureaucratic word, bombing women and children in Biafra is counterproductive," said diplomat. Nevertheless conviction persists many informed quarters that Gowon sincere when he says he has issued strict orders air force not strike civilian targets. Explaining apparent contradiction not easy.

3. Apple continues: take for example question who flies half dozen Ilyushin-28 bombers involved in raids. Nigerians insist pilots Nigerian, but no Nigerian known be qualified fly such aircraft. Evidence including on spot observation foreigners overwhelmingly indicates pilots Egyptians. Accepting that premise, several explanations suggest selves: Egyptians extraordinarily inept pilots who in months trying demolish airstrip between Uli and Ihiala have accomplished almost nothing. May also be disregarding orders, dropping bombs almost at random so they not be accused failure complete missions. It reported some pilots make habit jettisoning loads over sea. Nigerian generals, faced with shortage capable men and trying run country as well as army, navy, air force, exert little control over what happens in field. Command lines negated by personal rivalries, friendships. From technical viewpoint Nigerian air force—living in 1940. Bombs dropped by "eyeball" without electronic aid.

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		classification approved by:

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By Whara Date VD 10

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Origin

ACTION: Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

1-4-

No air-ground liaison, no reconnaissance, no debriefing pilots, inadequate radio. In theory NAF commander Col. Shittu Alao must give approval major strikes. In fact primitive communications Lagos to forward air bases Benin, Enugu, Harcourt, elsewhere often make this impossible. Govt has begun investigation raids on hospitals, market places, has hastily sent top information officers Britain and US try repair some of damage its reputation abroad. But seems unlikely strikes will cease any time soon. Ranking Nigerian official describing Egyptians as instructors rather than pilots, said: "We have to get help from somebody, so we can't afford anger Egyptians. Besides, if they say assigned targets have been hit, how do we check them?"

4. Garrison xxx says just what FMG hopes achieve with almost daily bombing Biafran civilians subject considerable puzzlement in Umuahia. If object to weaken Biafran morale, raids have had entirely opposite effect. Each new raid only stiffens will resist and reinforces already widespread conviction government headed by Gowon bent on genocide. Following three most recent raids Ohafia Street in Umuahia and markets of Eziama Mbano and Ozu-Abam, Garrison questioned scores survivors to test reactions. Typical sample: "Gowon's bombs kill plenty people, but no kill people's spirit." Such response may appear hackneyed, but reflects broadening belief this war for sheer survival, that if

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
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Origin

ACTION: Page 4 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

one not killed as soldier in trenches one will die as civilian from fragmentation bomb or if overrun from bullet in back. Emotional backlash from home front bombing has penetrated to firing line. During recent tour Owerri sector soldiers spoke with biting sarcasm of Egyptian pilots. Front line commanders frequently remarked how seldom they had been mm bombed or strafed. One possible explanation is Nigerians' apparent lack ground to air communications. To bomb at random suspected Biafran forward position means running very real risk hitting Nigerian troops by mistake.

END

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## Department of State

**TELEGRAM** 

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RAGE 01 LAGOS 01954 051413Z

ACTION AF 18

INFO URW 01, UCF1 03, SR 01, ORM 03, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, UPM 04, H 02,

INR 07.LI 032NSAE 00.NSC 10, P. 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12,

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P 051038Z MAR 69 FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS: TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5293: INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

CONFIL DENIT I A LILAGOS 1954

T. KOVEN ARTICLE PAGE 2 PARIS HERALD TRIBUNE MARCH 3 CONCERNING PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PARIS STATES INTER ALIA: ON BIAFRA FRENCH SAID THEY THOUGHT THEY DETECTED MOVEMENT TOWARD THEIR VIEWPOINT. AMERICANS WERE SAID TO BE LESS ATTACHED THAN BEFORE TO TREATING NIGERIA AS INDIVISIBLE STATE AND WILLING THINK OF PEACE GTE BETWEEN TWO SIDES UNGTE.

2. THIS AND OTHER SIMILAR STATEMENTS FROM FRENCH SOURCES ARELLIKELY CAUSE CONCERN WITHIN FMG. EMBASSY WILL APPRECIATE GUIDANCE ON LINE TO TAKE WITH FMG OFFICIALS.

GP-3

MATHEWS

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AGR	сом	FRB	FROM : Amembassy LAGOS DATE: MARCH 6	, 1969 file	
INT	LAB	TAR	SUBJECT: NIGERIA: International Observers: Status Report	u a caracia	
TR	ХМВ	AIR	REF : Lagos A-47, Jan 23, 1969; A-993, Dec 14, 1968; A-987	7, Dec 12, 1968	
ARMY	CIA	NAVY	Trans to T. 1	a nemont ¬	
OSD	20 USIA	NSA	While the International Observer Team as such has not issued since November 25, 1968, it continues to be active. A report	rt is currently	
34	10	3	I under preparation on a visit to the 3rd Division front from	rebruary 24-27.	
PASS A	STLIST		The Observers visited Elele, Ahoada, Uyo, Abak, Ikot Ekpene For "operational reasons" they were unable to visit Owerri	and Azumini.	
		ь	<del>-</del>	•	
			Brigadier Fergusson (UK) has reported to London that there is that the 16th Brigade is surrounded in Owerri and being supp He also reported that there was no indication of an advance who appeared to be fully occupied in containing rebel attack	plied by air.* by FMG troops,	
ડા			The team found the condition of the refugees they saw to be allegation made in the Canadian Parliament that male refugee and Port Harcourt had been massacred was investigated and for baseless.	es in Elele	
8 PH 2	While the team continues to be active, it has unquestionably been down-graded. Brigadier Fergusson has now returned to England and Lt. Col. D. J. Cairns has taken over as principal British observer. Another retired officer, Major I. A. Walsworth-Bell, is being appointed as his deputy.  Brigadier General Hamilton has, as previously reported, taken over from			d Lt. Col. Another	
SSS MAR				en over from has been	
.5.2			* The situation has since changed GROUP 3		
			Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.		
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recalled and succeeded by his assistant, Jensen. The only member of the OAU team currently in evidence is Captain O. Yilma (Ethiopia).

The FMG is reportedly unhappy about the downgrading on the theory that the reports of the observers will now carry less weight. This is particularly felt in the case of Jensen. Gussing was aware of this and has reportedly recommended to U Thant that a more senior representative be sent out should the situation warrant it.

Apart from the downgrading, the team itself seems to be working less harmoniously than it did in its initial stages. Some difficulty has arisen of late which Fergusson, in reports to London, attributed to "unfortunate agreements" made in the early days of the team--i.e., that the FMG was responsible for the safety of the observers and that the determination of what was safe rested with the division commanders.

This situation led to a near confrontation with Adekunle last month. A showdown was narrowly averted by Fergusson, according to his own account, when both the Swedish observer, Major General Raab, and the Canadian, Hamilton, wanted to charge ahead. (Fergusson: "My new Canadian colleague, alas, is not a patch on his predecessor. The most charitable view to be taken of the Swede is that he is feeling the heat!") Fergusson also reports that the Swedish and Polish observers have taken an intense dislike to one another.

Despite its problems, the team, along with the UN and OAU observers, is at least functioning. Gussing submitted his last report in January, and Jensen will presumably continue to work with the team and submit parallel reports. The same applies to the OAU observer(s).

Future reports will be forwarded as they are received. The forthcoming report of the team will probably cover the trip mentioned above plus visits to the 1st and 2nd Division areas. It will certainly temporize on the difficulties with Adekunle.

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL 715

PAGE: 01 LONDON: 01749 051656Z

47 ACTION AF( 18

INFO: EUR: 15. JPM: 04.NSC: 10.SPI 02.SS: 20.RSC 01.CIAE: 00.DODE: 00.INR 07.

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R: Ø5161ØZ MAR: 69 FM! AMEMBASSY LONDON: †O: SECSTATE: WASHDC: 9161 ₹NFO: AMEMBASSY LAGOS:

COUNTRI DE ENT I A LI LONDON 1749

SUBU & AZIKIWE

REF: LAGOS 1899- Pol 27 Beafra - Negeria Jr. Pol 7 Beafra

T. WEISHARE SKEPTICISM ABOUT REPORT THAT AZIKIWE IS: PLANNING TO RETURN LAGOS: SOON. WHEREVER ZIKES REALL SYMPATHES MAY LIELEXTENT TO WHICH HELCAN AFORD TO BE IDENTIFIED. WITH FMG IS: SHARPLY LIMITED BY FACT THAT ONE GENERAL SENDER OF HIS SONS IS IN BIAFRA. BOY. WAS WOUNDED IN FIGHTING LAST YEAR. EVACUATED FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT TO LIBREVILLE AND THEN RETURNED TO UMUAHIA. ZIKE HAS MADE SEVERAL UNAVAILING EFFORTS: TO PERSUADE OUUKWU THAT SON SHOULD BE EVACUATED TO EUROPE. UNLESS HELHAS FINALLY SUCCEEDED CAND NEITHER BRITISH NOR GURSELVES THINK HELHAS) AZIKIWE WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO RISK: BOY'S SAFETY BY PUBLICLY EMBRACING FMG.

2. TO BEST OF OUR (AND BRITS) KNOWLEDGE AWOLOWO AND AZIKIWE BID NOT MEET AT TIME OF COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE FMG HAS HOWEVER CONTACTED ZIK IN LONDON THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES AND MAY HAVE FOLD HIM THEY WOULD WELCOME HIM BACK. IF SO WE SUSPECT ZIKES RESPONSE WAS CORDIAL BUT NON-COMMITTAL CERTAINLY OUR OWN CONTACTS WITH AZIKIWE HAVE REVEALED NO INTEREST WHATEVER IN RETURNING. HE HAS BEEN COMPLETELY PREOCCUPIED WITH HIS BEEN COMPLETELY PREOCCUPIED WITH HIS RECENTLY RELEASED PEACE PLAN WHICH GIVEN ITS UNSYMPATHETIC RECENTLY REGENER WAS EVIDENTLY NOT DESIGNED TO PAVE HIS WAY BACK TO LAGOS. BRUCE

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By MM ARA Date 6 5 9

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AGR COM FRB	FROM : AmEmbassy DUBLIN DATE: March 4, 1969		
INT LAB TAR	SUBJECT: Letter to President from Nigeria Union of Ireland.		
TR XMB AIR	REF :		
ARMY CIA NAVY	\ <u>-</u>		
OSD USIA NSA	On February 28 the Charge d'Affaires a.i. received four Nigerian students, M. B. EKPANG, A. W. ETUK, John FIBERESIMA		
	and Jonathan MAGBADELO, representing the Nigeria Union of Ireland. According to Mr. Ekpang, President of the Union,		
	his organization represents the 80-100 Nigerians living in Ireland, nearly all of whom are students at universities in		
	this country.		
PM 7 58 PBR	Mr. Ekpang handed the Charge a letter addressed to the President of the United States (Enclosure No. 1), asking that it be transmitted to him. In the course of a conversation lasting about half an hour Mr. Ekpang and his companions emphasized that the United States and Nigeria have much in common, that the two countries have close and friendly relations, and that a united Nigeria is vital to the stability of Africa.		
969 MAR 11 PM COPYFLO-PBR	Mr. Ekpang said he was disturbed at press reports which indicated that there is considerable sympathy in the United States for Biafra and expressed concern that the United States was encouraging the Biafrans and thus prolonging the civil war.		
	After listening patiently to the Nigerians the Charge replied that the United States recognizes and deals only with the Federal Government in Lagos, that we hope that peace can be restored quickly to Nigeria, and that our only concern with Biafra and the Biafrans was a humaritarian one to relieve human suffering. He also noted that the Department		
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Clearances:	answerd by CA 1977 4/2		

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By MMARA Date W 5/05

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of State, in its capacity as the executive department charged with advising the President on matters of foreign policy, contains a number of senior officials with broad experience in Nigerian affairs. He said he would transmit the letter via the Department of State, and that the Nigeria Union could expect a reply in due course.

Following this conversation, during which he was present, the reporting officer also emphasized to the Nigerians that it is not the desire of the United States Government or people to intervene in Nigerian affairs but only to help alleviate the misery caused by the civil war. The reporting officer promised to send the Nigeria Union USIS releases relating to U.S. policy toward Nigeria. The reporting officer believes that the Nigerians were satisfied with their reception at the Embassy.

#### ACTION REQUESTED

The Embassy requests that the enclosed letter be transmitted to the appropriate officials in the Department, and that the Embassy be provided with a suitable reply which it can convey to the Nigeria Union of Ireland on behalf of the President.

Enclosure: As stated.

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By MWARA Date V 5 65

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 01898 041500Z

53 ACTION AF 18

INFO EUR 15,10 [3,CIAE 00,DODE 00,JPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,NSAE 00,

NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 20,USIA 12,SR 01,ORM 03,UPW 01,

SCS 04, SCA 01, AID 28, RSR 01, ACDA 16, /166 W

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P R 041200Z MAR 69

FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS

†O SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5264

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

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ÚSMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

ÁMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

ÚSUN NEW YORK 877

CONFIDENTIALILAGOS 1898

SUBJ: BOMBING OF CIVILIANS

REF: STATE 32362 AND PARAGRAPH 1, LAGOS DATT 083 MARCH 69

IN MEETING

ON OTHER MATTERS AT THIS REQUEST, PERMSEC.

EXTAFF THIS MORNING BROUGHT UP REPORTS OF NIGERIAN AIR

FORCE (NAF) BOMBING OF CIVILTANS IN REBEL TERRITORY. HE

SAID FMG POLICY AND INSTRUCTIONS TO NAF RULED OUT ATTACKS.

ON CIVILTANS. IF CIVILTANS AND NON-MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

WERE OCCASIONALLY BOMBED, THIS WAS: UNFORTUNATE

RESULT OF THEIR CLOSE PROXIMITY TO MILITARY TARGETS.

MOREOVER, PRESS REPORTS OF SUCH INCIDENTS WERE GREATLY

EXAGGERATED. FMG WAS, HOWEVER, CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION

AND REITERATING INSTRUCTIONS TO NAF.

2. I SAID POLICY AND INTENT OF FMG WAS NOT IN QUESTION. FACT WAS, HOWEVER, THAT CIVILIANS AND

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By MN ARA Date 0 5 95



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PAGE 02 LAGOS 01898 041500Z

NON-MILITARY INSTALLATIONS: WERE BEING BOMBED BY NAF.

THERE WERE MANY EYE WITNESS REPORTS OF SUCH INCIDENTS.

PMG: MUST IN ITS: OWN INTEREST STOP: INCIDENTS.

- 3. I COMMENTED! THAT I WOULD BE FRANK AND BLUNT AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT TRUTH! AS I SAW IT WAS THAT IT DIFFICULT FOR FMG. TO! CONTROL! MERCENARY PILOTS: WHOSE INTERESTS! IN NIGERIAN SITUATION MIGHT NOT PARALLEL! THOSE! OF: FMG. EYE WITNESSES! OF BOMBING! RAIDS NOTED THAT OBVIOUS MILITARY TARGETS! WITH! ANTI-AIRCRAFIT DEFENSES WERE AVOIDED! AND THAT UNDEFENDED! TARGETS WERE ATTACKED. MILITARY VALUE OF: SUCH AIR OPERATIONS WAS CERTAINLY OPEN TO QUESTION.
- # PERSEC WAS ATTENTIVE BUT UNHAPPY AS I MADE FOREGOING COMMENTS HE! DID NOT; HOWEVER, MAKE ANY REBUTTAL AND CONCLUDED DISCUSSION BY SAYING FMG GIVEING URGENT ATTENTION TO PROBLE •
- 5. I AM STILL PRESSING FOR EARLY APPOINTMENT WITH COMMISSIONER EXTAFF! WHO RETURNED MARCH 1.6 GP-3 MATHEWS

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 01899 041456Z

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NSAE 00.P 04.USIA 12.AID 28.PC 04.RSR 01./126 W

R Ø41215Z MAR 69 FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS FO AMEMBASSY LONDON INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 5263:

CONFIDENTIA LILAGOS 1899

SUBJECT: RETURN OF AZIKIWE

- T. JACOB AINA OF WEST AFRICAN PILOT, AZIKIWE'S OLD NEWSPAPER, HAS TOLD PAO AZIKIWE WILL! RETURN TO LAGOS BETWEEN MARCH 9 AND 15.
- 2. ACCORDING AINA, NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR SOME TIME. ZIK: IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE DEMANDED GUARANTEE OF SAFETY, RESTORATION OF PROPERTY AND ASSETS, AND RESPONSIBLE POSITION IN FMG.
- 3. AINA CLAIMS: ZIK AND: AWOLOWO MET IN LONDON DURING COMMONWEALTH: CONFERENCE: AND: THAT AWOLOWO PROFESSED! WILLINGNESS TO SERVE UNDER ZIK. AINA THINKS: IT POSSIBLE A SECOND VICE CHAIRMANSHIP: OF EXECUTIVE COUNTIL WILL BE CREATED.
- # COMMENT: ALTHOGH AINA HAS PROVIDED INFORMATION TO USIS HERE: FOR SEVERAL YEARS: AND IS CONSIDERED USUALLY RELIABLE: SOURCE; WE ARE VERY SKEPTICAL! OF FOREGOING REPORT. ACCORDING TO OTHER SOURCE; ZIK AND AWO DID NOT MEET IN LONDON HAS EMBASSY LONDON ANY COMMENT?

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By WMARA Date V 5 05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

## Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 KADUNA 00167 041708Z

53: ACTION AF: 18

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NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 20,USIA 12,UPW 01,MC 01,EUR 15,

AID 28.5R 01.0RM 03 RSR 01./162 W

103525

RI 041030Z MAR: 69 FM: AMCONSUL: KADUNA TO SECSTATE WASHDC: 1057 INFO: AMEMBASSY LAGOS: @INCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA UNN:

REF (A) KADUNA 121 (B) KADUNA 156 POL 27 BIAFRR-NIGERIA

T. SOURCE (REFLA) STATES THERE HAS BEEN SUN UP TO SUN DOWN ACTIVITY BY IL-28S ON CONTINUOUS SERIES BOMBING RUNS SINCE FEBRUARY 26 RIGHT THROUGH PERIOD OF ID-EL-KABIR CEASE FIRE. SAYS OPERATIONS HAVE EXHAUSTED ENTIRE NAF: BOMB SUPPLY OF 250 TONS AT PORT HARCOURT AS WELL AS SUPPLIES AT ENUGU/CALABAR. IN ADDITION PAIRS MIG 17S FLYING OUT OF KANO TO ENUGU PRECEDED BY DC-3 (NORMALLY NUMBERS AAN OR AAQ). BELIEVES MIGS BEING FUELED AND SUPPLIED IN FORWARD ARE BY DC-3. ALL AIRCRAFT RETURN KANO DAILY APPARENTLY FOR REFUELD RESUPPLY. JET PROVOST 3: IN CONTINUOUS ACTION FEBRUARY 24 TO MARCH 3. DAWN TO DUST BETWEEN PORT HARCOURT BENIN AND POSSIBLY ENUGU.

DET PROVOST NOW DUE RETURN KADUNA. SOURCE PRESUMES AIR-CRAFT DAMAGED OR UNSERVICEABLE OR BOTH.

2. ALGERIAN AN 17 (NO» 7 TWAD FORMERLY ON REGULAR MILK RUN TAMANASSET TO KANOZLAGOS REPLACED AS OF 25TH BY PLETS OF TABSO (BULGARIAN).

3. AERO - CONTRACTOR PILOT TOLD SOURCE NAFIHAD MADE FREE AID DROP AROUND OR IN OWERRI. DROP BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN AMMO WHICH REPORTEDLY EITHER UNRECOVERABLE OR UNSERVICEABLE AFTER DROP.

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By WNARA Date 05 105



CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE: 02 KADUNA 00167 041708Z

# NIGERIA AIRWAYS: VISCOUNT CREW TOLD SOURCE THEY SAW DC-4 COME INTO CALABAR: THREE TIMES DURING PERIOD (APPROX) FEBRUARY 25 TO 28 CARRYING 100 TROOPS EACH TIME.

S. INTERNATIONAL ARMS DEALER (FNU) LINDSAY OR LINDSEY, A. CANADIAN NATURALIZED SWISS, WITH OFFICES IN GENEVA AND WITH NAF STAFF LAGOS, REPORTED BY SOURCE TIBE OPERATING IN NIGERIA. SOURCE TERMED LINDSAY (INTERNATIONAL MR. FIXIT" PURPORTEDLY ABLE PROVIDE SPARE PARTS, ARMS, AMMO, MEN, ETC. SOURCE REPORTED MESSAGE FROM LINDSAY TO HIS GENEVA OFFICE REQUESTING LATTER TO OBTAIN JET PROVOST 3: PARTS FROM THREE J-P3\*S NOW BEING BROKEN UP IN RANGOON. ACCORDING SOURCE THREE NAF MERCENARIES (MICHAEL HUNT) MICHAEL THOMSETT. BOTH FORMER RAF - AND A THIRD, NAME UNKNOWN) ARE EMPLOYED BY LINDSAY. THESE MERCENARIES, SOURCE SAYS, ARE SPECIALISTS IN AIR TO GROUND ATTACK.

6. FURTHER TO DATT LAGOS BY MEMO. GP-1 STOKES

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

NICHARGE TO

SECRET POL 27BIAFRA NIGERIA

SECRET POL 27BIAFRA NIGERIA 4 Mar 69 17 17 z 2 ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS PRIORITY LIMDIS JOINT STATE/DEFENSE Subj: FMG Military Leadership 1. As part current contingency planning we must, of course, include possibility replacement Gowon should present military stalemate continue. If this should occur, past experience suggests successor might well be second echelon military man not readily identifiable. However, would appreciate Embassy/DATT assessment capability and potential support of current military leaders, both at headquarters and in field. Assessment should include Embassy/DATT judgment as to which officers might conceivably be chosen to succeed Gowon. 2. While appreciate above requirement could necessitate airgram response, request cable summary. AF/W:GBSherry Nigeria Task Force SECRET Classification FORM DS-322 and read pulsaried statement strains and second section.

APPROVED IN S 3/14/69

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

3457

DATE: March 4, 1969

TIME: 12:30 p.m. PLACE: Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: The ICRC Airlift (Part 3 of 3)

PARTICIPANTS:

Foreign

President Emile-Derlin Zinsou of Dahomey

H.E. Maxime-Leopold Zollner, Ambassador of Dahomey,

Mr. Virgile-Octave Tevoedjre, Minister Counselor Dahomean Embassy

<u>United States</u>

The Secretary

Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Mr. William E. Schaufele, Country Director, AFCW

Mr. Walter S. Clarke, Country Officer, Dahomey

COPIES TO:

s/s WH

AF-3

Amembassies:

COTONOU PARIS **GENEVA** 

S/P INR/OD

CTA AIDDOD

LAGOS

LOME

In the subsequent conversation, prior to the luncheon, President Zinsou discussed the problems which his decision to allow the ICRC to fly from Cotonou to Biafra has caused him. He said that the closing of the Nigerian border was well calculated to hurt him badly and that it was done clearly in retaliation for his position on the ICRC airlift. Because this had a direct effect upon the traders in Porto Novo, where President Zinsou noted he was "in the minority," there had already been rioting on the previous Saturday. He reiterated his intention to keep the airlift going and to remain firm in the face of any threat. The Secretary congratulated him on his courage and wished him well in facing his domestic problems.

CW: WSC wrke: km 3/6/69 (Drafting Office and Officer)

FORM DS - 1254

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### POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA Department of State TELEGRAN

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R: 041530Z MAR 69 FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2388 INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDDAN' AMEMBASSY COTONOU AMEMBASSY KINSHASA AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY NIAMEY AMEMBASSY PARIS: AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

CON FIT DENTI A LILIBREVILLE 219

SUBU NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENTS:

I • FRENCH AMBODELAUNEY TELLSOME THAT OCAM NIGERIAN INITIATIVE HAS NOT GOTTEN ANYWHERE I GATHERED THAT FMG NEITHER RESPONSIVE NOR INTERESTED IN OCAM PROPOSAL.

A DELAUNEY WENT ON NOTE BLAFRAM MILITARY SITUATION APPARENTLY TAKING MORE FAVORABLE TURN. SAID HE ASSUMED GENERAL DE GAULLE HAD DISCUSSED BLAFRA PRES NIXON AND EXPRESSED HOPE US WOULD LEND ITS SUPPORT EFFORTS BRING ABOUT NEGOTIATED SOLUTION CONFLICT.

RE INCREASED FRENCH PUBLIC INTEREST CONFLICT. SAID THAT TWO FRENCHOEPUTIES, MARETTE AND OFFROY (FORMER FRENCH AMB LAGOS) HAD LEFT LIBREVILLE FOR BLAFRA NIGHT MARCH 2 ON FACT FINDING MISSION. LATTER CONFLIRMED BY GABON MATIN TODAY. GPI3 BANE

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PAGE 01 LONDON 01725 041951Z

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R 041830Z MAR 69 PM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9153 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA AMEMBASSY LAGOS AMEMBASSY PARIS USMISSION GENEVA USUN NEW YORK 1607

CONFIL DEEN TIA LILONDON 1725

SUBJECT: NIGERIA: STEWART TALKS TO NIGERIAN HICOMER REGARDING BOMBINGS

T. FONSEC STEWART YESTERDAY (MARCH 3) CALLED IN NIGERIAN HICOMER! BY NIGERIAN AIR! FORCE CITING RECENT PRESS REPORTS FONSEC WARNED OGUNDIPE THAT FURTHER EVIDENCE OF INDISCRIMINATE BOMBINGS WOULD CREATE "GRAVE DIFFICULTIES" BOTH FOR BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND FOR MMG IN EYES OF WORLD OPINION STEWART SAID THAT HE KNEW THAT #MG.IN ETES OF WORLD OPINION STEWART SAID HAT HE NEW TRATAMENT FEDERAL MILITARY TARGETS BUT FEDERAL PILOTS WERE EVIDENTLY DISREGARDING POLICY OR WERE CARELESS IN MPLEMENTING IT. FONSEC ASSERTED THAT FMG SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO PREMENT FURTHER! INCIDENTS AND HE ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FINGEWOULD ISSUE PUBLIC STATEMENT SAYING THAT ACTION WAS BEING TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

OGUNDIPE REPLIED THAT NIGERIANS WERE "INDIGNANT" ABOUT WINSTON CHURCHILL S REPDRTS IN TIMES WHICH HE CLAIMED WERE ONESIDED AND INACCURATE. UMUAHIA WAS LEGITMATE TARGET AND FMG HAD WARNED BY RADTOLTHOSE LITVING IN TARGET AREAS TO MOVE AWAY. STEWART REPLIED.
THAT WHATEVER PRECAUTIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN IT WAS INDISPUTABLE.
THAT HOSPITALS WERE BING HIT AND CIVILIANS KILLED. OGUNDIPERS

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Authority WMD By MMARA Date



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PAGE 02 LONDON 01725 041951Z

REJOINDER! WAS THAT RED! CROSS MARKINGS WERE! SOMETIMES USED: BY
BIAFRANS TO DISGUIESE MILITARY TARGETS. HE DENIED! THAT FMG AIRCRAFT
HAD AT ANY TIME! DELIBERATELY BOMBED! BUILDINGS KNOWN TO BE HOSPITALS.
HICOMER SAID! THAT CRITICISM OF FEDERAL BOMBING POLICY WAS PART
OF MCONSPIRACY TO FORCE UK TO STOP! ARMS DELIVERY TO LAGOS.
HAVING FAILED IN THEIR CAMPAIGN TO CONVICT FMG OF GENDICIDE.
BIAFRANS WERE NOW ATTEMPTING TO AROUSE WORLD OPINION AGAINST
BOMBINGS.

3. STEWART SAID THAT IN ANY CASE FMG SHOULD DO ITS UTMOST

#0: AVOID INCIDENTS WHICH WOULD SUSTAIN BIAFRAN CHARGES. HE
RECOGNIZED THAT ULT WAS LEGITIMATE TARGET BUT WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT
MILITARY VALUE OF OTHER TARGETS HIT BY FMG. FONSEC RETTERATED.
VALUE OF PUBLIC STATEMENT BY NIGERIANS AND SAID THAT THIS WOULD
BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL TO HIM IN HANDLING PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS.
#10: SEEK ENTER BIAFRA TO INSPECT DAMAGE AND HORD FMG WOULD
NOT OBUECT. OGUNDIPE WAS DOUBTFUL HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD GO! ALONG
WITH THIS IDEA BUT AGREED TO RECOMMEND ITS ACCEPTANCE.

FONOFF: TELLSOUS THAT BRITISH HILCOMER HUNT SPOKE ALONG SAME LINES TO GOWON MARCH 3.

TIMES CORRESPONDENT CHURCHILLI MEANWHILE HAS RETURNED TO UK AND IS KEEPING ISSUE ALIVE WITH SERIES OF ARTICLES REPORTING HIS IMPRESSIONS OF CONFLICT FIRST ARTICLE YESTERDAY DESCRIBED!

BIAFRAN SUFFERING IN FAMILIAR TERMS AND REFERED! TO CIVIL WARLAS NONE OF GREATEST HUMAN TRAGEDIES IN RECENT YEARS. SECOND ABTICLE TODAY ATTRIBUTES MILITARY STALEMATE TO COMBINATION OF BIAFRAN COURAGE AND FEDERAL LACK OF ORGANIZATION. TEXT OF ARTICLES BEING POUCHED TO DEPT AND ADDRESSESS BRUCE

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Authority WN 05/5/3

By MMARA Date 05/05

0326 UTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT UNCLASSIFIED Classification Origin 3 Mar 69 21 32 z ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS INFO: Amembassy ADDIS ABABA Info LONDON PARIS USUN US MISSION GENEVA CINCSTRIKE Amconsul IBADAN KADŲNA SUBJECT? Nigeria Press Summary - March 3 1. NYTimes carries column by Graham Hovey, editorial board member recently returned from visit to both sides, under head "Unhappy Perspectives in Nigeria's Civil War." It fascinating experience spend two weeks in Nigeria followed by week in Biafra but it brings observer no closer to feasible solution 20-month-old civil war. May persuade him in fact that any conceivable earlier settlement would have been preferable to existing situation. If for example Biafra had been able defend its original area for year and demonstrate substantial support from Ibo minority, it would have earned independence. It then would have been what Radio Biafra still proclaims it to be: viable state of 29,000 square miles and population (perhaps) of 14 million, blessed with natural and human resources. In first year of war however Biafra lost capital Enugu, major outlets to sea Port Harcourt and Calabar, other major cities, most of its oil. Biafra today is landlocked enclave 4,000 square miles with tremendous population density. Enclave, food deficit area in good times, has few natural resources

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FORM DS-322

Draftad by:

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ACTION: Page 2 of telegram to Amembasy LAGOS

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other than two precariously held oil fields. Even 1.5 million Ibos, perhaps more, now back under Nigerian control, many under Ibo civilian administration, in refutation genocide charge hurled so recklessly at FMG. Biafra might be able hold out on present lines until international intervention forced ceasefire on Nigeria - clearly Ojukwu's real hope. But Biafra would remain unviable state, jammed with hungry people, surrounded by hostility. Cease-fire would be unlikely to last. Many Biafrans concede state would not be viable unless they regain Port Harcourt. They unlikely do this without foreign backing of dimensions that might deter even de Gaulle or most devout American supporters. Politically FMG could never agree transfer PH even to Ibo state agreed remain within federation, let alone independent Biafra. This would provoke revolt from considerable portion five million non-Ibos former eastern region that opposed secession and remained loyal Nigeria. No one knows how these minority groups, Ijamas, Ibibios, Efiks and rest, divided on secession. Ojukwu recently estimated 30 per cent had opposed break, but neutral foreign observer believes only 30 per cent so-called Rivers people favored secession, with proportion lower still Calabar area.

2. Hovey continues: at any rate govts based PH and Galabar beginning administer new Rivers and Southeast states of 12-state federation. These manned by former

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Info:

civil servants, professors, lawyers, businessmen who seem comparable men from those areas who chose serve Biafra. Many in these states harbor long-standing grievances against Ibo rule, describe atrocities comparable those charged by Biafrans, against Nigerians. Will be difficult turn clock back those areas. But if Biafra's prospects seem bleak, those federal Nigeria hardly rosy. After threatening overrun rest of Biafra last fall, fed forces bogged down four months. Long awaited "final push" has men not materialized and open criticism of army has mounted sharply. Gowon had hoped Biafra would face up situation and make invasion Ibo heartland unnecessary by agreement negotiate one Nigeria settlement. One of many underestimations by Lagos of Biafran determination. Wisest heads Lagos now know must finish war quickly or meet tidal wave international pressure for unconditional cease-fire which would mean Biafran victory. Have already seen USG waver under powerful political pressure fueled by compassion for starving children. If Biafra gets by with it, one of two developments likely: Gowon, ever a moderate whatever Biafrans may say, may be swept aside by xenophobic military group ready turn to Soviet Union. Or whole Nigeria structure may collapse in miasma hate, recrimination with profound repercussions elsewhere Africa. With passion for preserving and extending French influence, Charles de Gaulle, only effective neo-colonialist

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Sub-Saharan Africa, would doubtless rejoice at such a cataclysm. It difficult donclude either of these developments in Nigeria would serve any valid interests of US.

- 3. NYTimes carries Umuahia report dated March 2 of federal jet attack on town that day, second in week. Five persons killed, eight seriously wounded as plane dropped two bombs. One demolished several houses residential area, second started fires where railway crosses road leading from Queen Elizabeth hospital. Bombing today seventh in week. Others included Ozu-Abam market last Wednesday with more than 500 persons reported killed. Toll first Umuahia raid put at 45.
- 4. Wash Post carries similar report quoting Biafran official claim five killed and thirty critically wounded. In Lagos, Home Affairs minister Kam Salem said arrangements being made for new OAU committee meeting on civil war, said no date set for meeting chaired by Emperor.
- 5. Times has AP Lagos story on life is furtive for Ibos in Lagos despite federal assurance they find city hostile.
- 6. Balt Sun March 2 has two AP Lagos pieces on heavy burden debt repayment on Kainji Dam and roundup piece on Nigerian worries re US policy, which essentially old stuff.

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7. CS Monitor March 1 has Ranging David Winder piece from London rounding up Biafran hopes for world recognition, citing Commons discussion and Winston Churchill bombing reports London Times.

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R: 031540Z: MAR: 69 FM: AMCONSUL: IBADAN: TO SECSTATE WASHDC 772: INFO: AMEMBASSY LAGOS AMEMBASSY LONDON: AMCONSUL: KADUNA

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JOINT CONSULATE/USIS MESSAGE

SUBJECT: YORUBA REACTION PRESIDENT NIXON S MESSAGE TO GENERAL GOWON.

T. SEVERAL PROMINENT WESTERN YORUBAS HAVE COMMENTED FAVOURABLY ON PREDSIDENT'S MESSAGE TO GOWON REPORTED IN NIGERIAN PRESS FEB 24.

2.IN CONVERSATION WITH CONOFF MAR I, COL! OBASANDO, CO IBADAN
GARRISON, VOLUNTARILY BROUGHT UP! PRESPDENTES MESSAGE AND CONTASTED
HIS FAVORABLE REACTION WITH HIS DISMAY OVER US ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT
EIGHT RELIEF AIRCRAFT (IBADAN 759). HE SAID HIS FAITH IN AMERICA'S
NON-INVOLVEMENT NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR RESTORED AND HIS CONFIDENCE.
REGAINED IN USG ABILITY WITHSTAND EFFECTS WELL ORGANIZED REBELL
LOBBY OPERATING IN US. ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT MET DEAN FERGUSON WHEN
LATTER VISITED NIGERIA, HE HAD HEARD OF HIM AND THOUGHT PRESIDENT
HAD MADE A WISE DECISION APPOINT LAW PROFESSOR WITH SPECIFIC CHARGE
WHOT SEEK AND NOT ACCEPT CHARGE NEGOTIATE ISSUES OTHER
THAN THOSE DIRECTLY RELEVANT RELIEF. HE NOW CONVINCED GOOD
INTENTIONS USG WHEN IT SPOKE OF "HUMANITARIAN INTEREST" IN
NIGERIAN CONFLICT.

3. IN ANOTHER CONVERSATION WITH CONOFF MAR 2. OGIE ALAKAJA,

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MANAGER NIGER: WEST STEEL: CO. SPONTANEOUSLY PRAISED PRESIDENT NIXON FOR HIS MSTATESMAN LIKE LETTER TO GOWON HIS COMMENTS WERE SHARP CONTRAST TO HEATED DISCUSSION FEB 201 WITH CONOFF WHEN HE HIGHLY CRITICAL OF US ROLE IN NIGERIAN CONFLICT AND "INTERFERENCE" HUMANITARIAM ORGANIZATIONS" HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN GREAT DEAL: APPREHENSION IN NIGERIA DUE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT US POLICY UNDER NIXON ADMINISTRATION. THERE FEAR THAT REBELL LOBBY HAD GOTTEN TO OR TRADING ON FRIENDSHIP WITH MEMBERS NEW ADMINISTRATION AND AS CONSEQUENCE, USG POLICY WOULD BE MORE FAVORABLE TOWARDS REBELS NIXON STATEMENT HAD DISPELLED THESE FEARS AND ALLINIGERIANS NOW# RELITABLE PERSONAL ASSURANCE OF PRESIDENT THAT USG CONCERNED SOLELY IN HUMANITARIAN ANDNOT POLITICAL ASPECTS NIGERIAN CIVIL WARE HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT PROFESSOR FERGUSON WILL NOT FALL INTO TRAP OF BECOMING TOO CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH REBELL CAUSE BUT WILL GIVE HEQUAL TIME" TO RELIEF PROBLEMS ON FEDERAL SIDE OF BATTLE LINES . 4. BRAD WHITE HAS HEARD SIMILAR FAVORABLE COMMENTS FROM OTHERS INCLUDING COMMISSIONER LANDS AND HOUSING OMISADE AND RETIRED JUSTICE DOHERTY AND HIS WIFE PROMINENT LOCAL WOMENS S LEADER.

COMMENT: EVEN ALLOWING FORSOME TYPICAL YORUBA EXAGGERATION THERE NOHDTHPRESIDENT'S MESSAGE CLEARED AIR AND ALLAYED WORST SUSPICIONS NUMBER OF BASICALLY FRIENDLY YOURUBAS, I.E. THAT NEW ADMINISTRATION MOVING TOWARDS DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION "BIAFRA" ADMINISTRATION MOVING FOWARDS: DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION MBIAFRA "AND/OR MILITARY ASSISTANCE" THERE ALSO GREATER AWARENESS: OF PRESSURES: ON USG FROM WIDE RANGE HUMANITARIAN GROUPS. EVEN IN RESSURES: ON USG FROM WIDE RANGE HUMANITARIAN GROUPS. EVEN IN PRESSURES: ON USG FROM WIDE RANGE HUMANITARIAN GROUPS. EVEN IN PRESSURES: ON USG FROM WIDE THAT IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE PERMANENT OR WOSTILE ELEMENTS WILL NOT CONTINUE EFFORTS: SOW SUSPICION: OUR EFFORTS. BUT BELIEVE AT LEAST THERE IS AUTHORIATIVE POLICY STATEMENT, TO: WHICH: WE! AND OUR FRIENDS CAN REPAIR. STRONG

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RE 031540Z MAR 69 #MEAMCONSUL IBADAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 772: INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMCONSUL KADUNA

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JOINT CONSULATE/USIS MESSAGE

SUBJECT: YORUBA REACTION PRESIDENT NIXON'S MESSAGE TO GENERAL

T. SEVERAL PROMINENT WESTERN YORUBAS HAVE COMMENTED FAVOURABLY ON PREDSIDENT'S MESSAGE TO GOWON REPORTED IN NIGERIAN PRESS FEB 24.

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH CONOFF MAR I, COLLOBASANUO, COLLBADAN GARRISON, VOLUNTARILY BROUGHT UP PRESPOENT S MESSAGE AND CONTASTED HIS FAVORABLE REACTION WITH HIS DISMAY OVER US ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT EIGHT RELIEF AIRCRAFT (IBADAN 759). HE SAID HIS FAITH IN AMERICA'S NON-INVOLVEMENT NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR RESTORED AND HIS CONFIDENCE REGAINED IN USG ABILITY WITHSTAND EFFECTS WELL ORGANIZED REBELL LOBBY OPERATING IN US. ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT MET DEAN FERGUSON WHEN LATTER VISITED NIGERIA, HE HAD HEARD OF HIM AND THOUGHT PRESIDENT HAD MADE A WISE DECISION APPOINT LAW PROFESSOR WITH SPECIFIC CHARGE WONT SEEK AND OT ACCEPT CHARGE NEGOTIATE ISSUES OTHER THAN THOSE DIRECTLY RELEVANT RELIEF. HE NOW CONVINCED GOOD INTENTIONS USG WHEN IT SPOKE OF THUMANITARTAN INTEREST.

3. IN ANOTHER CONVERSATION WITH CONOFF MAR 2. OGIE ALAKAJA,

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## **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 IBADAN 00061 051337Z

MANAGER NIGER WEST STEEL CO. SPONTANEOUSLY PRAISED PRESIDENT
NIXON FOR HIS MSTATESMAN-LIKEW LETTER TO GOWO, THIS COMMENTS WERE
SHARP CONTRAST TO HEATED DISCUSSION FEB 201 WITH CONDET WHEN HE
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NIXON STATEMENT HAD DISPELLED THESE FEARS AND ALL NIGERIANS NOW#
RELIABLE PERSONAL ASSURANCE OF PRESIDENT THAT USG CONCERNED
SOLELY IN HUMANITARIAN AND OT POLITICAL ASPECTS NIGERIAN CIVIL!
WAR. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT PROFESSOR FERGUSON WILL NOT FALL INTO
TRAP OF BECOMING TOO CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH REBEL! CAUSE BUT WILL
GIVE MEQUAL TIME TO RELIEF PROBLEMS ON FEDERAL SIDE OF BATTLE

4. BRAD WHITE HAS HEARD SIMILAR FAVORABLE COMMENTS FROM OTHERS INCLUDING COMMISSIONER LANDS AND HOUSING OMISADE AND RETIRED JUSTICE DOMERTY AND HIS WIFE PROMINENT LOCAL WOMENS'S LEADER.

5. COMMENT: EVEN ALLOWING FORSOME TYPICALLYORUBA EXAGGERATION THERE NOHDT #PRESIDENT SOME SAGE CLEARED AIR AND ALLAYED WORST SUSPICIONS NUMBER OF BASICALLY FRIENDLY YOURUBAS, I.E. THAT NEW ADMINISTRATION MOVING TOWARDS: DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION "BIAFRA" AND OR MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THERE ALSO GREATER AWARENESS: OF PRESSURES: ON USG FROM WIDE RANGE HUMANITARIÁN GROUPS. EVEN IN RRESS: CRITICISM HAS SUBSIDED. THIS DOES NOT MEAN US POLICY FULLY UNDERSTOOD OR ACCEPTED, THAT IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE PERMANENT OR HOSTILE ELEMENTS WILL NOT CONTINUE EFFORTS: SOW SUSPICION OUR EFFORTS. BUT BELIEVE AT LEAST THERE IS AUTHORIATIVE POLICY STRONG

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FM: AMEMBASSY' LAGOS:
TO SECSTATE: WASHDC PRIORITY 5238
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AMEMBASSY PARIS:
AMEMBASSY PARIS:
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE:
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION ÜSUN NY
AMCONSUL: IBADAN;
AMCONSUL: IBADAN;
AMCONSUL: KADUNA.
CINCSTRIKE

UNCLAS LAGOS 1847

SUBUECT: - OUUKWU: STATEMENT ON: AMERICAN: QTE: PEACE INITIATIVE: UNQTE:

- T. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED PARTIAL TEXT (FBIS ITEM C261901) OF DUUKWU STATMENT APPARENTLY MADE ON FEB 26. AS CARRIED BY FARIS AFP IN ENGLISH.
- 2. WHEN ASKED WHAT BIAFRA DOING TO COUNTER FMG AIRSTRIKES, OUKWU REPORTEDLY SAID, OTE WE ARE SPENDING A LOT OF MONEY ON ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY. OUR PEOPLE ARE ALSO BUILDING TRENCHES UNGTE.

(2)

3. IN ANOTHER APPEAL! FOR QTE AN AMERICAN PEACE INITIATIVE UNGTED HE SAID, ACCORDING AFR, QTE THERE WERE THREE COUNTRIES -- FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES -- WHICH HAD INFLUENCE

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By MMARA Date 1/15/05




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PAGE: 02 LAGOS 01847 031256Z

ON MOST AFRICAN NATIONS - WHILE POSITION OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE WERE KNOWN - IT IS AMERICA! THAT IS CRITICAL. AND PEOPLE ARE WAITING TO SEE WHAT SHE WILL DO UNDTER HE SAID.

4. REGARDING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE, OUUKWU ALLEGEDLY SAID IF FMG WINS WARD RUSSIANS WILL BE IN NIGERIA TO STAY. MATHEWS

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### Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 00627 030914Z

Ž2 ACTION: AF: 18

INFO EUR 15, 10 13, CIAE: 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE: 00,

NSC 10,P: 04,RSC: 01,SP: 02,SS: 20,USIA 12,UPW 01,SR 01,ORM 03, ..

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PR 030845Z MAR 69
PM USMISSION GENEVA
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INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CONFILDENTIA LIGENEVA 627

SUBJECT: NIGERIA: BOMBING OF BIAFRAN CIVILIANS

REF GENEVA 625

T. IN RESPONSE ICRC REQUEST FOR RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING ICRC ACTION ON REPORTS FMG BOMBING CIVILIANS, LINDT (FROM BIAFRA) MARCH 2 URGED ICRC CABLE DIPLOMATIC PROTEST INCORPORATING REFERENCE TO REPORT OF BOMBINGS A CONFIRMED BY JAGGI, TO MINISTRY EXTERNAL AFFAIRS LAGOS WITH COPY TO NIGERIAN PERMREP GENEVA.

LINDT FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT MAKING OF PROTEST BE GIVEN PRESS PUBLICITY 24 HOURS AFTER NOTE SENT LAGOS.

2. FREYMOND HAS: INFORMED US ICRC WILL PROTEST BOMBING TO GOVERNMENT NIGERIA (PROBABLY MARCH 3) BUT WILL NOT REPEAT NOT MAKE ANY
FUBLIC STATEMENT. IN ADDITION CITING PRACTICAL PROBLEM VIS-A-VIS
FMG (REFTEL) FREYMOND ALLUDED TO ICRC POLICY OF NOT MAKING PUBLIC
FROTESTS. ICRC ALWAYS "CLOSELY WATCHED! BY ALL! SIDES IN ALL!
CONFLICTS: AND CANNOT BE PUT IN POSITION WHERE IT MIGHT PLAUSIBLY
BE CHARGED WITH PARTISANSHIP OR OF FOLLOWING "CONTRADICTORY"

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
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PAGE: 02 GENEVA 00627 030914Z

PUBLICITY POLICIES. FREYMOND: COMMENTED PUBLICITY GIVEN BY ICRC TO ICRC PROTEST TO FMG OVER FEBRUARY 5 BOMBING OF ICRC HOSPITAL (SEE GENEVA 46) WAS A "MISTAKE" (HE DID NOT SAY SO) BUT "MISTAKE" WAS MADE BY LINDT WHO AS ICRC "OUTSIDER" IS NOT AS SENSITIVE TO LONG-TERM ICRC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AS COMMITTEE. AND PERHAPS ESPECIALLY COMMITTEE VICE-PRESIDENT AND ACTING PRESIDENT FREYMOND).

3. ICRC HAS INFORMED LINDT ABOVE DECISION. TUBBY

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### Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LONDON 01671 031541Z

ACTION EUR 20

INFO AF 12. CIAE 00. DODE 00. JPM 04.H 02. INR 0. L 03. NSAE 00. NSC 10.

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R 0314572 MAR 69 ÉM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO SECSTATE WASHDE 9116

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON 1671

SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PROPOSED VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF MAURICE FOLEY

I. MAURICE FOLEY, PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE AT FONOFF, HAS MENTIONED TO US THAT HE IS CONSIDERING SHORT VISIT TO WASHINGTON LATER THIS MONTH FOLLOWING ANGLO-US PARLIA-MENTARIANS MEETING IN ST. CROIX. DATES HE HAS IN MIND ARE MARCH 25-28. FOLEY ALSO HOPES SPEND ONE OR TWO DAYS IN NEW YORK ENROUTE TO CANADA WHICH HE WILL ALSO BE VISITING BRIEFLY. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF VISIT WILL BE TO DISCUSS NIGERIAN SITUATION WITH US OFFICIALS, LEGISLATORS AND OTHER INFLUENTIAL.

2. AS DEPT KNOWS, FOLEY HAS INJECTED CONSIDERABLE ENERGY AND FLEXIBILITY INTO GOVT'S HANDLING OF AFRICAN PROBLEMS SINCE TAKING OVER FEW MONTHS AGO AS, IN EFFECT, FONOFF'S MINISTER FOR AFRICA. DEVOTING MOST OF HIS TIME TO NIGERIA, FOLEY HAS DONE MUCH TO CREATE BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF BRITISH POLICY IN PARLIAMENT AND PRESS, WHERE IT HAS BEEN MOST CRITICIZED. HE HAS MET SEVERAL TIMES OUTSIDE FONOFF WITH BIAFRAN REPS WHO PROBABLY DISTRUST OF THE PROBLEM OF HIM LESS THAN OTHER BRITISH OFFICIALS. FOLEY'S RESPONSIBILITY AND INTERESTS ARE NOT OF COURSE CONFINED TO NIGERIA. HE IS GOVT'S CHIEF SPOKESMAN IN HOUSE OF COMMONS ON AFRICAN PROBLEMS:
IN GENERAL'S INCLUDING RHODESIA, AND IS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN ALL BOLICY MATTERS AFFECTING AFRICA.

3. BRITISH EMBASSY WASHINGTON WILL BE APPROACHING DEPT SOON TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER PROPOSED DATES: ARE: CONVENIENT AND TO DISCUSS PROGRAM. FOLEY TELLS: US: HE: MENTIONED HIS PLANS TO SECRETARY IN

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on a language to great management retrained to the decident and the state of the management and the state of the

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# POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA Department of State TELEGRAM

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47 ACTION AF 18

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UNCLAS LAGOS: 2867

SUBJECT: - NIGERIANI PRESS ROUNDURS APRIL 2

1. ALLI PALERS: GIVEI BIG: PLAY TOLADVANCES: BY FEDERALI TROOPS. SKETCH: CALLS: IT GTE FINAL! ONSLAUGHT UNOTE. BIGGEST GAINS REPORTED! IN IST DIVISION AREA SOUTH OF OKIGIWI. TIMES SAYS: OTE FIRECE FIGHTING RAGING! ONLY IZ MILES FROM UMWAHIA UNOTE! AND ALSO \$LAIMS SRD DIVISION ATTACKING! AT VARIOUS: POINTS: ON SOUTHERN FROM:

2. MOST PAPERS REPORT THAT IN BROADCAST FROM REBELL RADIO

3. TRIBUNG: CARRIES LETTER FROM AWOLOWO DENTING RESPONSIBILITTY FOR RECENT EDITORIALS IN TRIBUNE CALLING FOR EARLY RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE AWOLOWO STATES IN LETTER THAT HE BELIEVES PRESENT MILITARY RULE SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL CIVIL

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WAR: SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED AND GTE UNTIL POLITICALI
NUTSANCE WHICH • • GAVE IT BIRTH BULLY ABATED UNGTE 
ALSO NOTES HE IS: GTE IRREVOCABLY COMMITTED TO FEDERAL!
POLITICS UNGTE AND HAS NO DESTRE AFTER BEING PREMIER OF 
WESTERN REGION TO GTE DESCEND FROM PEDESTAL UNGTE:
TO RULE WESTERN STATE • TRIBUNE ALSO COMMENTS EDITORIALLY 
THAT WHILE AWOLOWO FOUNDED RAPER 20 YEARS AGO HE IS 
NOT CONNECTED WITH ITS PRODUCTION OR RESPONSIBLE FOR 
OPINIONS EXPRESSED IN IT • PAPER RETTERATES STAND ON 
RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE BUT INSISTS QUE NO ONE ON!
THIS NEWSPAPER OR IN POLITICAL OFFICE UNGTE MATHEWS

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By MMARA Date 05/05

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### POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

# Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 00625 011438Z

54 ACTION: AF: 18

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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

CONFIDENTIALIGENEVA 625

SUBJECT: REPORTS OF BOMBING OF BIAFRAN CIVILIANS

REF STATE 32362 TIL

I. MESSAGE TO ICRC FROM JAGGI (ICRC REP BIAFRA) DATED FEB 26
SAID ICRC MUST REALIZE FROM MANY RECENT REPORTS TO YOUW THAT
TYPE OF AIR ATTACK IN BIAFRA ALMOST WITHOUT EXCEPTION AGAINST
MARKETPLACES: HOSPITALS: AND VILLAGES. ON FIRST DAY FMG TRUCE
(FEB 26) NIGERIAN AIRCRAFT AT IT AM ATTACKED MARKETPLACE AT

6ZU ABAM. 24 MILES EAST OF UMUAHIA. DROPPED SIX BOMBS. USED
CANNON FIRE. MARKET MILES FROM ANY MILITARY OBJECTIVE. WAS IN
MIULL SESSION! WITH 500 PEOPLE PRESENT, MOSTLY WOMEN. OVER HALF
DEAD OR WOUNDED. ICRC PERSONNEL! FROM ABIRIBA ON SITE TWO HOURS
(ATER. JAGGI WITH MEDICAL ADVISER AND ADMINISTRATIVE DELEGATE
ICRC HGTRS UNUAHIA ARRIVED 1830, AT WHICH TIME MANY BODIES.

Ž. JAGGI MESSAGE: TO ICRC: CONTINUES: THAT SUCH ATTACKS INNOCENT VICTIMS: "MUST BE CONDEMNED! VIGOROUSLY AND PROTESTED AGAINST. WE

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Authority WN 0 95 1503

By MMARA Date 0 5 105



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
PAGE 02 GENEVA 00625 011438Z

EXPECT YOUR IMMEDIATE AND UNCOMPROMISING ACTION.

3. ICRC: GENEVA CONVEYED! JAGGI MESSÄGE URGENTLY TO LINDT IN COTONOU: LINDT IN: BIAFRA TODAY.

4. FREYMOND (LICRC: ACTING PRESIDENT) SAYS AWAITING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM LINDIT. IN VIEW DELICATE ICRC-FMG SITUATION AND NEED CLOSE CONTINUED COOPERATION, FREYMOND PRESENTLY THINKS PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC APPROACH TO LAGOS MAY BE PREFERABLE TO PUBLIC STATEMENT. TUBBY

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 ABIDJA 00575 011318Z

ACTION AF: 18

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B Ø11050Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3675
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
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L'IMITED OFFICIAL USE ABIDUAN 0575

SUBJ: BIAFRAN ABIDJAN REPRESENTATIVE INTERVIEWED.

I. FRATERNITE-MATIN MARCH I PUBLISHED INTERVIEW WITH PETER C. CHIGBO, SPECIAL BIAFRAN REPRESENTATIVE IVORY COAST; IN WHICH, IN ADDITION ASSERTING UNITY ALL TRIBAL GROUPS BIAFRAN AREA AND: BIAFRA'S WILL HOLD ON UNTIL NIGERIA ABANDONS WAR, AND CITING PRINCIPAL BIAFRAN MILITARY HEROES, HE COMMENTED: ON POSSIBLE: AMERICAN ROLE IN ENDING CONFLICT.

2. ASKED ABOUT BIAFRAN REACTION APPOINTMENT FERGUSON AS SPECIAL:
ASSISTANT FOR AID WAR VICTIMS, CHIGBO REPLIED (UNESSENTIAL WORDS,
GMMITED): QUOTE: OUR PEOPLE BELIEVE: SO LONG AS BRITAIN AND RUSSIA
AIO NIGERIA LATTER: WILL! NEVER: END: MAR-BUT NOW AMERICA HAS BEGUN
ABSERVE A QUITE POSITIVE NEUTRALITY, HERE: IS: A HOPE. WORLD HAS!
NO MORALITY IN ITS ECONOMIC POLICIES AND AFRICA HAS NOW REALIZED
THIS IN OUR: STRUGGLE. IT IS JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION: WHICH: PUT
FORWARD "QUICK KILL POLICY. IT IS A POLICY WHICH WANTED ALL!
BIAFRANS KILLED: BEFORE! HELP: ARRIVED. THE: FACT THAT PRESIDENT NIXON
HAS: NAMED A PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATOR FOR AID: DESTINED TO WAR
VICTIMS: IS: STEP: ON RIGHT ROAD. PRESIDENT NIXON HAS: MOREOVER ALREADY

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By MARA Date V 5/05